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I. INTRODUCTION
In F. Scott Fitzgerald's The Great Gatsby,' the "blue and
gigantic eyes"' of Doctor T.J. Eckleburg stare out from a giant
advertising billboard situated on the road connecting Long
Island to the city of New York. The Jack Clayton film based on
the novel depicts the oculist's advertisement as a dilapidated
but arresting monument to mass marketing.' The eyes of Dr.
Eckelberg fix both Fitzgerald's characters and the film's
audience with an hypnotic glare. The advertisement's
psychological impact is most chillingly suggested at the turning
point in the narrative. Immediately before George Wilson
departs into the night, eventually to murder Gatsby, he is
portrayed staring at the advertisement, in a trance-like state.
He is mesmerized by it: "his face close to the window pane,
nodding into the twilight," repeating the phrase, "God sees
everything."'
Hardly an exemplar of rationality or free will, Wilson
does not have much in common with the liberal legal subject.
He does, however, have quite a lot in common with another
construction of the modern legal system: trademark law's
"ordinarily prudent consumer."' Just as Wilson seemed
overwhelmed by the Eckelburg advertisement, modern
their careful and insightful editing, and to Osborn Maledon and the University of Ari-
zona Law College Association for their continuing support of faculty research.
F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY (Scribner Paperback ed., 2003)
(1925) [hereinafter FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBYI.
2 Id. at 27.
3 For a discussion about the rise of mass marketing in the 1920s, see JULIET
B. SCHOR, THE OVERSPENT AMERICAN: UPSCALING, DOWNSHIFTING, AND THE NEW
CONSUMER 8 (1998) [hereinafter SCHOR, OVERSPENT AMERICAN] (describing the
changes in systems of production in the 1920s that "made possible an outpouring of
identical consumer goods that nearly everybody wanted - and were better able to
afford"). See also Lizabeth Cohen, Encountering the Mass Culture at the Grassroots:
The Experience of Chicago Workers in the 1920's, 41 AM. Q. 6 (1989) (discussing and
critiquing assumptions about the rise of mass marketing and a national consumer
culture in the 1920s) [hereinafter Cohen, Encountering the Mass Culture].
' "That's an advertisement,' Michaelis assured him. Something made him
turn away from the window and look back into the room. But Wilson stood there a long
time, his face close to the window pane, nodding into the twilight." FITZGERALD, THE
GREAT GATSBY, supra note 1, at 167-68.
5 Id.
6 I do not mean, of course, to suggest that trademark law's ordinarily
prudent consumers ordinarily commit murders. But see Oralandar Brand-Williams,
Frenzy Over New Nike Shoe Worries Parents: Too Few Air Jordans May Spur Violence,
DETROIT NEWS, March 7, 2001 (discussing the relationship between violence and newly
marketed cult brands for sports shoes), available at http://www.detnews.com/200l1
metro/0103/07/dOl-196466.htm.
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trademark law often seems to be premised on the idea that
consumers are mesmerized by brands and are incapable of very
much independent thought. Indeed, important aspects of
trademark doctrine render consumer thought largely irrelevant
to liability theories.' Modern trademark law understands the
"consumer" as somebody whose imagination has been
"burdened" by brands, and characterizes as "trademark
infringement" and/or "unfair competition" attempts by other
firms to unburden a consumer's imagination by expressing
different messages and offering different choices through a set
of similar or identical symbols.' The law assumes that the
ordinarily prudent consumer unthinkingly accepts the
messages trademark proprietors seek to enforce through their
branding strategies,' which as one leading jurist observed,
frequently involve well-orchestrated campaigns intended to
"burn" trademarks into our collective consciousness.' In much
trademark law, legally cognizable harm equates with damage
that rival traders might do to the "branded" consumer
worldview."
7 See infra Part IV.
This point is illustrated most clearly by the doctrine of initial interest
confusion, which characterizes acts by defendants that peak consumers' interest as
"infringement" even when any confusion is dissipated at the point of sale. Initial
interest confusion is discussed infra Part IV.B.2.
9 As I discuss in more detail infra Part V, these assumptions are belied by
important new trends in consumer marketing strategies, which apprehend the
consumer as far more actively involved in relationships with firms that are mediated
by trademarks and branding strategies. This perspective is also inconsistent with
postmodernist ideas that conceive of brands as constituent elements in the construction
of identity. Professor Rosemary Coombe, for example, has argued that trademarks
contribute to the dialogic construction of reality, whereby the subject is constantly
constructing herself through her engagements with artifacts of meaning that circulate
in society. See ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW (1998).
'0 Writing extra-judicially, Judge Alex Kozinski deftly deployed this
metaphor in his article, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960 (1993),
observing that "words and images do not worm their way into our discourse by
accident; they're generally thrust there by well-orchestrated campaigns intended to
burn them into our collective consciousness." Id. at 975.
" Cf ALISSA QUART, BRANDED: THE BUYING AND SELLING OF TEENAGERS
(2003) (elaborating on the metaphor of the "branded consumer" in a critical evaluation
of marketing aimed at teenagers). See also Bob Tedeschi, E-Commerce Report:
Consumer Products Companies Use Web Sites to Strengthen Ties with Customers, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 2003, at C6 (citing market analysts, who "say the sites are keeping
those visitors in place long enough to etch their logos in the consumers' consciousness,
to 'brand' them, in packaged foods parlance").
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Oddly, consumers appear to be getting smarter about
brands,"2 yet trademark rights continue to expand.'3 In
traditional trademark infringement cases, the core issue is
whether ordinarily prudent consumers would be confused in
some legally relevant way by the defendant's use of a contested
symbol." Finding that consumer confusion is "likely" is usually
12 See C.K. Prahalad & Venkatram Ramaswamy, Co-Opting Customer
Competence, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 79. See also Conor Dignam, Prosumer
Power: Communication Between Brands and Consumers Has Created the "Prosumer,"
MARKETING (U.K.), Mar. 14, 2002, at 24. Digman draws on the concept of the
"prosumer," a term coined in ALVIN TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK (1970), signaling the
breakdown in traditional divisions between consumers and producers. Contributing to
this phenomenon is the "greater brand literacy" of consumers. See Richard Cross &
Janet Smith, Retailers Move Toward New Customer Relationships, DIRECT MARKETING,
Dec. 1994, at 20 (noting that "[a]dvertising clutter has produced a nation of ad weary
and ad savvy buyers"). See also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48
EMORY L.J. 367, 373-420 (1999) [hereinafter Lunney, Monopolies]. The significance of
these themes for the present analysis is discussed infra Part IV.B.
13 See, e.g., SCHOR, OVERSPENT AMERICAN, supra note 3, at 37-38.
14 The principal legal basis for causes of action for infringement of federally
registered trademark rights is contained in Section 32 of Lanham Act, which provides:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant -
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering
for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered
mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or
advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such
use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive,
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter
provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not be entitled to
recover profits or damages unless the acts have been committed with
knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive.
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000).
The Lanham Act also creates, inter alia, a "federal cause of action for
traditional trademark infringement of unregistered marks." Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003). Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which -
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his
or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person,
or
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enough to enjoin a defendant from using a contested mark." It
also helps determine the scope of a trademark proprietor's
rights, by establishing that the defendant was doing something
that only the trademark proprietor was entitled to do." But if
consumers are becoming increasingly sophisticated, we might
anticipate that they are likely to be confused less often. As a
corollary, the scope of trademark proprietors' rights should
become more limited. The doctrinal position is, however, the
reverse: The stronger the plaintiffs brand, the more likely the
court will find legally cognizable consumer confusion.'7
One explanation for the expansion in trademark rights
is that over the last several decades trademark doctrine and
legislation have added new types of trademark infringement
that firms can invoke to protect the value that they have
established in their brands.'8 This Article concerns a different
and broader explanation: trademark law's understanding of the
"consumer." One of the unusual things about trademark
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her
or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or
is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
15 The meaning of "likelihood of confusion" is discussed in more detail infra
Part III.B. In trademark infringement cases, likelihood of confusion is usually enough
to enjoin a defendant's activities under the Lanham Act. An award of monetary
damages can require a showing of actual confusion. Res. Developers, Inc. v. Statute of
Liberty-Ellis Island Found., Inc., 926 F.2d 134, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1991). Use of the
plaintiffs mark "in commerce" is a prerequisite for liability for trademark infringement
under the Lanham Act. The Lanham Act defines "use in commerce" as "the bona fide
use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). Accordingly, if a
defendant uses the plaintiffs mark in a "'non-trademark' way - that is, in a way that
does not identify the source of a product - then trademark infringement and false
designation of origin laws do not apply." Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office
Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 695 (6th Cir. 2003). As is to be expected, courts have been
quite creative in fleshing out the concept of "use of a trademark." According to some
courts, trademark "use" includes preventing consumers from accessing a trademark
proprietors' website. See, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v.
Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2001); but compare Wells Fargo & Co. v.
WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 758-59 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
16 See generally Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 621 (2004).
17 See, e.g., Quality Inns Int'l v. McDonalds Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198 (D. Md.
1988) (weighing the strength of the "McDonald's" trademark heavily in favor of finding
infringement by use of"McSleep" for hotels).
"' See generally Beebe, supra note 16, at 624, 669. As Professor Beebe
suggests in his exhaustive analysis of the semiotics of trademark law, traditional,
economically-focused trademark analysis cannot account for newer understandings of
trademarks, whereby trademarks are produced, consumed, and given legal protection
as much for their status-signaling function as for their search- and quality-enhancing
functions.
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infringement cases is that liability most often depends on the
state of mind of none of the parties to the litigation. 9 As a
result, trademark law must always apprehend the consumer
worldview at a distance. Two aspects of trademark law's
understanding of the consumer are of particular interest here:
First, the "ordinarily prudent consumer,"" whose attitudes and
beliefs shape trademark rights, is largely a legal construct.
Like her cousin, tort law's "reasonable person," the "ordinarily
prudent consumer" is an amalgam of legal and policy
aspirations, commitments and beliefs, distilled over time as
doctrines emerge and legislators innovate. Whereas tort law's
reasonable person is recognized as an analytical tool,"
trademark law's ordinarily prudent consumer is a proxy for
real people - the actual consumers who might be confused by
the defendant's use of a contested symbol. Second, trademark
law constructs the consumer worldview in ways that minimize
the relevance of consumers' own independent thinking.
Trademark law's "ordinarily prudent consumer" is very often
less than prudent, exhibiting instead unthinking and irrational
responses to branding messages.
Both of the Supreme Court's 2003 trademark decisions
help illustrate these points. Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp.,22 which concerned consumers' ideas about the
"origin" of goods for the purposes of the Lanham Act, illustrates
how judicial assumptions about what consumers might think or
believe actually produce the characteristics of the consumer
worldview.' Mosely v. V Secret Catalog' illustrates how
trademark doctrine sometimes seeks to protect consumers from
thinking very hard about branding messages. The Court
characterized the "harm" in trademark dilution cases as uses of
trademarks that risk displacing consumers' "mental
19 Harvey S. Perlman, The Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition: A
Work in Progress, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 461, 466-67 (1990). For a discussion on the
relevance of the defendant's fault in trademark infringement litigation, see infra Part
II.B.
20 The status of the "ordinarily prudent consumer" in trademark
infringement analysis is discussed infra Part II.A.
21 See generally Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, Legal Phenomena,
Knowledge, and Theory: A Cautionary Tale of Hedgehogs and Foxes, 77 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 683, 683-88 (2002); Anita Bernstein, The Communities That Make Standards of
Care Possible, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 735 (2002); Hilary Allen, One Law for All
Reasonable Persons?, 16 INT'L J. SOC. L. 419 (1988).
22 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
23 See infra Part IV.
24 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
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impression" of senior users' marks.25 As will be suggested
below, the Supreme Court's analysis in V Secret was close to a
recent suggestion by the Seventh Circuit that trademark
dilution is a legal wrong because it imposes on consumers an
"imagination cost" from which they need to be protected.'
Because the scope of trademark rights frequently
depends on determinations about what "ordinarily prudent
consumers" think, 7 high stakes accompany trademark law's
understanding and construction of the consumer worldview.
Despite this, there is little academic commentary on the way
that the law has shaped this critically important element of
trademark doctrine. This Article seeks to begin filling that
void. To that end, my discussion of this topic proceeds as
follows. Part II outlines the traditional rationales for legal
protection of trademark rights and the critiques these
rationales have attracted. The orthodox justification for
protecting trademarks is that trademarks enhance the efficient
functioning of a competitive marketplace by ensuring that
consumers can either find goods from the same source as goods
they have enjoyed previously, or can find goods whose
reputation has been advanced through advertising. This
rationale for trademark protection is based on the idea that
trademarks reduce consumer search costs, and encourage firms
to at least control," and hopefully to enhance,29 the goodwill in
the goods and services they purvey. Another rationale for
trademark protection is concerned more obviously with
protecting firms from "misappropriation" of the value they have
built up in brands than with protecting consumers from
confusion. As Part II explains, neither rationale is
uncontroversial. The consumer search costs approach, with its
focus on the efficient expression of consumer preferences, deals
only awkwardly with the reality that production itself, and an
25 Id. at 434.
26 See Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002). See infra Part
IV.B.1.
" See infra Part III.
2 See El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392, 395 (2d
Cir. 1986) (observing that "actual quality of the goods is irrelevant; it is the control of
quality that a trademark holder is entitled to maintain").
29 For an example, see the comments of Judge Newman in Nitro Leisure
Prods. v. Acushnet Co., 341 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003): "[11n an ever more complex
commercial economy, it is increasingly important to preserve standards of quality and
confidence. Trademark law carries this burden.... The role of the trademark is its
assurance of quality, and its value depends on the consistent quality of the product
that bears the mark." Id. at 1369-70 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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accompanying - and incessant - promotion of brands create
consumer preferences, even as the protection of trademarks
ensures that consumers are able to express those preferences.
Similarly, the misappropriation rationale avoids the key
question it seeks to answer: As many commentators point out,
this rationale fails to identify a cogent reason for rewarding
firms with property rights based on their investment in and
promotion of brands. However, the critiques of these rationales
are themselves problematic. Critiques of the consumer search
costs model, even if sound, provide no obvious basis for
calibrating trademark rights in the light of the insights they
offer; critiques of the misappropriation approach may be too
much at odds with the realpolitiks of modern trademark law to
be very useful.
Part III identifies and discusses the "inchoate
empiricism" of modern trademark law. Trademark law is
certainly interested in "real-life" consumers as they engage in
various marketplace activities - shopping, browsing on the
World Wide Web, confronting goods in post-sale contexts, and
so on. For the most part, however, trademark law does not get
to know consumers from empirically ascertained "fact.""
Survey evidence, which provides empirical data about the
likelihood that consumers would be confused by the defendant's
conduct," carries weight in trademark infringement cases
relatively infrequently. 2  Included in Part III is an
impressionistic survey of trademark infringement cases over
the last decade, which discloses that in about half the litigated
cases, litigants offered no survey evidence to the court or, if
they did, courts accorded it little weight. In the majority of
cases, accordingly, the conclusion that a defendant's conduct is
likely to confuse consumers flows from judicial speculations
and assumptions about what consumers believe. Courts conjure
the ordinarily prudent consumer out of circumstantial
30 See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent
Distinctiveness of Product Design Trade Dress, 75 N.C. L. REV. 471, 485-88 (1997)
(advocating for a greater role for empirical analysis in trademark litigation).
31 Though empirical in character, survey evidence is sometimes characterized
as "circumstantial evidence," to distinguish it from direct evidence, such as testimony
from members of the buying public. See, e.g., PBX Enters. v. Audio Fidelity Entes., 818
F.2d 266, 271 (2d Cir. 1987). In this article I distinguish between "empirical" evidence,
which includes survey evidence, and "circumstantial" evidence, which means the
analysis of the various "likelihood of confusion factors" that is typical of trademark
infringement cases. See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961). The factor analysis is discussed infra Part III.B.
32 See infra Part III.A.
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evidence, usually by analysis of various "factors," which they
invoke to determine whether consumer confusion is likely.33 The
final section of Part III notes some of the ways that policy,
doctrinal, and constitutional concerns affect the law's
cognizance of consumer confusion in a variety of contexts.
Part IV elaborates on the argument that much of
modern trademark law can be understood as a continually
unfolding process of the legal construction of the "ordinarily
prudent consumer." As Dastar indicates, and the survey of
cases in Part III confirms, the worldview of the ordinarily
prudent consumer is frequently based upon judicial
assumptions. Most important for present purposes, however, is
how it is constructed. As John Dewey said long ago, an
underlying theory of the legal person is implicit in much legal
activity; he also observed that one of the tasks of legal theory is
to "make explicit what is implied."' Part IV begins the task of
interrogating the cluster of ideas that lie beneath the surface of
trademark doctrine that help construct trademark's consumer.
We can make explicit what is implied about the consumer by
teasing out legal actors' ideas about what will harm consumers,
what consumers care about, and what their value systems
comprise. Furthermore, evidence of the normative construction
of trademark law's consumer can be found in many strands of
trademark doctrine: the idea that having to "think harder" is a
burden; the rationalization of post-sale confusion on the basis
that consumers need to be protected in their investment in
prestigious brands;" the idea that "harm" occurs when
shoppers' interest is piqued by the wrong brand, even if the
confusion is dissipated before any purchase is made;" and the
presumption that consumers will be confused by unlicensed
promotional goods.37 Even assumptions about how astute
consumers are, their capacities to detect differences in marks,
their expectations about how readily firms "bridge" market
gaps, and so on, are critical to the scope of trademark rights.
Much of this doctrine minimizes the relevance of consumer
thinking and discrimination. Even if consumers were more
3 See infra Part III.B.
John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35
YALE L.J. 655, 660 (1926).
35 Hermes Int'l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104 (2d Cir.
2000). See infra Part III.B.1.
36 See infra Part IV.B.2.
37 See infra Part IV.C.
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discerning than is often assumed, trademark doctrine
frequently renders such discernment irrelevant to the analysis.
The subtitle of one of the best-selling books on
advertising of recent years, Positioning, by Al Ries and Jack
Trout,' is "The Battle for Your Mind." It may be possible to see
the "battle" for consumers' minds differently, and to use the
normative character of the consumer worldview in trademark
law as a springboard for critical evaluation of the ideas,
assumptions, and prejudices that inform the construction of the
ordinarily prudent consumer. Part V explores an alternative
vision of the consumer, one that is informed by values such as
self-determination and agency - or as John Stuart Mill put it,
"the human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative
feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference."9 I draw on
two quite different sources for ideas about how to imagine an
alternative "consumer." First, I consider part of the history of
consumer movements in the United States. This history reveals
numerous examples of American consumers exhibiting quite
sophisticated attitudes towards branded products and services
and using their purchasing power in a highly deliberative
manner. Inspired by the kind of "politicized consumerism" that
has frequently characterized American marketplace activity,
judicial construction of the "ordinarily prudent consumer"
might be more consistent with values of self-awareness,
deliberation, agency, and free exercise of choice - values that
correspond with the ideals of liberal capitalism that trademark
law is meant to serve. Second, I examine the way that
marketing professionals currently think about consumers.
Once again, we see signs that, even as marketing professionals
still seek to produce the kind of unthinking responses to brands
that much trademark law assumes occurs, many actually think
of consumers as quite smart and highly discriminating in their
interactions with firms and their marketing endeavors.
Part V concludes with a preliminary exploration of the
implications for trademark law of this "re-imagined" consumer.
Inevitably, in trademark law, as in so much other legal
activity, there will be a dynamic tension between the "real" and
u AL RIES & JACK TROUT, POSITIONING: THE BATTLE FOR YOUR MIND (2000).
The cover of the book claims that there are 1.2 million copies in print.
39 John S. Mill, On Liberty, reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART
MILL 252 (M. Cohen ed. 1981).
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the "constructed" legal person." One lesson of the current
project is that, so long as perceptions of consumers remain
relevant to the scope of trademark rigts, we need to
disaggregate actual and assumed characteristics of the
consumer worldview. Our understanding of how "real" minds
work, through insights such as those provided by cognitive
science, is enhancing apace." Trademark law should perhaps be
more receptive to the insights of cognitive science. However,
where empirical evidence about consumer responses is absent,
legal actors should also scrutinize more carefully the
implications of the kind of consumer they construct.
It will be for others to determine whether the re-
imagining of the consumer in trademark law presented here
offers a preferable vision. For now, it may be enough to
identify differences between this re-imagined consumer and the
"ordinarily prudent consumer" who currently peoples
trademark jurisprudence. Even if "re-imagining" the consumer
in this way offers only awareness of the constructed character
of trademark's consumer, and a different set of characteristics
from which to draw when legal actors envisage what the
"ordinarily prudent consumer" might be like, that may be
sufficient. Choice, after all, is a large part of what trademark
law is meant to be about.
II. MARKETS AND MORALITY
Current debates about the purposes of trademark law
seem to be at an impasse, which is one of the reasons that
focusing on the construction of the consumer in trademark
doctrine itself might be a more helpful way to think through
40 See generally Ngaire Naffine, Who Are Law's Persons? From Cheshire Cats
to Responsible Subjects, 66 MOD. L. REV. 346 (2003); Note, What Do We Talk About
When We Talk About Persons: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 114 HARv. L. REV. 1745
(2001). For an exploration of similar themes in economic literature - the tension
between normative and positive theories of consumer behavior, Richard H. Thaler,
Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 269
(Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
41 See generally STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE,
AND MIND (2001); WALTER J. FREEMAN, How BRAINS MAKE UP THEIR MINDS (2000);
STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE (2002).
42 Aware that this analysis risks essentializing a particular version of human
nature, I believe nonetheless that trademark law's current construction of the
consumer already involves a more problematic form of essentializing, which derives
general - and often dispositive - principles in a manner that is "disdainful of human
experience and empirical fact." See Martha C. Nussbaum, The Use and Abuse of
Philosophy in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1627, 1628 (1993).
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some of the normative issues that trademark law concerns.
This focus avoids directly engaging with the far grander
theoretical controversies that feature in much contemporary
trademark commentary, controversies that offer little prospect
of useful resolution.
A. Trademarks and the Efficient Functioning of Consumer
Markets
Trademark law is "troubling. 3 in part because of the
lack of consensus about what protecting trademarks is meant
to achieve. Identifying the purposes of trademark law, and then
tethering trademark rights to those purposes, has been a
perennial concern in trademark jurisprudence." Judge Learned
Hand once warned that "[wie are nearly sure to go astray...
as soon as we lose sight of [trademark law's] underlying
principle,"45 which for him was preventing consumer confusion.
Judge Hand's concerns echoed, and more elegantly refashioned,
similar expressions of anxiety from earlier times.4' Much recent
commentary on trademark law returns to the question of
identifying rationales for trademark rights.47  Many
43 Cf. Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759
(1990) [hereinafter Carter, Trouble with Trademark].
For an excellent intellectual history of trademark law, which traces the
interplay between the various rationales for imposing liability, see Daniel M. McClure,
Trademarks and Competition: The Recent History, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1996, at 13.
45 S.C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 116 F.2d 427, 429 (2d Cir. 1940), quoted in
Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising in the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade
Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1184. As Professor Mark Lemley observes, for Professor
Brown, the wisdom of trademark doctrine was to be measured by how well it hews to
the purpose identified by Learned Hand in Johnson. Mark Lemley, The Modern
Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1688-89 (1999).
46 Courts were concerned with constraining trademark rights from at least
the middle of the nineteenth century. For instance, in an 1849 case, Judge Duer of the
New York Superior Court cautioned that the power to restrain trademark infringement
was "not to be exercised so as to involve a violation of the principles upon which it is
founded." Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Spear, 2 Sand. 599, 606 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849). The
Supreme Court characterized this case as "leading" in Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tennessee
Mfg. Co., 138 U.S. 537 (1891):
We quote thus at length, because the decision is a leading one, which has
been repeatedly referred to and approved as presenting the philosophy of the
law applicable to trade-marks in a clear and satisfactory manner, as should
also, indeed, be said of Judge Duer's noted opinion in the case therein cited.
Id. at 546-47 (quoting Amoskeag Manufacturing and Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13
Wall) 311, 322 (1870) (citing Judge Duer's language from Amoskeag Manufacturing)).
47 Professor McCarthy has observed that trademarks serve a "number of
important functions," including: helping identify one seller's goods and distinguish
them from goods sold by others; designating the source from which all goods bearing
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contemporary critics argue that the continued expansion of
trademark rights thwarts the fundamental principles upon
which the trademark system is based, and that legislative and
judicial protectionism should be rigorously curbed. 8
Instrumentalist rationales tend to dominate modern
trademark discourse. Modern trademark jurisprudence
emphasizes the deleterious effects on the functioning of
consumer markets49 caused by trademark infringement or
passing off." Originally,"' however, the action for trademark
the mark come or are which are controlled by a single source; serving a "quality
function," indicating that all goods bearing the marks are of an equal level or quality;
and an "advertising function," by promoting and assisting in sales. J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, McCARTHY'S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 444 (2d ed.
1995). This is not the same, however, as identifying compelling reasons why society
might wish to have the law protect traders in the tasks they have identified for
trademarks. Put another way, that firms have identified functions for trademarks that
they find helpful does not fully explain why from a societal perspective those functions
might warrant legal protection. For a recent attempt to describe, and limit, the scope of
trademark rights in terms of a "purposive" approach, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The
Rational Limits of Trademark Law, in U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY
(Hansen ed., 2002) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, Rational Limits].
48 See, e.g., Dinwoodie, Rational Limits, supra note 47 (reaffirming "the
classic avoidance of consumer confusion rationale"); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with
Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717 (1999)
[hereinafter Litman, Breakfast With Batman]; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive
Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
397, 397-98 (1990) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity]; Carter, Trouble with
Trademark, supra note 43; Lemley, supra note 45; Lunney, Monopolies, supra note 12.
See also COOMBE, supra note 9.
49 See, e.g., Blinded Veterans Ass'n v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d1035, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting that to succeed in a passing off action, the plaintiff
must prove that consumer confusion is the "likely effect" of the defendant's actions)
(original emphasis).
60 On the history of consumer markets in the United States, see WILLIAM
LEACH, LAND OF DESIRE (1993); SUSAN STRASSER, SATISFACTION GUARANTEED (1989);
JULIANN SIVULKA, SOAP SEX AND CIGARETTES: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN
ADVERTISING (1998); DANIEL HOROWITZ, THE MORALITY OF SPENDING: ATTITUDES
TOWARD THE CONSUMER SOCIETY IN AMERICA, 1875-1940 (1985); LIZBETH COHEN, A
CONSUMERS' REPUBLIC (2003).
51 The origins of trademark law are conventionally traced to the seventeenth
century English decision Southern v. How that referred to an earlier decision in which
action for deceit was maintained where one clothier sold his cloth as that of another.(1618) Popham 143. The earlier case was identified by legal historians, J.H. Baker and
S.F.C. Milsom, as J.G. v. Samford. J.H. BAKER & S.F.C. MILSOM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH
LEGAL HISTORY: PRIVATE LAW TO 1750, 615-8 (1986). See also C.D.G. PICKERING, TRADE
MARKS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 2 n.8 (1998) [hereinafter PICKERING, TRADEMARKS]. In
the nineteenth century, English judges relied on Southern v. How to establish the
antiquity of their jurisdiction over trademark piracy. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Hill, 2
Atkyns 484 (1742), where Hardwick L.C. invoked the case as authority for the
proposition that affixing a mark "with fraudulent design" was a legal wrong, but
declined to issue an injunction on the specific facts because the plaintiffs mark was
designed to enforce an unlawful monopoly. A detailed history of trademarks was
provided by Frank Schecther, who traced the affixation of trademarks by trade guilds
as a way of both controlling monopoly power and as a way of identifying the source of
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infringement protected traders only against deliberate fraud by
the junior user.2 But by the middle of the nineteenth century,
the English Chancery Courts had tempered their earlier
insistence on a showing of fraud, 3 and held that "a remedy was
allowed in Equity even in the absence of any fraudulent intent
on the part [of] the defendant."' United States case law in the
nineteenth century closely paralleled the English
developments. Though American courts initially required
showing of a "fraud on the plaintiff,"5 by the latter half of the
century state and federal courts began adopting the view that
defendants' fraudulent intention could be inferred from their
actions.5 In the early decades of the twentieth century, the
goods and services of inadequate quality. As Schechter recounts, the history of
trademark law involves a transformation of trademarks from a liability to an asset.
Trademarks were initially regulatory, to the extent that they facilitated the
punishment of guild members responsible for poor quality craftsmanship. See FRANK I.
SCHECHTER, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS (1925).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 cmt. b (1995) ("The purpose of such
compulsory marking was primarily regulatory since the marks fixed responsibility for
defective merchandise and facilitated enforcement of the territorial monopolies enjoyed
by the guilds.").
52 The Chancery Courts originally distinguished between frauds on the
plaintiff, for which relief would be granted, and a fraud on the public, for which Equity
would not intervene, "a fraud upon the public being no ground for coming to Chancery."
Webster v. Webster, 3 Swan. 490, noted in Clark v. Freeman, 11 Beav. 112 (1848). On
the application by an eminent physician, Sir James Clark, no injunction was issued
against a "quack, who was advertising largely and selling 'Sir James Clark's
Consumption Pills,' on the ground that no damage accrued to the plaintiff." Id.
At Common Law, the approach to the issue of the defendant's fault was
often subtle than that of the Chancery Courts, possibly because the latter were merely
enforcing property rights whose definition was the responsibility of common law
judges. The tension between the more robust approach of the Chancery and that of the
Common Law Courts was adumbrated by the Master of the Rolls, Lord Langdale in
Perry v. Truefitt, 6 Beav. 66, 73 (1842). Referring to the rule in Millington v. Fox, 3
Myl. & Cr. 338 (1838), that the "deception need not be intentional," Lord Longdale
observed, "I am not aware that any previous case carried the principal (sic) to that
extent." See also Addley Bourne v. Swan, 20 R.P.C. 105, 117 (1902) (fraud is not an
element of the tort).
PICKERING, TRADEMARKS, supra note 51, at 2 (citing Millington v. Fox, 3
Myl. & Cr. 338, 352 (1838) (granting an injunction in the absence of a finding of
fraud)). Even so, in the mid-19th century, writs in cases at common law still recited
that the defendant's imitative mark was affixed "wrongfully, knowingly and
fraudulently." See, e.g., Crawshay v. Thompson, 4 Man. & G. 357, 384 (1842) (Justice
Creswell quoting terms of the writ). Professors Handler and Pickett regard this as the
only reported case in which the evidence of fraud was insufficient. Milton Handler &
Charles Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names - An Analysis and Synthesis: 11, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 759, 769 n.47 (1930).
55 See, e.g., Thomson v. Winchester, 36 Mass. 214, 217 (1837) (holding there
was no valid cause of action without a showing of fraud); Marsh v. Billings, 61 Mass.
322 (1851) (same).
6 See, e.g., Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Spear, 2 Sand. 599, 607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1849): ("[Alffixing to his own goods . . . the name or style of another person . . . is,
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Supreme Court also came to characterize the "essence of the
wrong" in a trademark infringement case as simply "sale of the
goods of one manufacturer or vendor for those of another.""
Trademark proprietors were to be afforded redress, the Court
reasoned, "upon the ground that a party has a valuable interest
in the goodwill of his trade or business, and in the trademarks
adopted to maintain and extend it."5
This rationale sees the purpose of trademark rights as
merely" to protect a firm's goodwill." Trademarks are not
generally speaking, conclusive evidence of a fraudulent intent[.]"). See also Lawrence
Mfg., 138 U.S. 537, 549 (1891) (1891) (holding that fraudulent intent is to be inferred
from defendant's actions). Some courts distinguished between cases involving
duplication of the plaintiffs mark and more general cases of unfair competition,
involving the appropriation of other kinds of indicia of origin, such as trade names. The
latter class of case required actual fraud, whereas in cases of the former type, fraud
could be assumed. For a detailed discussion of the distinction between ordinary
trademark cases and broader unfair competition principles, see Milton Handler &
Charles Pickett, Trade-marks and Trade Names - An Analysis and Synthesis: 1, 30
COLUM. L. REV 168, 169 (1930). By 1938, the Supreme Court had affirmed that the
facts supporting a trademark infringement action and those supporting a claim on
broader unfair competition grounds were substantially the same. See Armstrong Paint
& Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 325 (1938).
57 Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412-13 (1916) (citations
omitted). The eviscerated role of fraudulent intention as a separate requirement for
liability was succinctly captured in Lawrence Manufacturing, 138 U.S. at 549 (holding
that wrongful use of a trademark "is of itself evidence that the party intended to
defraud, and to palm off his goods as another's") (citations omitted). See also Elgin
Nat'l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665 (1901):
If a plaintiff has the absolute right to the use of a particular words or words
as a trademark, then if an infringement is shown, the wrongful or fraudulent
intent is presumed, and although allowed to be rebutted in exemption of
damages, the further violation of the right of property will nevertheless be
restrained.
Id. at 674. See also McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1877) ("Positive proof of
fraudulent intent is not required where the proof of infringement is clear, as the
liability of the infringer arises from the fact that he is enabled, through the
unwarranted use of the trade-mark, to sell a simulated article as and for the one which
is genuine."). See also Blinded Veterans Ass'n v. Blinded Am. Veterans Found., 872
F.2d 1035, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting that there is no necessity for the plaintiff in a
passing off action to prove intent on the part of the passer off).58 Hanover Star Milling, 240 U.S. at 412.
'9 Goodwill, a notoriously elusive concept, means, inter alia, the "expectancy
of continued patronage" that can be achieved when consumers can identify goods and
services as coming from the same source as those previously enjoyed. J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:18 (4th ed.
1996) [hereinafter MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS]. Judge Learned Hand defined the
concept of "good will" as follows:
[I]t includes not only the likelihood that customers will return to the old place
of business, but also that they will continue to do business with the old name.
Whether this is because they assume that the quality of the service or the
honesty of the management will continue; or whether because of the mere
inertia of past habit - like the 'good-will' which results from advertising - we
need not inquire. However acquired, our law recognizes the competitive
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themselves the subject of property except in connection with an
existing business.' This perspective resists characterizing
trademarks as rights "in gross,""1 and it is broadly consistent
with a number of traditional doctrinal commitments and
legislative constraints, such as forfeitures of rights following
both naked licensing of trademarks62 and assignments of marks
advantage that this disposition gives to the successor of an established
business, and treats it as 'property.'
Mutual Life Insurance v. Menin, 115 F.2d 975, 977 (2d. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313
U.S. 578 (1941).
60 See, e.g., United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918)
(stating that a trademark "is merely a convenient means for facilitating the protection
of one's good-will in trade by placing a distinguishing mark or symbol - a commercial
signature - upon the merchandise or the package in which it is sold"). See also Canal
Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311 (1872):
No one can claim protection for the exclusive use of a trade-mark or trade-
name which would practically give him a monopoly in the sale of any goods
other than those produced or made by himself. If he could, the public would
be injured rather than protected, for competition would be destroyed.
Id. at 323.
61 See United Drug Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918). The Court identified "the
fundamental error" of:
supposing that a trade-mark right is a right in gross or at large, like a
statutory copyright or a patent for an invention, to either of which, in truth,
it has little or no analogy. There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark
except as a right appurtenant to an established business or trade in
connection with which the mark is employed. The law of trade-marks is but a
part of the broader law of unfair competition[.]
Id. at 97 (citations omitted).
62 United States courts initially considered property rights in a trademark to
be incompatible with trademark licensing. See, e.g., Macmahan Pharmacal Co. v.
Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468, 475 (8th Cir. 1901) (reasoning that "[ain
assignment or license without [a transfer of the business] is totally inconsistent with
the theory upon which the value of a trade-mark depends"). Venerable authority
continues to support the view that "naked licensing" and assignments without goodwill
effected abandonment of the trademark. See, e.g., Dawn Donut Dawn Donut Co. v.
Hart's Food Stores, Inc. 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959):
[U]nless the licensor exercises supervision and control over the operations of
its licensees the risk that the public will be unwittingly deceived will be
increased and this is precisely what the Act is in part designed to prevent.
Clearly the only effective way to protect the public where a trademark is used
by licensees is to place on the licensor the affirmative duty of policing in a
reasonable manner the activities of his licensees.
Id. at 367 (citation omitted). See also Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care-USA,
Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 435 (7th Cir. 1989) ("The owner of a trademark has a duty to ensure
the consistency of the trademarked good or service. If he does not fulfill this duty, he
forfeits the trademark."). These controls have not deterred the practice of trademark
licensing; by the end of the 1980s, there were an estimated $50 billion worth of licensed
consumer goods being sold in stores. NEIL J. WILKOF, TRADE MARK LICENSING 1 (1995)
(quoting Breyer, Sublicensing Intellectual Property Rights in the United States, THE
LICENSING JOURNAL, 1989, at 4). The extent to which legal requirements relating to
quality control actually inhibit trademark licensing will be a reflection of the rigor with
which contractual terms providing for control will be policed and scrutinized.
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without the goodwill of a business.6' The theory is also
consistent with principles establishing priority of trademark
rights based on use of the mark rather than mere adoption.
Trademarks became increasingly important vehicles for
expressing consumer choices as the distance between
consumers and producers grew. When consumers started to
purchase "goods made by unknown hands,"65 and interacted
less with the actual producers or merchants," they needed to
rely more on indicia of origin as guarantees of quality and as
means to express their purchasing choices. 7 The doctrinal
emphasis on objective marketplace effects helped establish the
"consumer search costs"' rationale as the principal basis for
See, e.g., Clark & Freeman Corp. v. Heartland Co. Ltd., 811 F. Supp. 137,139 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Warner-Lambert Pharm. Co. v. General Foods Corp., 164 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 532 (T.T.A.B. 1970). The ability of trademark proprietors to assign their
trademark without the transfer of the business is now addressed at international law.Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
art. 21, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
33 I.L.M. 1197, 1205 (1994).
These principles have recently been tempered by the "intent to use"
system, ushered in by the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667,
102 Stat. 3935 (1988), amending the Lanham Act. Under the intent to use system,
priority of trademark rights can be achieved through filing documentation confirming abona fide intention to use a mark. The rights in the trademark are perfected on actual
use. See Lanham Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(2) (2000) (requiring the applicant for
registration to state "the date of the applicant's first use of the mark" and 'the date of
the applicant's first use of the mark in commerce").
65 WESLEY CLAIR MITCHELL, BUSINESS CYCLES 21 (1913), quoted in WILLIAM
LEACH, LAND OF DESIRE 7 (1993). See also STRASSER, supra note 50, at 15-16. In
American colonies, this sense of distance between consumer and producer occurred
earlier than in England, where, as recent historical research reveals, 18th century
store keepers whose inventory comprised many goods from local artisans. The 18th
century American colonies were, however, much more dependent on goods from
England, and there developed active trading networks, whereby locally produced goods,
such as tobacco, were exchanged for English imports. See generally CAROLE SHAMMAS,
THE PRE-INDUSTRIAL CONSUMER IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 225-60, 266-85 (1990).
While the 1920s are commonly identified with the rise of mass-marketing,
with an accompanying rise in the purchase of nationally branded goods, this should not
be overstated. Lizabeth Cohen's study of merchandizing in Chicago in the 1920s
reveals, for example, that working class people continued to engage in 'face to face"
commerce to a significant degree, allowing them to carefully scrutinize the actual
quality of goods, and to maintain strong relationships (often revolving around theprovision of credit) with local merchants. See Cohen, Encountering the Mass Culture,
supra note 3.
67 As is discussed infra Part V.B, however, the phenomenon of privatebranding is beginning to reassert the power of the retailer over the customer that was
displaced in the early decades of the twentieth century by the rise of national brands.
See also Mathew Boyle, Brand Killers, FORTUNE, Aug. 11, 2003, at 89.
68 Professor Landes and Judge Posner developed a formal economic model
showing the total costs of goods to consumers as the sum of the nominal price and the
cost to the consumer of gaining information about the source or quality of a product.
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
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protecting trademarks . 6  According to this analytical model,
trademarks help lower the search costs to consumers of looking
for goods they have enjoyed previously (or in whose reputation
they are confident), enable consumers accurately to express
marketplace preferences for goods from a particular source, °
and encourage firms to build up their goodwill.7' On a number
of occasions, the Supreme Court has endorsed the view that
protecting trademarks enhances competition.72 Among circuit
Perspective, 30 J. LAW & ECON. 265, 285 (1987). According to this model, the total cost
of a product to the consumer is inversely related to the reliability and ease of obtaining
this information. For trademarks to enable consumers to find goods and services
efficiently, it must be cheaper to search for the trademark than ascertain the quality of
the goods by more direct means. Consumers are prepared to bear an "information cost"
for the information trademarks provide: the premiums charged for branded goods are
cheaper than the costs a search would be without the trademarks. See also William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP.
267 (1988); Carter, Trouble with Trademark, supra note 43, at 761 ("Successful
trademarks are valuable because of the information that they convey."). In many
important consumer markets, however, consumers may be paying more than once for
the new kinds of information brands provide. Supermarkets and modern fast-food
restaurants, for example, are, monuments to "cost externalization." Certainly brands
help consumers find products, but prior to the rise of self-service retailing, consumers
did far less work than they do today locating the goods. Similarly, the rise in fast-food
restaurants, and the intense branding campaigns associated with them coincided with
a reduction in the degree of personalized retailing service. See JAMES B. TWITCHELL,
LEAD US INTO TEMPTATION: THE TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN MATERIALISM 92 (2000)
(suggesting that consumers "pay twice: once for the ad and once for the product"); id. at
125 (discussing cost externalization in supermarkets). For discussion on the rise of
supermarkets in the 1930s, see STRASSER, supra note 50, at 249, and COHEN, supra
note 50, at 257-89.
69 See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64
(1995) (observing that a trademark "'reduce[s] the customer's costs of shopping and
making purchasing decisions,' for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer
that this item - the item with this mark - is made by the same producer as other
similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past") (citation omitted).
70 The "source" of goods with which trademark law is concerned is not
necessarily the physical source of goods. Instead, U.S. trademark law adopted the
.single anonymous source" doctrine, whereby "the purchaser of goods bearing a given
label believes that what he buys emanated from the source, whatever its name or
place, from which goods bearing that label have always been derived." Manhattan
Shirt Co. v. Sarnoff-Irving Hat Stores Inc., 164 A. 246, 250 (Del. Ch. 1933), affd, 180 A.
928 (Del. 1934).
71 Federal trademark law thus addresses "the dual purposes of infringement
law: ensuring that owners of trademarks can benefit from the goodwill associated with
their marks and that consumers can distinguish among competing producers." Thane
Int'l Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002).
72 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 n.14 (1982)
(observing that "blatant trademark infringement inhibits competition... [because] the
infringer deprives the owner of the goodwill which he spent energy, time, and money to
obtain" and "deprives consumers of their ability to distinguish the goods of competing
manufacturers"). In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992), the
Court reasoned that:
Protection of trade dress, no less than of trademarks, serves the [Lanham]
Act's purpose to secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business
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courts, this rationale has perhaps received its firmest
endorsement from the Seventh Circuit, which has
characterized the reduction in consumer search costs as
trademark law's "fundamental purpose.3
B. Morality and Property
The search costs rationale has never succeeded in
suppressing a different rationale that is concerned less with
objective marketplace effects and more with issues of
commercial morality. Somewhat ironically, while the fortunes
and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing
producers. National protection of trademarks is desirable, Congress
concluded, because trademarks foster competition and the maintenance of
quality by securing to the producer the benefits of good reputation.
Id. at 774 (quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198
(1985) and citing S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at 3-5 (1946)). See also Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163-
64 (endorsing the search costs rationale).
73 Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7thCir. 2002). The Seventh Circuit
echoed earlier elaborations of the search costs rationale, observing:
Confusingly similar marks make consumers' task in searching for products
harder. The similar mark also dilutes the hostage value of the first, because
the firm that created the mark may lose business on account of the inferior
products of its rival, while the rival may not lose as much business as its own
quality dictates because customers mistakenly blame the first firm for the
failings of the second. As marks become less useful for identification, search,
and hostage purposes, firms invest less in them and consumers suffer.
Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1430 (7th Cir. 1985), cert denied,
475 U.S. 1147 (1986). See also W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir.
1985):
The purpose is to reduce the cost of information to consumers by making it
easy for them to identify the products or producers with which they have had
either good experiences, so that they want to keep buying the product (or
buying from the producer), or bad experiences, so that they want to avoid the
product or the producer in the future.
Id. at 338. The Second Circuit recently acknowledged the "search costs" rationale in
Brennan's Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurant, L.L.C., 360 F.3d 125, 132 (2004). Judge Leval
articulated a similar rationale in U.S. Shoe Corp. v. Brown Group, Inc., 740 F. Supp.
196 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 923 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1990):
In general, the law disfavors the grant of exclusive monopoly rights.
Exceptions exist, however, where the grant of monopoly rights results in
substantial benefits to society. Because of the benefits to society resulting
from the ability easily to recognize the goods or services of a purveyor or
manufacturer, the trademark law grants the exclusive right to employ an
identifying mark. A reciprocal benefit results. The merchant is thereby
permitted to profit from a well earned reputation; the public is thereby
enabled to choose the products produced by those who have satisfied them in
the past, avoid those that have disappointed and recognize an unknown
quantity as exactly that. The benefits are great, and because potential
identifying marks exist in virtually inexhaustible supply, the cost of the
monopoly to society is minimal.
740 F. Supp. at 198.
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of the discrete tort of "misappropriation" are probably waning,"
quite an energized impulse to prevent firms from reaping
where they have not sown" seems to animate trademark and
unfair competition law.76 Despite the instrumentalist emphasis
on "search costs," courts also rationalize imposing liability for
trademark infringement on general principles of commercial
morality,77 basing their analyses on broad unfair competition
14 See Richard A. Posner, Essay, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 HOUSTON L.
REV. 621, 621 (2003) (noting that misappropriation doctrine "is of uncertain but
diminished scope," and arguing that the doctrine should be jettisoned in intellectual
property law) [hereinafter Posner, Misappropriation]; Diane Leenheer Zimmerman,
Fitting Publicity Rights into Intellectual Property and Free Speech Theory: Sam, You
Made the Pants Too Long!, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 283, 295 (2000).
The Supreme Court endorsed the "misappropriation tort," albeit in the narrow context
of time sensitive, "hot" news in Int'l News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215
(1918). Though the Court has never overturned this decision, lower courts have often
distinguished the case, to the extent that it is probably now confined to its precise
facts. See, e.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert.
denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930); Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d
Cir. 1997). See also McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 2003) (observing
that "[r]ecent cases ... in recognition of the nebulousness of misappropriation doctrine,
place tight limitations on it"). For a discussion of the broader relevance of the
"restitutionary" focus of intellectual property law, see generally Wendy Gordon, On
Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L.
REV. 149 (1992) [hereinafter Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse].
75 See generally Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 74.
76 For example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that the
marketing of a statuette known as the "Star Award," infringed the "Oscar" trademark,
which it closely resembled. Acad. of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Creative
House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1991). The Court reasoned, "[Wihen
one party knowingly adopts a mark similar to another's, reviewing courts presume that
the defendant will accomplish its purpose, and that the public will be deceived." Id. at
1456 (citations omitted). While other factors pointed toward likelihood of confusion, the
finding of intention allowed the Circuit Court to overturn the District Court's finding
that the marketing of the defendant's statuette was likely only to give rise to an
"association" between the "Oscar" and the defendant's statuette. Characterizing this
approach as "unduly strict," the Ninth Circuit used the factor of "intention" to pave the
way to a new factual confusion, that consumers were likely to be "confused." See Best
& Co. v. Miller, 167 F.2d 374, 377 (2d Cir. 1948) (observing in dicta that, "[i]f the
defendant selects a trade-mark or trade name similar to the plaintiffs with intent to
palm off his wares as those of the plaintiff, proof of his intent may be strong evidence
of, and in proper circumstances establish, the likelihood of confusion").
71 Inhibiting "free riding" even plays an important role in traditional
likelihood of confusion analysis. Like any assessment of the likelihood of a future
event, analysis of "likelihood of confusion" is often a highly speculative endeavor, and
often involves a large measure of opinion. One Circuit Judge has observed that
recourse to the "factors" that are relevant to assessing likelihood of confusion means
that "[t]o reach a principled conclusion in a trademark case, it is just as essential to
recite the right formulas as it was for Ali Baba to say "Open Sesame" in order to open
the door to the treasure cave of the Forty Thieves." Centaur Communications, Ltd. v.
A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1219 (2d Cir. 1987) (Cardamone, J.). This
comment prompted the following response from Judge Sprizzo in a concurring opinion:
I do not share the view that a proper analysis of th[e] factors can or should be
properly characterized as a recital of "the right formulas" akin to Ali Baba's
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concepts . 8 A related development is that trademarks are often,
and increasingly, conceptualized as property in their own
right," allowing trademark proprietors to borrow from the
rhetoric associated with the enforcement of property rights in
other intellectual property contexts.
The defendant's intention to pass off its goods as those
of the plaintiff is often invoked" to help determine whether
doing so is unlawful. Where the right in the mark is clear, as is
the case with the right to affix a mark to the same goods with
respect to which the goodwill has been established, the
intention can usually be assumed." Where the scope of the
magical incantation "Open Sesame," nor do I believe that a proper resolution
of future cases raising these issues will be aided or enhanced by encouraging
district court judges to perceive their function in the mechanistic fashion
which that language suggests.
Id. at 1230 (Sprizzo, J., concurring). Beyond a particularly egregious case of trademark
counterfeiting, the most courts can do in very many cases is speculate as to whether
consumers would actually be confused in a way that materially raises the cost of
search.
Courts are often concerned with whether the defendant deliberately acted
to pass off its goods as those of the plaintiff. But, according to the "search costs"
rationale, it should not matter whether the defendant intended the results achieved.
The key analytical issue is whether the defendant's activity has the effect of making
consumer searches for goods more costly. However, given the speculative nature of the
inquiry, it is not surprising that the defendant's intention, whose formation is past
"fact" to be objectively ascertained, weighs quite heavily in the analysis. It may,
however, be possible to rationalize this on an economic basis. If the defendant knows
that he or she deliberately tried to pass off goods as those of the senior user, the
defendant may be in the better position to take steps to prevent this from occurring.
See Landes & Posner, supra note 68, at 279-84. However, even this rationale is
problematic, on the basis that firms are meant to compete with each other, and
competitive activity is, of course, likely to be more efficient if deliberate rather than
accidental. The rationale equates intentionally competitive activity with intentionally
infringing activity, in a manner that continues to beg the question of identifying and
characterizing activity as infringing.
78 See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918)
(observing that trademark infringement cases are a part of broader law of unfair
competition).
79 See generally Lunney, Monopolies, supra note 12. The dual purposes of
trademark rights - to protect both consumers and business interests - were mentioned
by Congress in the course of the passage of the Lanham Act. 92 Cong. Rec. 7524 (1946)
(observing that the purpose of the Act was 'to protect legitimate business and
consumers of the country").
Some analysis is more consistent with earlier approaches and can be found
in the case law, however. See, e.g., Int'l Bancorp v. Societe Des Bains De Mer Et Du
Cercle Des Etrangers A Monaco, 192 F. Supp. 2d 467 (E.D. Va. 2002) (finding bad faith
established though literal copying of the plaintiffs mark); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover
Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 927-28 (10th Cir. 1986) (departing from District Court's
decision that the defendant did not intend to pass off its goods as the plaintiffs, and
holding that intention may be inferred from similarity of goods).
" See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149 (9th
Cir. 1963):
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right is less clear, however, such as in cases involving similar
marks or similar goods to those in which the plaintiff has
established goodwill, the defendant's intention will often be
relevant, even "crucial,"82 to determining the defendant's
liability and thus the scope of the plaintiffs rights.'
Trademark law's concern with prohibiting
misappropriation of the value in a mark is also consistent with
the modern marketing reality that brand value is often only
partially captured by its "core" functional purpose of
symbolizing a firm's goodwill.' Today, the suggestion that
trademark law "deals merely with symbols that identify the
source of a product and distinguish that product from others,"'
has become increasingly misleading.' There is much in modern
trademark law that the search costs rationale does not
We cannot conclude but that [the defendant] deliberately adopted the name
knowing that Black & White was the name and trademark of [the plaintiff]
and they must have done so with some purpose in mind. The only possible
purpose could have been to capitalize upon the popularity of the name
chosen. This popularity, they must have known, would extend to their
product because the public would associate the name Black & White with
something old and reliable and meritorious in the way of an alcoholic
beverage.
Id. at 157. See also Interstellar Starship Services, Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 184 F.3d 1107,
1111 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Adopting a designation with knowledge of its trademark status
permits a presumption of intent to deceive.") (citing Brookfield Communications, Inc. v.
W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1059 (1999)).
82 See, e.g., Washington Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Authorities, Inc.,
33 F. Supp. 2d 488, 500 (E.D. Va. 1999) (describing defendant's intent in adopting the
allegedly infringing mark as a "crucial" factor).
See generally Acad. of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Creative House
Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1991).
84 Cf Sport Supply Group v. Columbia Casualty Co., 335 F.3d 453, 462 (5th
Cir. 2003) (reasoning that because "a trademark is a form of property," "trademark
infringement would appear to be a form of misappropriation of another person's
property (his trademark)," thereby appearing to subsume even conventional trademark
infringement within the concept of misappropriation) (citations omitted).
85 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to
Trademark Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 611, 614 (1999) (emphasis added). Professor
Dinwoodie has written eloquently and compellingly on the wide range of purposes
served by trademark law in modern economies. See, e.g., Dinwoodie, Rational Limits,
supra note 47. The limited understanding of the purposes of trademark law finds
support in judicial dicta, however. See, e.g., Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566
(9th Cir. 1968) (articulating "the traditionally accepted premise that the only legally
relevant function of a trademark is to impart information as to the source or
sponsorship of the product") (emphasis added).
m See generally Beebe, supra note 16. Of course, it depends on what one
understands by "symbols that identify source." It may well be true that some, or even
most, consumers recognize trademarks as designators of source and value the marks in
their own right, and to say that they value trademarked goods as "property" is probably
as helpful as any metaphor. Perhaps a more accurate way of putting the critique is to
suggest that trademark law still protects brands even if they are not, or not principally
valued, by consumers for their source designating function.
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explain;" indeed, today, product differentiation is only a small
part of the work done by brands in the modern marketplace.'
Consumers often value trademarks for their own sake, and the
incessant promotion of brands blurs the dividing line between
the trademark and the goods themselves.' They have also
become mechanisms for consumers' communication with each
other, as much as they are mechanisms for firms to
communicate with consumers." Angela Chao and Juliet Schor's
empirical work on the communicative effects of cosmetic brands
establishes, for instance, that the greatest premium is paid for
branded goods used in public, whose prestige other people can
see, such as lipsticks." In the cosmetics market, consumers are
87 The search costs rationale was elaborated in the context of a dispute as to
the potential anti-competitive effects of trademarks as they have been traditionally
conceived: as symbols of the source of goods or services. The modern origin of the idea
that trademarks are conducive of economic monopoly comes from EDWARD
CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1935). Chamberlin
argued:
mhe protection of trade-marks from infringement and of business men
generally from the imitation of their products . . . is the protection of
monopoly. To permit such infringements and imitation would be to purify
competition by eliminating monopoly elements .... For if the goods were
perfectly standardized, buyers would have no basis for discrimination; one
producer could secure no larger volume of sales than another and hence no
larger profits .... They are due to the dissimilarity, not the similarity of the
goods, hence to the monopolistic, not the competitive, elements.
Id. at 204-05 app. E. See also Brown, supra note 45. For a discussion on the eventual
dominance of the contrary view, urged by the Chicago School, that trademarks serve
the interests of free competition, see McClure, supra note 44, at 22-38 (tracing the
influence of "Chicago School" economic rationales for trademark law on the
development of trademark doctrine). See also PICKERING, TRADEMARKS, supra note 51,
at 71-95.
Kevin L. Keller et al., Three Questions You Need to Ask about Your Brand,
HARV. Bus. REV., Sep. 2002, at 80 (contesting the conventional wisdom that says
creating a brand is about differentiating products"). For an exhaustive analysis of this
point, see Beebe, supra note 16.
See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 10, at 963 (noting how trademarks are now
"pressed into service as products"); Lunney, Monopolies, supra note 12.
90 Sidney J. Levy, Symbols for Sale, HARV. BUS. REV., July 1959, at 117(presenting the classic statement of the idea that marketers are selling symbols as
wells as products). For analysis focused on the role of brands in constructing identity,
see Richard Elliott & Kritsadarat Wattanasuwan, Brands as Symbolic Resources for
the Construction of Identity, 17 INT'L J. ADVERTISING 131 (1998).
91 Angela Chao & Juliet B. Schor, Empirical Tests of Status Consumption:
Evidence from Women's Cosmetics, 19 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 107 (1998). For an early
exploration of these ideas (not based on empirical research), see JOHN RAE, THE
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF CAPITAL; BEING A COMPLETE REPRINT OF THE NEW
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1834 (Charles Whitney Mixter ed., Macmillan Co.
1905).
Articles of which the consumption is not conspicuous, are incapable of
gratifying this passion [vanity]. The vanity of no person derives satisfaction
from the sort of timber used in the construction of the house he occupies,
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prepared to pay less for products, such as moisturizers, that
are most often used in private. 2 Brands also provide consumers
with "the full satisfaction they have in knowing they have
purchased goods bearing the famous mark," as Justice
Kennedy put it in his V Secret concurrence. 3 Associating
"satisfaction" with a trademark has much to do with the "aura"
of the brand, something brand managers and marketers
achieve through their investment and creative effort.
Consumers often desire branded products because wearing a
brand, owning it, eating it, or drinking it helps satisfy a desire
to be "cool" or "sophisticated," to "belong,"' or even to be
"patriotic," as some drivers of the absurd "Humvee" utility
vehicles have acknowledged. 9 As Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss
once put it, "[trademarks have come a long way."'
Just how far trademarks have come is indicated by
recalling the Supreme Court's initial antagonism toward the
kind of effort required of firms to establish trademark rights.
In the 1879 Trade-Mark Cases,97 the Supreme Court held that
the Constitution's Copyright and Patents Clause did not
empower Congress to enact a federal trademark statute. For
because the wood work is usually concealed by paint or something else....
Thus coal is consumed for the heat given out by it, and the different
quantities of heat yielded by different qualities of coal are easily ascertained.
One scarcely, therefore, prides himself on burning one sort in preference to
another.
Id. at 247 app. 1 (The Nature and Effects of Luxury).
92 Chao & Schor, supra note 91.
93 id.
94 See generally QUART, supra note 11.
95 Danny Hakim, In Their Hummers, Right Beside Uncle Sam, N.Y. TIMES,
April 5, 2003, at Cl:
In my humble opinion, the [Hummer] is an American icon. Not the military
version by any means, but it's a symbol of what we all hold so dearly above
all else, the fact we have the freedom of choice, the freedom of happiness, the
freedom of adventure and discovery, and the ultimate freedom of expression.
Id. (quoting the founder of "I.H.O.G.", the International Hummer Owners Group). The
article also quotes a consumer researcher employed by General Motors acknowledging
that the 2003 U.S./Iraq war helped sales of the Hummer SUV. Id. "The Hummer is a
car in uniform. Right now we are in a time of uncertainty, and people like strong
brands with basic emotions." Id.
Dreyfuss, Express Genericity, supra note 48, at 397.
97 United States v. Steffens, United States v. Wittemann, United States v.
Johnson, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) [hereinafter The Trade-Mark Cases].
98 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Court also held that the statute was not
empowered by the Commerce Clause. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). In a
different context, the Supreme Court in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003), has recently confirmed its analysis in The
Trade-Mark Cases, emphasizing that rights in a trademarks are not rewards for - and
have no necessary relation to - innovation or creativity. Dastar, 123 S. Ct. at 2048
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the present analysis, the significance of the case is in the
Court's refusal to characterize trademarks as "fruits of
intellectual labor."' Securing trademark rights, the Court
emphasized, did not require "novelty, invention, discovery, or
any work of the brain."'" The trademark proprietor's efforts,
which were rewarded by the federal protections, "require[d] no
fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought;"' °1 rights
in a trademark accrued only through "use."'2 Moreover, as the
Court persistently emphasized in the early decades of the
twentieth century, 3 it is only through use of the mark in
commerce that goodwill in a mark could be established and
enhanced. '
In the 1870s, branding was a relatively new commercial
concept. 5 Today, most marketing professionals would likely
find the Supreme Court's characterization to be laughable at
best, perhaps insulting, and certainly wildly at odds with the
creative efforts expended in the task of building and managing
brands."' Marketing professionals today regard building and
promoting a brand as enormously creative and investment-
intensive tasks. A whole academic discipline and a large
popular literature (some of it quite cynical) 7 have grown up
(quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 22, 34 (2001) ("The
Lanham Act... does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating
a particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its period of
exclusivity.")).
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S at 94.
IGO Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916). See also note 60.
104 Hanover Star, 240 U.S. at 412 ( "Courts afford redress or relief upon the
ground that a party has a valuable interest in the good will of his trade or business,
and in the trade-marks adopted to maintain and extend it.").
105 NANCY F. KOEHN, BRAND NEW: How ENTREPRENEURS EARNED
CONSUMERS' TRUST FROM WEDGWOOD TO DELL 59 (2001).
106 See KOEHN, supra note 105, at 60. For an interesting English comparison,
see Exxon Corp. v. Exxon Insurance Consultants Int'l, [19821 Ch. 119 (C.A.), where the
English Court of Appeal concluded that copyright did not subsist in the word "Exxon,"
notwithstanding that "considerable time and work" were expended on devising the
word. Id. at 129.
107 An early exemplar was work by Thorstein Veblen, which coined the phrase
"conspicuous consumption." THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS:
AN ECONOMIC STUDY IN THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS (1899). The concepts
discussed by Veblen, including the notion of conspicuous consumption, have a much
longer pedigree. See RAE, supra note 91, at 249, 243. The mid-20th Century saw best
selling author Vance Packard provide a scathing critique of the manipulative dangers
of mid-Century advertising practices. VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS
(1957). Other examples of popular literature exploring the role of the societal impact of
marketing include: MARSHALL MCLUHAN, THE MEDIUM IS THE MASSAGE (1967):
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around the phenomenon of achieving, sustaining, and
advancing "brand consciousness." Building brands is a
"creative development experience,". 0 and products are now
"artifacts around which customers have experiences."' Those
experiences are produced by the associations generated by the
brands and accompanying marketing efforts, as much as by the
products themselves."' Brands are not merely "leveraged" or
"grown;". they have "metaphysics;" 2 they have "aesthetics;"1 M3
they are a "genetic code" to be cracked.14 The terminology
brand managers and advertising executives use to discuss what
they do suggests that they see their endeavors every bit as
creative and as much the "work of the brain" as the kinds of
activities that U.S. law rewards with patents or copyrights.
Modern trademark law offers a rich doctrinal and
statutory repertoire that protects trademarks beyond their core
function of symbolizing the provenance of goods, and that
DOUGLAS RUSHKOFF, COERCION: WHY WE LISTEN TO WHAT "THEY" SAY (1999); JOHN
DE GRAF ET AL., AFFLUENZA: THE ALL-CONSUMING EPIDEMIC (2002); QUART, supra note
11; and NAOMI KLEIN, No LOGO: TAKING AIM AT THE BRAND BULLIES (2000) (exploring
issues of brand fetishization from a global-political perspective).
1os JON STEEL, TRUTH, LIES, AND ADVERTISING: THE ART OF ACCOUNT
PLANNING 222 (1998).
109 See, e.g., JAMES PINE, II & JOSPEH H. GILMORE, THE EXPERIENCE
ECONOMY: WORK IS THEATRE AND EVERY BUSINESS A STAGE (1999). See also SCOTT
BEDBURY, A NEW BRAND WORLD: EIGHT PRINCIPLES FOR ACHIEVING BRAND
LEADERSHIP IN THE 21ST CENTURY 16 (2002); DIANA LASALLE & TERRY A. BRITTON,
PRICELESS: TURNING ORDINARY PRODUCTS INTO EXTRAORDINARY EXPERIENCES (2002).
"('Professor Jessica Litman captures this phenomenon perfectly in her
discussion of character merchandizing. Adding a brand, such as "Batman" to the
packaging of a cereal box arguably creates a unique "product." Litman, Breakfast With
Batman, supra note 48, at 1727:
Ask a child, and he'll persuade you that the difference between a box of
Kellogg's Corn Flakes with a picture of Batman on it and some other box
without one is real. There is nothing imaginary about it. It has nothing to do
with the way the cereal tastes. What kids want isn't a nutritious part of a
complete breakfast; they want Batman to have breakfast with them. One box
supplies that; the other doesn't.
See also Alex Kozinski, supra note 10, at 972-73 (1993); Rudolf Rayle, The Trend
Toward Enhancing Trademark Owners' Rights, A Comparative Study of U.S. and
German Trademark Law, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 227, 281-82 (2000). Professor Tim
Kasser speculates that children who experience nonnurturant parenting may be
especially susceptible to consumer messages that prey on insecurities and promise
happiness and security through consumption. See TIM KASSER, THE HIGH PRICE OF
MATERIALISM 31-32 (2002).
... See, e.g., David A. Aaker, Should You Take Your Brand to where the Action
Is?, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept./Oct. 1997, at 135.
112 BEDBURY, supra note 109, at 18.
13 See BERND SCHMITT & ALEX SIMONSON, MARKETING AESTHETICS: THE
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF BRANDS, IDENTITY AND IMAGE (1997).
"4 BEDBURY, supra note 109, at 23-59.
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responds to the new kinds of "value" trademarks have in
consumer markets.' °  "Extended" forms of trademark
infringements seem to accommodate the concerns of firms and
their marketing and advertising experts far better than
traditional likelihood of confusion analysis. For example,
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act includes liability for causing a
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception as to "affiliation,
connection, or association," a form of liability that bolster firms'
ability to drive away competition in the promotional goods
context."' "Initial interest confusion"'17 can protect against other
firms' uses of trademarks to pique consumers' interest, even
where the confusion is wholly absent at the point of any
purchase. The "post-sale confusion""' doctrine imposes liability
where the purchaser knows he is not buying a product from the
trademark proprietor, but where third parties viewing the
product might be confused as to the origin of the goods."'
"Trademark dilution "1" protects the value firms have built up
in famous marks against being "blurred" by the uses of the
same or similar marks, even where these uses do not cause
11 See generally Jerre B. Swann, Dilution Redefined for the Year 2002, 92
TRADEMARK REP. 585 (2002) [hereinafter Swann, Dilution Redefined].
16 See, e.g., Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22 (lst Cir. 1989). See
infra Part IV.C.
11 See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 260 (2d
Cir. 1987) (finding trademark infringement based on the use of a mark to generate
"interest," even where the confusion would be dispelled prior to purchase). See also
infra Part IV.B.2.
"" See, e.g., Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le
Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 832 (1955). See also
infra Part IV. D.
19 What "friends and family" think of our purchases may be particularly
important to the goodwill that firms build up in their brands. Some research into the
sources of consumer desires suggests that among the most powerful stimulators of
desire to purchase goods are the goods friends and family have, see SCHOR, OVERSPENT
AMERICAN, supra note 3, at 69 (citing Susan Fournier & Michael Guiry, A Look into the
World of Consumption Dreams, Fantasies, and Aspirations, Research Report,
University of Florida, December 1991, suggesting that trademark proprietors will be
vigilant about protecting the meanings accorded to brands in these kinds of context by
invoking doctrines such as "post-sale" confusion). Adding to the concern to protect the
impressions of goods gained by friends and family viewing these purchases is the fact
that these impressions are harder won today, a result of the increased privacy of the
American home. See generally DAVID HALLE, INSIDE CULTURE: ART AND CLASS IN THE
AMERICAN HOME (1993).
120 Trademark dilution was federalized in 1985 under the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act (1985), which added a new Section 43(c) to the Lanham Act, and a
definition of dilution in Section 45. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) & 1127 (2000). See generally
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 59, § 24.67. See also infra Part IV.B.1.
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confusion.'21 We shall consider each of these "extended" forms of
liability in more detail below; all provide insight into the way
that trademark jurisprudence thinks about the "consumer."1 22
C. Traditional Critiques
Both of the conventional rationales - the "objective"
focus on marketplace effects and the "subjective" concern with
defendants' fault in free riding on the property of another -
have provoked considerable controversy. One strand of critique
concerns the extent to which protecting trademarks dovetails
with the concept of the "sovereign consumer," which in turn
taps into fierce debates about whether this latter-day hero of
economic liberalism 121 can survive, given prevailing modalities
of preference formulation in markets saturated with
manipulative selling methods. A second strand of critique is
closer to traditional concerns of legal theory, and rehearses
debates about whether property rights can or should be
established merely because the trademark has achieved some
discernible marketplace "value." As is explained in this
subpart, however, none of these controversies offers much
possibility of resolution.
1. "Sovereign" vs. "Susceptible" Consumers
A key conceptual foundation of neo-liberalism,12 1 the
"sovereign consumer," who rationally seeks out an optimal mix
of goods and services,'25 remains one of the most influential
121 For a particularly illuminating exploration of the concept of blurring and
dilution doctrine generally, see Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in
Trademark Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 731 (2003).
122 See infra Part IV.
113 DON SLATER, CONSUMER CULTURE & MODERNITY 34 (1997) ("'Consumer
sovereignty' is the most powerful image of the consumer as social hero and has been a
major ideological rallying cry for liberal assaults against 'collectivism' - socialist,
communist and Keynesian - from the 1920s to the Cold War.").
124 SLATER, supra note 123, at 37-38. Though the notion of the sovereign
consumer is championed by neo-liberalists, perhaps reaching its apogee in Anglo-
American polities during the era of Thatcherism and Reganomics, see id. at 37,
emphasis on the sovereign consumer echoes much earlier ideas. Adam Smith famously
championed the interests of consumers with a "maxim ... so perfectly self-evident, that
it would be absurd to attempt to prove it": "Consumption is the sole end and purpose of
all production; and the interest of the producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it
may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer." ADAM SMITH, AN INQUITY INTO
THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS vol. II, bk. IV, ch. 8, at 179
(Edwin Cannan ed., U. of Chicago Press 1976) (1776).
125 SLATER, supra note 123:
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academic accounts of consumer behavior.1 6 The sovereign
consumer is part of a cluster of commitments and economic
ideals that valorize, and regard as central to societal welfare,
the ability of individuals to express private preferences, largely
unimpeded by governmental regulation. 7 Because trademarks
facilitate the expression of consumer choices, legal protection of
trademarks seems to comport with and support the consumer
sovereignty framework.
Competing with the "sovereign" consumer is the notion
of the "susceptible" consumer, whose vulnerability to making
irrational choices is caused and exacerbated by advertising and
the promotion of trademarks.' Some critiques of the consumer
sovereignty ideal emphasize the deleterious effects of
advertising on the formulation of rational choices."9
Trademarks are implicated in these critiques because they
[L]iberalism places individual choice at the center of social theory;
social institutions must derive from or respond to the way in which
individuals formulate their private, self-defined interests as social
demands, as choices of these goods, those policies, these laws;
choices that are made by individuals purely as part and parcel of
their pursuit of their own agenda.
Id. at 40.
", Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1700, 1747 (2003) (examining consumer expectations in context of products liability)
[hereinafter Kysar, Expectations].
127 Championing the sovereign consumer in this way gives rise to a kind of
"economic amoralism," conventionally defended on three bases. The first is ethical:
characterizing the pursuit of liberty through expression of individual choice. Within
this intellectual tradition, social coordination occurs only as the sum of individual
choices, a concept most famously articulated through the familiar notion of the
"invisible hand." SMITH, supra note 124. Secondly, the sovereign consumer concept is
consistent with the Enlightenment commitment to separating knowledge from values
and beliefs. SLATER, supra note 123, at 49. Thirdly, the sovereign consumer concept
acknowledges limits to the analytical competence of economic theory: emphasizing
expressed preferences, rather than the reasons why preferences are formed, means
that "murky" issues of psychology are avoided. SLATER, supra note 123, at 46. In classic
economic thought, utility is to be inferred from expressed choices. The consumer
sovereignty theory emphasizes not what consumers choose: rather, what is important
is that they choose. Preferences are 'revealed," not judged. See generally George J.
Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 76
(1977).
128 The classic statement of the susceptibilities of consumers to persuasion
comes from JOHN KENNEDY GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (4th ed. 1998). A
seminal legal analysis of these issues was offered by Professor Ralph Brown. Brown,
supra note 45.
129 See, e.g., GALBRAITH, supra note 128; RUSHKOFF, supra note 107. Professor
Juliet Schor offers a slightly different explanation, noting that, notwithstanding the
onslaughts of advertisers, consumers continue to be very discriminating about their
purchasing choices and the signaling effects of other consumers' choices. SCHOR,
OVERSPENT AMERICAN, supra note 3, at 34-35.
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enhance the efficacy of advertising.130 Economist John Kenneth
Galbraith famously identified the "dependence effect" of
modern systems of production that are aided and abetted by
advertising, whose "central function is to create desires - to
bring into being wants that previously did not exist."13'
According to Galbraith, levels of production do not respond to
the expression of individual consumer desires; rather,
consumer desires are created "for"'32 the consumer through
production itself and advertisers' accompanying onslaughts.
Accordingly, advertising's contribution to the production of
desires renders the sovereign consumer a risible fiction.1"
The implications of this analysis for the search costs
rationale are potentially devastating. How can trademarks be
neutral vehicles for transmitting information efficiently to
consumers to enable them to distinguish between, and express
preferences for, goods from one source as opposed to those from
other sources, when trademarks themselves are bundled
together"M with promotional and advertising strategies that
manipulate consumer desires? Moreover, those promotional
and advertising strategies, rather than assisting in the efficient
'30 See generally Frank Schecter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection,
40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927).
13 GALBRAITH, supra note 128 (footnote omitted). Galbraith was not the first
to identify the creation of wants and needs by production. Historian, James Axtell
quotes the letter of an English visitor to colonial Baltimore, who observed of the
American economy: "As wealth and population increased, wants were created, and
many considerable demands, in consequence, took place for the various elegancies as
well as the necessaries of life." James Axtell, The First Consumer Revolution, in
CONSUMER SOCIETY IN AMERICAN HISTORY: A READER 85, 86 (Lawrence B. Glickman
ed., 1999).
132 GALBRAITH, supra note 128. Galbraith was writing at a time of increased
attention by firms to market segmentation and product differentiation, strategies that
reflected firms' increasing understanding of the marketing implications of the realities
of imperfect competition. A "bending of demand to the will of supply," product
differentiation was in part a response to the reality that "[n]ot all consumers have the
desire or the ability to shop in a sufficiently efficient or rational manner as to bring
about selection of the most needed or most wanted goods or services." Wendell R.
Smith, Product Differentiation and Market Segmentation as Alternative Marketing
Strategies, J. MARKETING, July 1956, at 3, 4, 5. New marketing strategies were in part
made possible by technological changes that provided alternatives to the homogeneity
of mass-marketing, such as technological advances allowing smaller product runs to be
economically efficient. Id. at 6.
'- See, e.g., GALBRAITH, supra note 128, at 124.
" See generally Jacob Jacoby et al., Price, Brand Name, and Product
Composition Characteristics as Determinants of Perceived Quality, 55 J. APPLIED
PSYCH. 570 (1971) (noting that consumers' impressions of products are due to a number
of cues, including price, product composition characteristics, packaging, brand,
manufacturer and store image, advertising, word of mouth reports and past purchase
experience).
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transfer of information from trader to consumer, frequently
contain very little meaningful product information, but rather
are "arresting images, whimsical characters, and compelling
minidramas, all of which seem quite unrelated to the product
on offer."' 3 As Professor Douglas Kysar puts the point, the
predominance of these techniques in the promotion of goods
and services gives consumer sovereignty theorists much to
explain. '36
Consumers' susceptibility to manipulation through
advertising, and the implications of this kind of manipulation
for competitive efficiency, have certainly been acknowledged by
U.S. courts, 137 even if the kinds of critiques put forward by
Galbraith and others ' have not achieved widespread currency
among economists. 9 But judicial disapprobation of advertisers'
selling techniques has never led to much serious questioning of
the judicial, or, indeed, the legislative, function in upholding
trademark rights per se. For courts, this may partly be due to
their reluctance (or inability) to differentiate between some of
the different kinds of consumer preferences that are relevant to
135 Kysar, Expectations, supra note 126.
136 Kysar, Expectations, supra note 126.
117 See, e.g., Smith v. Chanel, 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968):
The primary value of the modern trademark lies in the 'conditioned
reflex developed in the buyer by imaginative or often purely monotonous
selling of the mark itself.' Deering, Trade-marks on Noncompetitive Products,
36 OR. L. REV. 1, 2 (1956). To the extent that advertising of this type
succeeds, it is suggested, the trademark is endowed with sales appeal
independent of the quality or price of the product to which it is attached;
economically irrational elements are introduced into consumer choices; and
the trademark owner is insulated from the normal pressures of price and
quality competition. In consequence the competitive system fails to perform
its function of allocating available resources efficiently.
Moreover, the economically irrelevant appeal of highly publicized
trademarks is thought to constitute a barrier to the entry of new competition
into the market. '[Tihe presence of irrational consumer allegiances may
constitute an effective barrier to entry. Consumer allegiances built over the
years with intensive advertising, trademarks, trade names, copyrights and so
forth extend substantial protection to firms already in the market. In some
markets this barrier to entry may be insuperable.' Papandreou, The
Economic Effect of Trademarks, 44 CAL. L. REV. 503, 508-09 (1956). High
barriers to entry tend, in turn, to produce 'high excess profits and
monopolistic output restriction' and 'probably ... high and possibly excessive
costs of sales promotion.' J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 203 (1955).
Id. at 566-67 (footnotes omitted).
138 See, e.g., CHAMBERLIN, supra note 87, at 119-20, discussing the "new
scheme of wants" created by "selling methods that play upon the buyer's
susceptibilities" and the implications that such methods have on the transmission of
accurate information in the marketplace.
139 Kysar, Expectations, supra note 126, at 1753.
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this debate.'4 ° According to one strand of counter-critique,'4'
advertising and the promotion of brands should be
reconceptualized as providing "information" about matters that
are important to consumers, such as firms' confidence in the
products they promote, information that is itself "consumed" by
consumers engaged in making rational marketplace choices.'
If trademarks are aspects of goods that are consumed, whose
value includes the "information" consumers derive from them
and the use to which such information is put, ' it is presumably
neither the courts' nor the government's job to limit consumers'
access to aspects of the "products" from which they derive
value.'"
. As Professor Kysar notes, Justice Harlan made this point in his
concurrence in Federal Trade Comm'n v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967),
reasoning that if an advertisers brand name is an assurance of quality, it is not the
government's function to decide which of the benefits offered the consumer should be
considered useful and which should be considered the symptoms of industrial
'sickness.' Id. at 603-04. The Court concluded: "It is the consumer who must make that
election, through the exercise of his purchasing power." Id. at 604.
4 See, e.g, Stigler & Becker, supra note 127, at 83-87. Professors Stigler and
Becker directly contest the view promulgated by Galbraith that advertising molds
consumer preferences and tastes. Id. at 83-84. They reconstruct the utility derived by
consumers from a market good as including consumer knowledge of its "true or alleged
properties." Id. at 84. In Stigler and Becker's analysis, the family does not maximize
utility by expressing preferences through purchases; rather, the full utility of goods
includes the information consumers derive from them, and the use to which such
information is put. See generally id. at 77.
141 See also Ronald Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 8
(1977). A slightly different, though related, perspective is offered by Professors Richard
Elliott and Krisadarat Wattanasuwan, who focus on the role of consumption in
consumer's "symbolic project" of identity creation. Elliott & Wattanasuwan, supra note
90, at 132. However, these authors also recognize the paradox that though the
consumer exercises "free will to form images of who and what he or she wants to be,"
this freedom of will "is directed by values that are probably also a social product." Id.
These authors characterize the relationship between consumption and production of
advertising as cyclical:
The relationship between advertising and the consumer is dialectical:
advertising not only helps in creating, modifying and transforming cultural
meanings for the consumer, but also represents cultural meanings taken
from the consumer's world view and invested into the advertised product.
This dialectical relationship drives a cyclical flow of symbolic meanings
derived from culture and transferred into the semiotic world of advertising,
then interpreted and used by consumers to construct internally their self-
concept and externally their social world.
Id. at 136.
143 See Stigler & Becker, supra note 127.
144 The counter-criticism is itself problematic, however, in part because it is
probably impossible to confirm whether the susceptible consumer really can be
crowned anew, on the basis that they rationally consume the information advertising
provides. See Kysar, Expectations, supra note 126, at 1757. It may be very difficult to
determine whether consumers actually "consume" advertising information in the way
theorists such as Stigler and Becker suggest, deriving useful messages from it such as
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Even if its resolution were possible, one problem with
this debate is that it is unlikely to distil any meaningful
implications for shaping of modern trademark policy. On the
one hand, the view that consumer "utility" results from the
value consumers derive and produce from the "information"
they take from products, including trademarks, is probably un-
testable.145 On the other hand, if theorists such as Galbraith are
right, and consumer susceptibility to advertising and the
promotion of trademarks significantly undermines the
consumer sovereignty theory, we are left without any basis for
determining the scope of protection that ought to be afforded to
trademarks (assuming that the implication of Galbraith's
insight is that trademarks should be afforded less protection
than they currently are). That is, even if the "sovereign"
consumer is displaced by the "susceptible" consumer, this does
not tell us how the rights in trademarks should be calibrated.
Assume, for example, that the proprietor of trademark
"X" has convinced consumers through incessant advertising
and promotion - and, yes, the quality of its goods and services
as well - that X brand goods and services are "cool." Assume
also that the X brand attaches to a wide range of goods and
services: "mega music stores" purveying CDs, mobile phones
and other electronic devices, an airline, wine stores,
motorbikes, clothing, perfume, resort hotels, and financial
services. Now assume that a different trader has started
how confident firms are in their brands, or whether they are simply swept away by
their surface persuasions. Galbraith himself remained incredulous. Responding to his
critics, he retorted: "Economists . . . did not (still do not) watch television." John
Kenneth Galbraith, Foreword to THE CONSUMER SOCIETY xxi (Neva R. Goodwin et al.
eds., 1997), cited in Jon D. Hanson & Douglas Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:
Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARv. L. REV. 1420, 1439 (1999). There is,
nevertheless, some strong historical research suggesting that brands are strongest
when firms are sensitive to the supply side of the demand equation. See generally
KOEHN, supra note 105. Cf. Hanson & Kysar, supra, at 1467-1552 (presenting a
fascinating analysis of the manipulative selling techniques of the tobacco industry and
their effects on consumer risk perception). Some psychologists have argued that
advertising has particularly intense effects on preference formulation where viewers
experience "discrepancies" - a term used to describe people's emotional states that are
largely a function of how far they are from who, what, or where they ideally would like
to be. KASSER, supra note 110, at 51 (citing E.T. Higgens, Self Discrepancy: A Theory
Relating Self and Effect, 94 PSYCH. REV. 319 (1987)). People who idealize wealth,
attractiveness, and status are particularly attuned to information in their
environments that reinforce materialistic values. Kasser cites a number of research
studies suggesting that these ideas lead people frequently to experience discrepancies
and dissatisfaction. KASSER, supra note 110, at 52.
145 See generally Kysar, Expectations, supra note 126 (noting that the
argument that advertising contributes to utility of the goods is "essentially
nonfalsifiable").
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purveying a different category of goods under the X brand.
Whether we accept that a preference for X branded goods is an
expression of a consumer preference for "cool," there seems to
be no workable basis for distinguishing between genuine X
brand goods from the imposters, for the associations of "cool"
that are connected with the X brand already connect otherwise
unrelated categories goods and services in the consumer mind.
If consumers "know" that anything to which the X brand
attaches is "cool," it would seem to follow that the trademark
proprietor must have the right to attach, and prevent others
from attaching, the X mark to any product or service. The point
of such branding campaigns is often to make anything seem
"cool" to the consumer, so long as it has the X brand attached.
But it is entirely unclear whether this should lead to more
expansive or more constrained trademark rights in the X
brand. On the one hand, if there is no obvious basis for
anticipating ex ante the kinds of products that consumers
would expect the X brand to mark, the connection between the
X brand and new categories of goods and services might be
quite attenuated. As a corollary, X brand may have only
limited power to ward off other goods and services beyond those
categories in which the brand is established. On the other
hand, it may be precisely because consumers now believe that
anything to which the X brand attaches is "cool" that they
require protection from imposters. In a regime of less
protection, consumers might be both manipulated into thinking
that X brand is cool, and deceived by other traders who free
ride on the associations built up by the proprietor of the X
brand.
It is also possible that the terrain of the debate has
shifted already, following increasing recognition of the
implications for legal theory of work by economists and
psychologists that has identified the "bounded rationality"
146
146 See generally BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX (Gerd
Gigerenzer & R. Selten eds., 2002) [hereinafter BOUNDED RATIONALITY]. The idea of
bounded rationality owes its origins to H.A. Simon's seminal work Rational Choice and
the Structure of Environments, 63 PSYCH. REV. 129 (1956). "Bounded rationality" is not
the same as 'irrationality": rather, its theory aims to identify reasons, including those
characterized by the concept of "an adaptive tool box," for non-optimizing behavior. See
generally Gerd Gigerenzer, The Adaptive Toolbox, in BOUNDED RATIONALITY, supra, at
37. As Professor Douglas Kysar and Jon Hansen argue, the insights of cognitive
science, particularly their concern with issues of framing and presentation of choices,
may be helpful for understanding the responses of consumers to the use of symbols by
both plaintiffs and defendants in trademark infringement actions. See Jon D. Hansen
& Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market
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consumers bring to bear on their marketplace choices. Work by
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky that contests the notion
of the "rational actor" informing the assumptions of much
economic theory has surely achieved at least partial regicide of
the sovereign consumer. The work of Kahneman, Tversky, and
others "7 suggests that consumers respond to available choices
with limited information, using mental processes that can be
summoned at different rates, and according to imperatives
distilled as much from biological adaptation as from rational
choice. Insights from cognitive science may side-step debates
about the causes of consumer susceptibility."" Consumers
simply may not be "wired" with the kind of rational self-
interest in marketplace activities that traditional theories of
trademark law seem to assume. '4
2. The "Vicious Cycle" - Legal Rights for Perceived
Value
Whether the law should protect any value in a
trademark beyond its core function of distinguishing the goods
and services of one trader from others has long been
controversial. 1" Much recent scholarship and some judicial
commentary have pointed out that characterizing a defendant's
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999) [hereinafter Hansen & Kysar, Taking
Behavioralism Seriously]. The implications for trademark jurisprudence of ideas
associated with bounded rationality have yet to be theorized, and is a topic beyond the
scope of this article. Nevertheless, as I suggest below, work in cognitive sciences may
provide helpful evidence for courts attempting to assess how consumers might respond
to contested uses of trademarks.
147 See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR
AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS 33 (1985).
148 See generally Swann, Dilution Redefined, supra note 115.
149 Some of the implications of cognitive science for the processes by which
courts come to apprehend the consumer is discussed in further detail infra Part I.C.
150 Doctrinally, these issues are reflected in different attitudes towards
assertions of trademark rights that go beyond the traditional function of symbolizing a
firms' goodwill. Compare Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem
Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004, 1011 (5th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975) (finding
trademark liability by defendant who marketed embroidered emblems of sports teams,
acknowledging that the holding "may slightly tilt the trademark laws from the purpose
of protecting the public to the protection of the business interests of the plaintiffs"),
with Int'l Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th Cir.
1980), cert denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981) (declining to follow Dallas Cap, and holding that
manufacture and sale of jewelry in the shape of the plaintiffs emblem does not
constitute trademark infringement, partly on the basis that the Job's Daughters
trademark was marketed "for its own intrinsic utility to consumers").
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actions as "free riding" often begs the very question at issue,"'
which is whether the production of excess value in a mark
gives rise to a property interest.5' It is one thing to suggest that
building a brand takes creative effort;"u it is another to
determine whether and why firms should be protected against
appropriation of all or most of the value such efforts produce."
Prohibiting "misappropriation of value" has long been regarded
as a thinly-disguised excuse for rewarding advertising
expenditures with little accompanying societal benefit. 5'
Professor Jessica Litman puts it well: "[I1f competition is still
the American way of doing business, then before we give out
"5' There are also evidential problems with the continued relevance of the
junior user's intention to determine whether consumer confusion is likely. The fact that
the defendant might have intended to pass off its goods does not tell us whether or not
the defendant will actually succeed in its intention to mislead customers in a particular
case. On occasion, there may be evidence of actual confusion that helps bolster this
conclusion. But, as we have seen, evidence of actual confusion is not a necessary
determinant of the legal standard of likely confusion. If, in some cases at least, it is
possible not to succeed, a defendant's intention should not in itself be dispositive of the
likelihood of consumer confusion. Moreover, there is no obvious basis for distinguishing
between cases in which the defendant's intention carries predictive promise, and those
in which intention is merely a convenient tie-breaker in an otherwise highly
speculative analysis.
152 See Mobil Oil Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 260 ("Such initial confusion works a
sufficient trademark injury."). In Mobil Oil, the likelihood that an oil trader might
listen to a cold call from "Pegasus Petroleum," mistakenly thinking it was related to
Mobil Oil, is a kind of 'confusion' sufficient for infringement even though the oil trader
would soon be unconfused and not actually enter into a business transaction with
Pegasus in a confused state of mind. Id. at 259. One of the factors in Mobil Oil giving
rise to liability was the Second Circuit's view that the defendant had deliberately
adopted a mark that would give rise to initial interest confusion. Id. at 260. Mobil Oil
is discussed in more detail infra Part TV.B.2. See also Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th.
Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd., 523
F.2d 1311 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding actionable trademark infringement on the basis that,
though a sophisticated purchaser of a piano worth thousands of dollars would not buy a
"Grotrian-Steinweg" instead of a "Steinway" by mistake, once inside the store selling
Grotrian-Steinwegs, she may satisfy herself with a less expensive piano); Elvis Presley
Enterprises Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding infringement where a
bar was named "Velvet Elvis" even though once inside a patron would realize that
there was no connection with the Elvis Presley estate).
153 See supra Part II.B.
'5 The Ninth Circuit has observed that a "large expenditure of money does
not in itself create legally protectable rights." Smith v. Chanel, 402 F.2d 562, 568
(1968).
", See Lunney, Monopolies, supra note 12; Lemley, supra note 45; Dreyfuss,
Express Genericity, supra note 48; Dinwoodie, Rational Limits, supra note 47; Litman,
Breakfast with Batman, supra note 48; Brown, supra note 45. The controversy is not
confined to U.S. law. Leading European intellectual property jurist, Sir Robin Jacob,
commenting on the treatment of trademarks under Benelux law as "something
precious and important," has questioned why such status should be afforded to a mere
"badge of origin." Robin Jacob, Speech at the University of Bristol (Feb. 29, 1996),
quoted in PICKERING, TRADEMARKS, supra note 51, at 49.
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exclusive control of some coin of competition, we need, or
should need, a justification.' 5.
Critics of the emphasis on moral concerns in trademark
law tend to rehearse perennial themes in property
jurisprudence. In a famous law review article,'57 Legal Realist
scholar Felix Cohen identified the "vicious cycle"'" inherent in
the reasoning supporting the expansion of trademark rights
beyond contexts in which consumers are actually or likely to be
confused. Protecting the value in a mark, according to Cohen's
analysis, "purports to base legal protection on economic value,
when, as a matter of actual fact, the economic value of a sales
device depends upon the extent to which it will be legally
protected.' 5. Echoing Cohen's analysis, at least one court has
recognized the "obvious" analytical flaw that "requires the
court to assume that which is to be proved."" Critically, a
firm's ability to compete may be significantly curtailed where,
for instance, a junior user's "bad intention" can transform
"likelihood of association" (probably lawful)"' into "likelihood of
confusion" (definitely unlawful)."2 This is doubly problematic in
an economic system based on free competition, in which firms
are meant to compete with each other by any lawful means."' If
156 Litman, Breakfast with Batman, supra note 48.
1.5 Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935) [hereinafter Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense].
"' Id. at 817.
'59 Id. at 815.
160 Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Out in America, 481 F.2d 445, 449 (5th Cir.
1973) (also noting the circularity in the argument that: "confusing similarity is proved
by the defendants' intent to confuse the public and that the defendants' intent to
confuse the public is proved by the confusing similarity of the marks").
161 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 59, § 23.9 ("calling to mind is not
infringement").
162 See, e.g., Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Creative House
Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446 (9th Cir. 1991). The First Circuit has downplayed the
importance of intention to the likelihood of confusion analysis. See, e.g., I.P. Lund
Trading ApS v. Kohler, 163 F.3d, 27, 44 (1998) (cautioning that "little weight should be
given to the determination that [defendant] did not intend to copy [the mark]"). See
also Chrysler Corp. v. Silva, 118 F.3d 56, 59 n. 3 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that "[s]trictly,
intent, or lack thereof, does not affect the eyes of the viewer"). The principal target of
the Court's remarks in Chrysler were, however, an allegation by the defendant that it
did not intend to copy - "[p]roof of good intent does not change appearance." Id.
'63 Anxiety about the purposes served by intellectual property rights is also
partly product of fear of monopolies and the "exceptionality" of intellectual property
rights in an economic system committed to the idea that consumers are served best
when firms compete freely for their purchasing dollar. The Supreme Court has
persistently articulated this concern. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231,
248 (1951); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949); National Soc.
of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978). This concern
relates to intellectual property law generally, but trademark law attracted its own
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consumer search costs are underdetermining, and the
theoretical foundations for misappropriation doctrine are less
than compelling, we may be forced to acknowledge that there is
no cogent response to the challenges posed by theorists such as
Litman and Cohen. Coins of competition may be being handed
out for no good reason at all, and the only principled response
may be to close the bank.
The modern trademark law edifice seems, however,
quite resilient to such critiques. Cohen articulated problems
with the circularity of according property rights in trademarks
based on misappropriation of "value" in 1935. Notwithstanding
the pedigree and cogency of critiques of the current state of
trademark doctrine, trademark rights have, for the most part,"
continued to expand.'65 Indeed, the fact that both kinds of
rationale are available to aid in the formulation of trademark
law and policy may be one reason why this expansion
continues. Where instrumentalist rationales are found
wanting, trademark law's "moral" aspects are ever ready to
provide an alternative justification. Moreover, if the search
costs approach holds out the promise of rationality, the
misappropriation focus seems to tap into deep, if contested,
beliefs about basic issues of fairness. That one should not reap
where one has not sown is, after all, an enduring, if somewhat
under-theorized, idea."' To complain that misappropriation
doctrine does not make rational sense may be missing much of
its point."7
strand of monopoly critique. See generally Beverly W. Pattishall, Trade-Marks and the
Monopoly Phobia, 50 MICH. L. REV. 967 (1952).
'" In his history of trademark jurisprudence, Daniel McClure notes a few
occasions when trademark rights seem to abate. McClure, supra note 44, at 17-19.
"'5 Lunney, Monopolies, supra note 12.
"6 See generally Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 74, at 167
(discussing the role of the restitutionary principle in intellectual property law, and
locating its roots in "a particular conception of the judicial role and of the proper
relation of common law to the community; and ... a particular conception of unjust
enrichment"). See also Posner, Misappropriation, supra note 74, at 625.
161 Moreover, it is not as if deriving legal "property" interest from traditions
and practices that accord value to things lacks legal pedigree. For example, though the
famous House of Lords decision in Donaldson v. Beckett, 4 Burr. 2408 (H.L. 1774), held
that the Statute of Anne, the first copyright statute, provided the only legal basis for
protecting copyrights, many of the Law Lords deciding the case considered that the
practices of stationers, printers and authors prior to its enactment created a kind of
common law property. See JOSEPH LOEWENSTEIN, THE AUTHOR'S DUE: PRINTING AND
THE PREHISTORY OF COPYRIGHT 13-22 (2002). In Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303 (KB.
1769), whose decision upholding the notion of common law copyright was overruled by
Donaldson v. Beckett, Lord Aston said:
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Attempts to tether trademark theory to its "classic
avoidance of consumer confusion rationale "" seem inexorably
to lead to the conclusion that much of modern trademark law is
unsustainable. Accordingly, such critiques often end up
appearing quite radical, to the extent that they appear to
mount frontal attacks on established legal doctrines and
trends. For example, in a recent examination of the proper
scope of trademark rights, Professor Graeme Dinwoodie seems
to suggest that, on a "rational" approach to trademark law,
much of dilution doctrine would need to be jettisoned
altogether. 9 The realpolitiks of the trademark system indicate,
however, that such critiques are unlikely to result in
significant curtailment of trademark rights. Critics of current
developments in trademark law, particularly those who see the
increasing emphasis on the "trespass" paradigm as inconsistent
with trademark law's core functions, are likely to find
themselves shouting into the fierce winds of legislative and
judicial expansionism. Characterizing the premises of
expanded trademark rights as "transcendental nonsense, .....0
and then setting up that characterization in opposition to more
economically rational approaches, is unlikely to suppress legal
actors' impulse to curb misappropriation of the value of
established trademarks.
III. CONSTRUCTING CONFUSION
Focusing on the .process by which courts formulate
trademark doctrine may be a way of avoiding the impasses in
grand theoretical debates about the proper scope of trademark
rights. A key aspect of that doctrine is trademark law's
construction of the ordinarily prudent consumer. As this Part
The rules attending property must keep pace with its increase and
improvement, and must be adapted to every case. A distinguishable existence
in the thing claimed as property; an actual value in that thing to the true
owner; are its essentials; .. .For this [the property right] is originally the
author's: and, therefore, unless clearly rendered common by his own act and
full consent, it ought still to remain his.
Millar, 4 Burr. at 2338-40. In the same case, Lord Mansfield understood authors' prop-
erty in their works to be based "upon principles of right and wrong, the fitness of
things, convenience, and policy, and therefore [on] the common law." Id.
168 Dinwoodie, Rational Limits, supra note 47.
1 From policy and theoretical perspectives, this outcome may well be
welcome. Professor Dinwoodie's suggestion may also be supportable on purely doctrinal
grounds: many modern trademark doctrines come perilously close to creating rights in
gross. See infra Part TV.
170 Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 157.
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explains, a number of factors contribute to the constructed
character of trademark's ordinarily prudent consumer: the
absence of much empirical evidence in many trademark
infringement cases, vagaries in trademark doctrine, and
broader doctrinal and policy issues, all of which can render
largely irrelevant some of the responses that real consumers
might have to defendants' activities.
A. Trademark Law's Inchoate Empiricism
More than sixty years ago, the Supreme Court observed
that "[tihe protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of
the psychological function of symbols.' 7. The "psychological
function" with which the Court was then concerned was induc-
ing a purchaser to buy goods or services based on the selling
power of the mark.'72 For the most part, however, courts in
trademark infringement cases do not interrogate actual psy-
chological effects of the use of trademarks on "real-life" con-
sumers.
171 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203,
205 (1942).
172 The relevant passage from Mishawaka Rubber continues as follows:
The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological
function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that
we purchase goods by them. A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut
which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led
to believe he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by
making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the
drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the aim
is the same - to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential
customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once
this is attained, the trade-mark owner has something of value. If another
poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he has created, the
owner can obtain legal redress. And in this case we are called upon to
ascertain the extent of the redress afforded for infringement of a mark
registered under the Trade-Mark Act of 1905.
Id. at 205.
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A study of reported trademark infringement cases that
went to final judgment, including applications for interim in-
junctions, during the last ten years 17' reveals that survey evi-
dence (S.E.) is before the court around 57.4 percent of the time.
Of that 57.4 percent, however, survey evidence is discounted or
accorded little weight in around 22.2 percent of cases. This
suggests that survey evidence influences courts' deliberations
on what potential consumers might think around 35.2 percent
of the time:
S.E., Little-No Wt.
22.2% :
S.E. Before Court
35.2%0
42.6%
Figure 1: Use of survey evidence in Lanham Act judgments:
Total cases between May 1993-May 2003.75
173 The survey sample was produced using LEXIS and Westlaw databases,
using the following search terms: "Lanham Act," "trademark," "infringement." It
includes cases decided between May 1993 through May 2003. The purpose of the study
is to provide an impressionistic picture of the use of empirical data in trademark
infringement cases. In each of the cases counted at least one of the causes of action
involved allegations of infringement under both Section 32 and Section 43(1) of the
Lanham Act. The survey suggests that a significant portion of trademark
jurisprudence is developed without the aid of much empirical evidence about potential
consumer reactions.
174 Necessarily, assessment of the weight accorded by courts to survey
evidence is somewhat subjective. However, not to include some kind of evaluation of
the weight accorded to survey evidence would give the impression that empirical data
influences decisions more often than it actually appears to. Even without discounting
for cases in which little or no weight was given to the survey evidence, we find that
surveys are not used as much as 42.6% of the time.
.. This chart is based on the following cases:
I. Survey Evidence Presented
a. Little or no weight:
Leonard Studio Equip. Inc. v. Desmar Corp., No. 97-1511, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 25795 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 13, 1998); Conopco, Inc. v. Cosmair, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d
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242 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Nabisco v. Warner-Lambert Co., 32 F. Supp. 2d 690 (S.D.N.Y.
1999); Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Dick's Clothing & Sporting Goods, Inc., No. 98-
1653, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19942 (4th Cir. Aug. 20, 1999); A&H Sportswear Inc. v.
Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000); J & J Snack Foods Corp. v.
Earthgrains, Co., 220 F. Supp.. 2d 358 (D. NJ. 2002); Trouble v. Wet Seal, Inc., 179 F.
Supp. 2d 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); NFL Props, Inc. v. ProStyle, Inc., 57 F Supp. 2d 665
(E.D. Wis. 1999); IDV N. Am. v. S & M Brands, 26 F. Supp. 2d 815 (E.D. Va. 1998); Trs.
of Columbia Univ. v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 964 F Supp. 733, (S.D.N.Y.
1997); Dream Team Collectibles, Inc. v. NBA Props, 958 F Supp. 1401 (E.D.Mo. 1997).
b. Weight:
Sterling Drug v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733 (2d Cir. 1994); Qualitex v. Jacob-
son Prods., 13 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1994); Indianapolis Colts v. Metropolitan Baltimore
Football Club, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (S.D. Ind. 1994); Giant Brands Inc. v. Giant
Eagle, 228 F. Supp. 2d 646 (S.D. Md. 2002); Guinness United Distillers & Vintners BV
v. Anheuser-Busch, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); YKK Corp v. Jungwoo
Zipper Co., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (C.D. Cal. 2002 ); Miguel Torres SA v. Cantine Mez-
zacorona S.C.A.R.I., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1557 (E.D. Va. 1999); Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Mut. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n., 1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17305 (N.D. Ohio
1996); Kraft Gen. Foods v. Allied Old English, 831 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Sara
Lee Corp. v. American Leather Prods., 1998 US Dist. LEXIS 11914 (N.D. Ill. 1998);
Pebble Beach v. Tour 18 I, 942 F. Supp. 1513 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Shakespeare, Co. v.
Silistar Corp. of Am., 906 F. Supp. 997 (D.S.C. 1995); Anheuser-Busch Inc., v Balducci
Publications, 28 F.3d 769 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Jordache Enters. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 841
F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); National Distillers Prods. Co., L.L.C. v. Refreshment
Brands Inc, 198 F. Supp. 2d 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Cache v. M. Z. Berger & Co., 2001
U.S. Dist Lexis 226 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Racetrac Petroleum Inc. v. J.J.'s Fast Stop, Inc.,
2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1569 (N.D.Tex. 2003); Tonka Corp. v. Rose Art Indus., 836 F.
Supp. 200 (D.N.J. 1994); Brockmeyer v. Hearst Corp., 248 F. Supp. 2d 281, (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
II. No Survey Evidence Presented
Ice Cold Auto Air of Clearwater, Inc. v. Cold Air & Asccessories, Inc., 828
F. Supp. 925 (M.D. Fla. 1997); Wyndham Co. v. Wyndham Hotel Co., 670 N.Y.S.2d 995,
176 Misc. 2d 116, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997); Hard Rock Caf6 Int'l. (USA) Inc. v. Morton, No.
97 Civ. 9483, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8340, at *1 (S.D.N.Y June 1, 1999); Am. Family
Life Ins. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682 (N.D. Ohio 2002); Sam's Wines & Liquors, Inc.
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 92 C 5170, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12394 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 2,
1993); J & J Snack Foods, Corp. v. Nestle USA, Inc., 149 F. Supp 2d 136 (D.N.J. 2001);
Apple Corps. Ltd. & Subafilms Ltd. v. Button Master, P.C.P., Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1236 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Am. Auto. Ass'n v. AAA Auto. Club of Queens, Inc., No. 97
CV 1180, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8892 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1999); Porsche Cars N. Am.,
Inc. v. Manny's Porshop, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4519 (N.D.Ill. 1997); CBS Inc. v.
Liederman, 866 F. Supp. 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Quantum Fitness Corp. v. Quantum
Lifestyle Ctrs., L.L.C., 83 F. Supp. 2d 810 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Graham Webb Int'l Ltd. v.
Emporium Drug Mart, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 909, (E.D. Ark. 1995); Maple Grove Farms v.
Euro-Can Prod., Inc., 974 F. Supp. 85, 1997 (D. Mass. 1997); Sea-Roy Corp. v. Parts R
Parts, No. 1998-1, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21809 (M.D. N.C. Dec. 2, 1997); Planet Hol-
lywood, Inc. v. Hollywood Casino Corp., 80 F. Supp. 2d 815 (N.D. Ill 1999); Playboy
Enter. v. Terri Welles, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (S.D. Cal. 1999); Rainforest Caf6, Inc.
v. Amazon, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 886 (D. Minn. 1999); Banfi Prods. Corp. v. Kendall-
Jackson Winery, Ltd., 74 F. Supp. 2d 188 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Patsy's Brand, Inc. v I. 0. B.
Realty, Inc., 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Calvin Klein Jeanswear Co. v.
Tunnel Trading, No. 98 Civ. 5408, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18738 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16,
2001); Pocono Int'l. Raceway v. Pocono Mt. Speedway, 171 F. Supp. 2d 427 (M.D. Pa.
2001); Golden West Fin. v. WMA Mortg. Servs., No. C 02-05727 CRB, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4100 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 12, 2003); Locomotor USA v. Korus Co., 46 F.3d 1142 (9th
Cir. 1995); Int'l. Data Group v. Ziff Davis Media, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 422 (D. Del.
2001).
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The following chart tracks the use of surveys between
1993 and 2003 in more specific numerical terms by year:
10
4
6
3
6
2 5
S 4
2 2 -"' = Infringement Action
2 Survey Presented
Infringement Action
0 _No Survey Presented
Year of case
Figure 2: Use of survey evidence in Lanham Act judgments:
Cases between May 1993-May 2003, by year.
76
As one would expect, fewer surveys were before courts
where there was an application for a preliminary injunction:
6 .
,m oo2
%?%9 %c%% 9 % 0%
I Prelim. lnj. Sought
Survey Presented
=Prelim. Inj. Sought
No Survey Presented
Year of case
Figure 3: Use of survey evidence in Lanham Act opinions: Judgments
on interim injunction applications: May 1993-May 2003.177
176 See supra note 175 (listing cases used to compile data for this chart).
177 This chart is based on the following cases:
I. Survey Evidence and Preliminary Injunction Application
Conopco, Inc. v. Cosmair, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Sterling
Drug v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733 (2d Cir. 1994); Qualitex v. Jacobson Prods., 13 F.3d
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A number of reasons may account for the low use of
survey data in trademark cases. First, as the third chart
indicates, many trademark cases seek a preliminary injunction,
leaving insufficient time to order a survey. As in other
intellectual property contexts, the granting of interim relief can
finally resolve the matter. Second, surveys are expensive.
Smaller firms may not be able to afford to create this kind of
evidence. Third, reliance on survey evidence can be quite
precarious. The bases upon which courts may disregard survey
evidence"'8 usually concern flawed methodology, such as
choosing the wrong universe of respondents,179  leading
1297 (9th Cir. 1994); Indianapolis Colts v. Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club, 31
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (S.D. Ind. 1994); Giant Brands Inc. v. Giant Eagle, 228 F.
Supp. 2d 646, (S.D. Md. 2002); Guinness United Distillers & Vintners BV v. Anheuser-
Busch, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut. v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n., 1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17305 (N.D. Ohio 1996); Kraft
Gen. Foods v. Allied Old English, 831 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Sara Lee Corp. v.
American Leather Prods., 1998 US Dist. LEXIS 11914 (N.D. Ill., 1998).
II. No Survey Evidence and Preliminary Injunction Application
Ice Cold Auto Air of Clearwater, Inc. v. Cold Air & Asccessories, Inc., 828
F. Supp. 925 (M.D. Fla. 1997); Wyndham Co. v. Wyndham Hotel Co., 670 N.Y.S.2d 995,
176 Misc. 2d 116 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1997); Hard Rock Caf6 Int'l. (USA) Inc. v. Morton, No.
97 Civ. 9483, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8340, at *1 (S.D.N.Y June 1, 1999); Am. Family
Life Ins. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682 (N.D. Ohio 2002); Sam's Wines & Liquors, Inc.
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 92 C 5170, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12394 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2,
1993); J & J Snack Foods, Corp. v. Nestle USA, Inc., 149 F. Supp 2d 136 (D.N.J. 2001);
Apple Corps. Ltd. & Subafilms Ltd. v. Button Master, P.C.P., Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1236 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Am. Auto. Ass'n v. AAA Auto. Club of Queens, Inc., No. 97
CV 1180, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8892 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1999); Porsche Cars N. Am.,
Inc. v. Manny's Porshop, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4519 (N.D. Ill. 1997); CBS Inc. v.
Liederman, 866 F. Supp. 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Quantum Fitness Corp. v. Quantum
Lifestyle Ctrs., L.L.C., 83 F. Supp. 2d 810 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Int'l. Data Group v. Ziff
Davis Media, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 422 (D. Del. 2001).
178 Evidentiary objections to survey evidence per se are not among them,
although survey evidence, like other expert testimony must be "not only relevant, but
reliable." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). Rule 702
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as amended in 2000 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony
is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EviD. 702 (2000). While a trial judge has "basic gatekeeping obligation" to
ensure that expert testimony is both relevant and reliable, Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), survey evidence will ordinarily satisfy evidentiary
standards so long as the surveys are conducted in accordance with accepted principles.
Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, n.8 (9th Cir. 1997)). See also
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.14[1][e], at 56-169 to 56-
170 (3d ed. 2002).
179 See Fred W. Morgan, Judicial Standards for Survey Research: An Update
and Guidelines, 54 J. MARKETING 59 (1990); Janet Hoek & Philip Gendall, David Takes
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respondents to particular responses," or failing to identify key
issues, such as the distinction between names of products and
brand names.'8 ' Underlying these technical issues is also a
concern that the artificiality of the survey setting, invariably
somewhat removed from the actual purchasing context, means
that survey evidence can only partially capture the responses
of "real" consumers. Moreover, even when the law treats
consumer attitudes as matters of empirical fact, its concern is
with aggregates of consumers rather than identifiable
individuals. 8 ' Additionally, while important, survey evidence is
not per se dispositive. Instead, as the following section
discusses, it is one of a range of factors courts consider when
assessing the likelihood of consumer confusion."
B. Evaluating Confusion
All circuit courts of appeals and the district courts below
them use a non-exhaustive" set of factors to determine
whether confusion is likely." Analysis of the factors provides
on Goliath: an Analysis of Survey Evidence in a Trademark Dispute, 45 INT'L J.
MARKET RESEARCH 99 (2003); see generally WILLIAM A. BELSON, THE DESIGN AND
UNDERSTANDING OF SURVEY QUESTIONS (1981).
"' See, e.g., Quality Inns International, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 695 F. Supp.
198 (D. Md. 1988) (criticizing a survey for bringing the plaintiffs mark to mind with
one question, which "fueled" the following question as to who owns or sponsors
"McSleep Inn").
181 For a detailed outline of appropriate survey methodology in trademark
infringement cases, see FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION,
THIRD § 21.493 (1995), cited in MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 59, § 32.181.
See also Toys R Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189, 1205(E.D.N.Y. 1983); Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 744 F. Supp. 1259, 1272
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying the Federal Judicial Center's Manual).
182 Jacob Jacoby, The Psychological Foundations of Trademark Law:
Secondary Meaning, Genericism, Fame, Confusion and Dilution, 91 TRADEMARK REP.
1013, 1026 (2001): "Trademark law concepts, such as acquired distinctiveness, fame,
genericism, confusion, and dilution are not . . . applied to the contents of a single
person's mind. Rather, they apply to aggregates of people, typically, the universe of
purchasers or prospective purchasers of the particular product or service at issue."
'' See, e.g., Conopco, Inc. v. May Dept. Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556 (Fed. Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1078 (1995).
184 See, e.g., Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 34
(2d. Cir. 1995).
185 See Keds Corp. v. Renee Intern. Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 222 (1st Cir.
1989); Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Products Co., Inc., 963 F.2d 628,
637(3d Cir. 1992); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 320 (4th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 872 (1992); Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods.
Co., 791 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 1986); Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Marketing
Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1109-10 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith Fiberglass Prods., v.
Ameron, Inc., 7 F.3d 1327, 1329 (7th Cir. 1993); SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d
1086 (8th Cir. 1980); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir.
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
courts with "circumstantial evidence"" from which to assess
the likelihood of confusion. The Second Circuit's list, known as
the "Polaroid factors" after Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elects.
Corp.,'87 is illustrative. The Polaroid factors are: (1) the
strength of the plaintiffs mark; (2) the degree of similarity
between the plaintiffs and defendant's marks; (3) the
proximity of the products or services; (4) the likelihood that
plaintiff will bridge the gap between its products or services
and those marketed by the defendant; (5) evidence of actual
confusion; (6) defendant's good faith in adopting the mark; (7)
the quality of defendant's products or services; and (8) the
sophistication of the buyers. Actual confusion is thus one of
many factors courts evaluate. Moreover, the Polaroid factors
should be weighed "holistically," as the district court for the
Southern District of New York has recently stated, in
determining whether the infringement claim demonstrates a
probability of consumer confusion." And some courts have
observed that a finding of confusion does not even require a
positive finding on a majority of these "digits of confusion.""
Furthermore, not all factors will be relevant in every case. '
Trademark jurisprudence exhibits a large measure of
uncertainty, both at the doctrinal level and in matters of
evidence. Most important for present purposes are the wildly
variable judicial descriptions of the characteristics of the
ordinarily prudent consumer,"' a topic about which the
Lanham Act is silent. Sometimes courts say that the consumer
is "reasonably discerning;""' at other times, the consumer is
1979); Coherent, Inc. v. Coherent Technologies Inc., 935 F.2d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir.
1991); Frehling Enters. Inc. v. Int'l Select Group, Inc., 192 F.3d 1330 (lith Cir. 1999).
'8 See supra note 31.
117 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961).
188 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. v. 24/7 Tribeca Fitness, 277 F. Supp. 2d 356,
366 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). As the First Circuit has noted, a number of factors can be weighed
together, particularly those factors relating to the intersection between plaintiff and
defendant's markets. Pignons S.A. de Mechanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657
F.2d 482, 488 (1st Cir. 1981).
189 Conan Properties, Inc. v. Conans Pizza, Inc., 752 F.2d 145, 150 (5th Cir.
1985); Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc. 931 F.2d 1100, 1106-07
(6th Cir. 1991); Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 141, 194 (5th Cir. 1998).
'90 Lipscher v. LRP Publ'ns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1305, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2001)
(noting that not all of the factors in Frehling Enters., 192 F.3d 1330, will be relevant in
every case).
191 See generally MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 59, § 23:92.
192 Farm Serv. v. United States Steel Corp., 414 P.2d. 898 (Idaho 1966).
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"hasty, heedless and easily deceived.'' We shall consider
courts' views on the astuteness of the ordinarily prudent
consumer in more detail below: How legal actors think about
the perspicuity of consumers' decision-making process is a
significant element that shapes the legal concept of the
"consumer.,,194
Also illustrating trademark doctrine's lack of precision
are the peculiar semantic contortions in which courts engage
when defining and applying the basic concept of "likelihood of
confusion." Typical is this elaboration of the standard by the
Fifth Circuit: "Likelihood of confusion is synonymous with a
probability of confusion, which is more than a mere possibility
of confusion. '. 9. Similarly, courts refuse to be drawn on how
many consumers need to be confused,' invoking instead
malleable standards such as "numerous customers who are
ordinarily prudent consumers," 7 or "an appreciable number of
ordinarily prudent customers. " 8 Even a small number of
consumers may suffice" and, as the Sixth Circuit has observed,
193 Stix Products, Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). The Third Circuit has taken the statutory silence to mean that
trademark's consumer exercises a "normal measure of the layman's common sense andjudgment." United States v. 88 Cases, More or Less, Containing Bireley's Orange
Beverage, 187 F.2d 967 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951). The Supreme
Court has said that trademark law is concerned with "ordinary purchasers buying with
ordinary caution[." McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1878). See also MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS, supra note 59, § 23:92.
'94 See supra Part IV.A.
195 Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 193 (5th Cir. 1998)
(citing Blue Bell Bio-Med. v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1260 (5th Cir. 1989)). See
also A & H Sportswear Inc. v. Victoria's Secret, Inc., 166 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 1999)(holding that the court below erred when applying a "possibility of confusion"
standard); see also MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 59, § 23:3.
196 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 59, § 23:2.
197 Estee Lauder Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503, 1511 (2d Cir. 1997).
198 McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1979)(stating the test as an "appreciable number of ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely
to be misled, or indeed simply confused, as to the source of the goods"). See also
American Ass'n for Advancement of Science v. Hearst Corp., 498 F. Supp. 244 (D.D.C.
1980) (stating that an "appreciable" number is not necessarily a majority);
International Ass'n of Machinists & Aero. Workers v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103
F.3d 196, 201 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[T]he law has long demanded a showing that the
allegedly infringing conduct carries with it a likelihood of confounding an appreciable
number of reasonably prudent purchasers exercising ordinary care."); Streetwise Maps,
Inc. v. VanDam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 743 (2d Cir. 1998) ("A probability of confusion may
be found when a large number of purchasers likely will be confused as to the source of
the goods in question.").
199 McCormick & Co. v. B. Manischewitz Co., 206 F.2d 744, 745-47 (6th Cir.
1953) (citing three instances of actual confusion on the record). In some cases, however,
courts have found too little confusion. See, e.g., Brockmeyer v. Herst, 248 F. Supp. 2d
281, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that defendant's survey showed only less than 3% of
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"the law sets no numerical standard for misguided
purchasers."20 The relevance of the presence or absence of
actual confusion provides another example of doctrinal opacity.
The absence of such evidence may or may not weigh against a
plaintiff."' Of course, flexibility may be required in some
circumstances. However, the general uncertainty as to the
sufficiency and type of confusion required contributes to the
general impression that trademark liability is founded on an
unsteady pile of vague standards.
Sometimes, courts deciding trademark infringement
cases do articulate applicable standards with apparent
precision. But the precision achieved may sometimes be
illusory, particularly since courts determine liability based
upon an holistic evaluation of the evidentiary "factors."
Consider the attempt by the district court for the Northern
District of Illinois in Medic Alert Foundation v. Corel 2 to
pinpoint precisely what it is that consumers need be confused
about. Medic Alert concerned whether use by Corel of a Medic
Alert trademark in its clip art constituted infringement. The
district court for the Northern District of Illinois held that
confusion as to whether Medic Alert sponsored the use of its
trademark by Corel was an insufficient basis for finding
trademark infringement.02 Instead, Medic Alert was required
to show a likelihood that consumers would think that Medic
Alert had "approved of the Corel software."2" While this would
appear to set the bar quite high to a finding of infringement,
the court immediately acknowledged that in some cases an
respondents who saw connection between plaintiffs and defendant's products, which
was held to be an insufficient level of confusion); Cumberland Packing Corp. v.
Monsanto Co., 140 F. Supp. 2d 241, 254 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding survey's confusion
rate of 7.84% insufficient to raise material fact as to likelihood of consumer confusion);
cf. RJR Foods, Inc. v. White Rock Corp., 603 F.2d 1058, 1061 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding a
'consumer survey showing a fifteen to twenty percent rate of product confusion" to be
probative of a showing of confusion).
200 McCormick, 206 F.2d at 747. That confusion of a small number of
consumers is actionable sometimes makes commercial sense, and may be particularly
important for trademark proprietors purveying expensive goods whose profits do not
depend on high volume sales and to which even a handful of lost sales might do
significant financial harm.
20' Hasbro Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing
McGregor-Doniger, 599 F.2d at 1136).
202 43 F. Supp. 2d 933 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
213 Id. at 937.
204 Id. (noting that the approval at issue was not "whether Medic Alert
approved of the use, or alleged use, of its trademarked image, but whether Medic Alert
approved of Corel's software").
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impression of permission to use can give rise to a perception of
approval of the product."' Whether this perception arises
appears to depend on a court's impression of the total factual
circumstances and a weighing of all of the Polaroid (or
equivalent) factors. Particularly relevant will be whether the
goods and the marks are similar."6 Importantly, however, if
"perception of permission to use" can, where other facts are
present, tip over into "perception of approval or endorsement,"
any line between the two situations seems quite blurry indeed.
In the absence of empirical data about consumer
responses, and in a doctrinal context riddled with uncertainty,
courts sometimes spin quite creative narratives about what
consumers think, believe, and value. A form of judicial notice,
these kinds of assumptions about consumer worldviews
permeate trademark law. The Supreme Court continued to
model the technique in its most recent consideration of the
scope of the Lanham Act in the 2003 case of Dastar v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp."7 Parts of the Court's
analysis show just how detailed judicial assumptions about the
consumer worldview can be. At issue was whether the
defendant infringed section 43(a) of the Lanham Act when it
copied and republished public domain audio-visual materials
based on a memoir by President Eisenhower, Crusade in
Europe,"' without acknowledging the party "originally" "2
responsible for making the documentary. Holding that was not
an infringement to do so, the Court elaborated its views about
what consumers care about when confronting brands:
205 Id. (citing Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 1998))
In Pebble Beach, the Fifth Circuit adopted exactly this analysis, observing:
For a party to suggest to the public, through its use of another's mark or a
similar mark, that it has received permission to use the mark on its goods or
services suggests approval, and even endorsement, of the party's product or
service and is a kind of confusion the Lanham Act prohibits.
Pebble Beach, 155 F.3d at 544 (citations omitted).
206 See Medic Alert, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 938 (noting that the products in this
case "could not [have been] more dissimilar").
207 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
20 DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, CRUSADE IN EUROPE (1948).
209 As the Court noted in Dastar, application of the prohibition in section43(a)(1) against conduct likely to cause confusion or mistake as to the origin of goods in
these facts distilled a number of ambiguities. The case involved video-tapes containing
a television documentary based on a book by President Eisenhower. The Court
described the claim of the respondent, Fox Film, to be the "origin" of the works as
"limited." Equally valid - perhaps even better - claimants for that status might be the
original television documentary makers, and other sources of the film, including the
U.S. Army, Navy and Coast Guard, the British Ministry of Information and War Office,
and the unidentified camera operators. 539 U.S. at 35-36.
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Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits actions like trademark
infringement that deceive consumers and impair a producer's
goodwill. It forbids, for example, the Coca-Cola Company's passing
off its product as Pepsi-Cola or reverse passing off Pepsi-Cola as its
product. But the brand-loyal consumer who prefers the drink that
the Coca-Cola Company or PepsiCo sells, while he believes that that
company produced (or at least stands behind the production of) that
product, surely does not necessarily believe that that company was
the "origin" of the drink in the sense that it was the very first to
devise the formula. The consumer who buys a branded product does
not automatically assume that the brand-name company is the same
entity that came up with the idea for the product, or designed the
product - and typically does not care whether it is. The words of the
Lanham Act should not be stretched to cover matters that are
typically of no consequence to purchasers."'
The Court's speculations about consumer expectations
were relevant to the resolution of the controversy in the case -
what confusion as to "origin" meant in section 43(a)(1) of the
Lanham Act, and whether it made sense to think about origin
in terms of the underlying copyright work from which the
product was derived."' For the present analysis, it matters not
whether the Court's assumptions were correct; what is
important is that these are speculations, and present as fairly
naked speculations at that. Absent from the opinion are any
references to empirical data substantiating the view that
trademark law's consumer is more interested in the provenance
of particular goods, rather than the intellectual components,
such as recipes, designs, and ideas.
Cases involving the use of a trademark on secondhand
goods provide further examples of quite detailed assumptions
about the responses of consumers. These cases balance a
trademark holder's ability to maintain control over the quality
of the product to which the mark is attached with the
sustainability of secondhand goods markets."' Consumers
benefit from both. In Champion Spark Plug, Co. v. Sanders,"'
which involved reconditioned sparkplugs bearing the
trademark under which they were sold when new, the Supreme
Court declined to find infringement, observing that "inferiority
2'10 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 32-33.
21 For the reasons discussed supra note 209, the Court recognized that it
would be very difficult to identify exactly what the "underlying" work was. In addition
to the filmic sources, President Eisenhower's book, Crusade in Europe, would have also
been a good candidate.
212 See generally Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947);
Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002).
213 331 U.S. 125 (1947).
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is expected in most second-hand articles. Indeed, they
generally cost the customer less."214 This comment has
contributed to the ability of lower courts to spin out a
complex trademark jurisprudence allowing for the marketing
of branded secondhand goods, and to distinguish the
secondhand goods context from cases involving altered new
(often gray market) goods, where, apparently, consumer
expectations are different, resulting in a greater likelihood of
confusion.215
In Nitro Leisure Products, L.L.C. v. Acushnet Co.,21 the
Federal Circuit recently invoked Champion in a case involving
secondhand golf balls that had been damaged through use. The
defendant had removed the base coat of paint and the clear
coat layer, repainted the balls, added a new exterior coat, and
re-affixed the plaintiffs trademark. The court of appeals
upheld the district court's decision not to preliminarily enjoin
the defendant, partly on the basis that "there is an
understanding on the part of consumers of used or refurbished
products that such products will be degraded or show signs of
wear and tear and will not measure up to or perform at the
same level as if new."217 One problem with this analysis, as
Judge Newman implied in her dissenting opinion, 18 is that a
general assumption about consumer expectations does not tell
us whether consumers might be confused in this instance by
such extensive refurbishing, notwithstanding their general
predisposition to have lowered expectations when purchasing
secondhand goods. For the majority, however, the assumption
about consumer responses solved the problem presented by the
case, which was to limit the trademark owner's ability to wield
too much control over after markets.219
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit
were doing anything particularly unusual: Judicial and
214 Id. at 129-30.
215 One of the leading cases of the latter type is Davidoff & CIE, S.A. v. PLD
Int'l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2001), involving fragrance products from which the
defendant's removal of serial numbers provided part of the basis for finding trademark
infringement. See also Societe Des Produit Nestle S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d
633 (1st Cir. 1992) (same result following defendant's use of different configurations of
chocolate boxes, and colors and texture of packaging, from those used by the plaintiff
trademark proprietor).
216 341 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
217 Id. at 1362 (citing Champion, 331 U.S. at 129-30).
218 Id. at 1366.
219 See generally Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002).
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legislative "shaping" of the consumer worldview by judicial
assumptions about what consumers understand and care about
play a significant role in trademark jurisprudence.2 "' To suggest
that judicial assumptions account for some of the
characteristics of the ordinarily prudent consumer in
trademark jurisprudence does not mean that the common
assumptions that pepper trademark cases are always wrong or
misguided.22' And recourse to assumptions about the consumer
worldview does not necessarily lead to expanded trademark
rights, as Dastar itself indicates. The Court's views on
consumer beliefs about the "origin" of goods led to more
curtailed trademark rights in that instance." That said, an
important implication of seeing how assumptions about the
consumer worldview shape trademark jurisprudence -
sometimes more than empirical data - may be greater
awareness of the possibilities for normative analysis of the way
that trademark law thinks about the consumer. But before
examining in more detail the characteristics of trademark law's
"ordinarily prudent consumer," it is also important to
acknowledge the way that doctrinal and constitutional
concerns also influence trademark law's cognizance of
consumer characteristics.
C. Doctrinal and Constitutional Constraints
Cases such as Dastar and Nitro Leisure illustrate the
general point that part of trademark doctrine is about
protecting what legal actors assume consumers think about
220 See supra Part III.
22' While assumptions that consumers understand basic functions of brands
are relatively uncontroversial, they are not always reliable. Even the most basic
assumption about trademarks, that "marks are treated by purchasers as an indication
that the trademark owner is associated with the product," sometimes don't hold true.
Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 387 (5th
Cir. 1977). I once had a roommate from Odessa, in the former Soviet Union, who had
"jumped ship" literally and figuratively and landed on the shores of New Zealand.
Because Andr6 did not understand that X branded goods came from the same source as
previously enjoyed X branded goods, a trip to the supermarket could take all afternoon.
His breakfast cereal choices, for example, were dictated by reading the lists of
ingredients on the box and studying the illustrations on the packages. Predictably, it
could take quite some time to work down a single aisle. ("Judge Posner is right," I
muttered through gritted teeth, as I began to teach him about the meaning of
"Kellogg's."). Suffice to say, after a month or so in New Zealand, Andrd began shopping
much more efficiently. Initially, grocery shopping with Andr6 illustrated both the
veracity of the search costs rationale and that trademarks serve the purpose of
lowering search costs only when consumers know how brands are meant to work.
222 See supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
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brands. They also illustrate how doctrinal and policy concerns
help construct a zone of "legally non-cognizable confusion.."...
Preserving secondhand goods markets is not the only policy or
doctrinal concern. In other cases, including Dastar, we can see
a number of different doctrinal and constitutional concerns
affecting the kinds of consumer confusion that are legally
cognizable, thereby shaping the concept of the "consumer" as it
is understood by trademark law.
Because Dastar did involve "communicative" material,
material that might be valued for its "intellectual" aspects, the
Court considered whether consumer expectations might differ
for these kinds of products as compared with ordinary
consumer items.25 The Court identified problems with this
argument: in particular, the tension with other intellectual
property policies that would arise if these kinds of consumer
expectations were accorded legal significance. The requirement
that patented and copyrighted works pass into the public
domain on expiration of their term implies that the Lanham
Act should not impose additional fetters on their exploitation.
Moreover, copyright law already provides for a limited "author
attribution" requirement for works of visual arts.22 The Court
reasoned that to find in the Lanham Act a cause of action for
misrepresentation of authorship of non-copyrighted works
would render these limitations superfluous.27
223 See infra Part III.A.
224 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003).
225 Id. at 33-36.
226 Section 603(a) of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
650, 104 Stat. 5128, provides that the author of an artistic work "shall have the right to
claim authorship of that work." 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A) (2000). The attribution right
attaches only to specified works of visual art that are personal to the artist and that
endure only for "the life of the author." Id. § 106A(b), (d)(1), (e); see also § 101
(definition of "work of visual art").
227 Dastar, 539 U.S. at 35. A concern to ensure that trademark protection does
not usurp other intellectual property rights is an important theme in U.S. intellectual
property jurisprudence. See, e.g., Saxlehner v. Wagner, 216 U.S. 375, 380 (1910);
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532
U.S. 23, 30 (2001); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-
151. In Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. New Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2000),
the Ninth Circuit was concerned with the tension between the copyright system and
protections afforded by the Lanham Act. Declining to hold that use of a clip from a film
featuring the Three Stooges in which the copyright had expired in another movie, the
Court refused to "entertain this expedition of trademark protection squarely into the
dominion of copyright law, to allow for Lanham Act coverage of a piece of footage taken
directly from a film by The Three Stooges." Id. at 596. See also Oliveira v. Frito-Lay,
Inc., 251 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2001) (declining to extend trademark protection to a singer's
.signature song").
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Other limitations dictating how much and what kinds of
confusion are legally relevant include genericism and
functionality. Trademark law denies protection to generic
terms... notwithstanding the convictions of "real-life"
consumers that the term designates a specific source of
products or services."9 Like descriptive marks, generic terms
can acquire secondary meaning through extensive advertising
and other types of promotion. However, the concept of
genericism renders almost entirely irrelevant any source-
designating beliefs that consumers might have as a result of
these promotional efforts." ° Any secondary meaning that might
be achieved is characterized as "de facto," rather than "de
jure."' The principle of genericism thus significantly reduces
the legal relevance of any beliefs that "real-life" consumers
might have in the source-designating significance of generic
terms.
228 Were trademark law to permit generic terms to function as trademarks,
the trademark would impose barriers to market entry by other firms who would be
prevented from using the "name" of the product to attract customers. The needs of
competition outweigh any interest a firm might have in using the term as a trademark.
See, e.g., A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 304 (3rd Cir. 1986) ("Courts
refuse to protect a generic term because competitors need it more to describe their
goods than the claimed markholder needs it to distinguish its goods from others.").
' For a discussion on the irrelevance of secondary meaning in the context of
generic terms, see Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d
Cir. 1976) ([Nbo matter how much money and effort the user of a generic term has
poured into promoting the sale of its merchandise and what success it has achieved in
securing public identification, it cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the
product of the right to call an article by its name."). See also Application of Preformed
Line Co., 323 F.2d 1007 (C.C.P.A. 1963); Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden Cracknel and
Specialty Co., 290 F.2d 845 (C.C.P.A. 1961); Application of G.D. Searle & Co., 360 F.2d
650 (C.C.P.A. 1966). The leading case on de facto secondary meaning is the Supreme
Court's decision in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938), which held
that there was no trademark rights in "shredded wheat," despite the fact that
consumers recognized that there was a single source of the product. See also Miller
Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 81 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1025 (1978) (holding "LITE" beer to be generic, despite consumer recognition
of the term "LITE" as designating source); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. John Labatt Ltd.,
89 F.3d 1339, 1346 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1109 (1997) (deeming "ice"
beer to begeneric); Dranoff-Perlstein Associates v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1992)
(telephone numbers that designate generic terms not protectable, even if they have
acquired secondary meaning).
230 Some authority exists for the proposition that, notwithstanding the
genericism of a mark, the junior user may be required as a matter of fairness to take
reasonable steps to dispel confusion. See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S.
111 (1938).
231 See, e.g., In re Deister Concentrator Co. 289 F.2d 496, 502 (C.C.P.A. 1961)
(explaining the difference between secondary meaning that gives rise to trademark
rights, and de facto secondary meaning in generic terms, which does not).
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The functionality doctrine aims at preventing
trademark law from usurping the role of patents. It does this
by precluding firms from asserting their trademark rights in
ways that risk removing from the public domain technical
innovations that have not achieved the level of inventiveness
required by the patent system or innovations that were the
subject of expired patents.3 ' Accordingly, even if consumers
think that "X-shaped goods come from the same source as X-
shaped goods previously enjoyed," if the "X shape" is also
functional, there are overriding policy reasons for not
protecting consumers in such beliefs.3 Like genericism, the
functionality doctrine helps to render legally irrelevant some
forms of "actual" consumer confusion that might be ascertained
through survey evidence." The policy against establishing
rights in functional aspects of products has also influenced the
Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence on the kind of
distinctiveness required for product designs to be accorded
trademark significance. In support of its holding in Wal-mart
Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers that product designs require a
showing of secondary meaning to act as trademarks, the Court
expressed a concern about the potential anti-competitive effects
of regarding product designs as inherently distinctive for
trademark purposes.3 ' One result of Wal-mart is to resurrect a
22 See TraFfix Devices, 532 U.S. at 25, 32 (articulating the test for
functionality in utilitarian product features as whether the features are "essential to
the use or purpose of the device or when it affects the cost or quality of the device," and
holding that in cases involving aesthetic functionality, it is proper to inquire into
whether the protection of the aspect of the product will give rise to a "significant non-
reputation-related disadvantage"); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159,
164-65 (1995) (noting that the functionality doctrine prevents trademark law from
inhibiting legitimate competition by protecting useful product features, which is the
province of patent law). See also W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337 (7th
Cir.1985) (noting that the functionality doctrine prevents conflict between trademark
and patent law). According trademark protection to marks that serve functional
purposes would impose barriers to entry for other firms. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v.
Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 775 (1992) (holding that only non-functional trade
dress is protected "to assure that competition will not be stifled by the exhaustion of a
limited number of trade dresses"); Taco Cabana, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 113,
1119 (holding that the functionality doctrine "secures for the marketplace a latitude of
competitive alternatives").
23 TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 34; See also Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v.Godinger Silver Art Co., Inc., 916 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976(1991) (plaintiff may not exclude competitors from using functional design elements
necessary to compete in the market, "whatever secondary meaning [plaintiffs design]
may have acquired").
U For further discussion, see Dinwoodie, Rational Limits, supra note 47.
M5 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000).
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concern with the trademark taxonomy."' Some trade dress in
the form of packaging can be regarded as inherently distinctive
and, as a result of the Court's earlier decision in Two Pesos,
Inc. v. Taco Cabana," some intermediate categories, such as
restaurant d6cor, may also be distinctive.' On the other hand,
it may be more difficult to establish trademark significance in
product design due to the categorical requirement of secondary
meaning. Wal-mart invites litigants to argue over the category
of the mark. Another implication of the decision is that it seems
to render legally irrelevant factual concerns with how
consumers might actually respond to distinctive product
packaging.239
Constitutional concerns also have the potential to limit
the scope of trademark rights. This potential exists particularly
where trademarks cease to act as designators of source and
become even more susceptible to characterization as property
in their own right.4 ° As trademark rights become tethered less
to the concept of goodwill, marketers and consumers may
delight in more robust understandings of trademarks, 4' and
semioticians might celebrate a more honest recognition of
trademarks as "floating signifiers."24 ' Yet if trademark rights
expand too far, they risk challenge on the ground that the
federal government should not be engaged in creating property
rights of potentially perpetual duration beyond the more
limited scope afforded by the Copyright and Patents Clause of
the Constitution.2 3  Unless buoyed by some compelling,
236 Cf Dinwoodie, supra note 85.
237 505 U.S. 763 (1992). In Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., 514 U.S. 159
(1995), the Court earlier added another categorical distinction. It held that colors may
function as trademarks, but only on a showing of secondary meaning.
23 See Wal-mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
239 This suggestion follows the anlaysis in Dinwoodie, Rational Limits, supra
note 47.
240 See discussion supra note 89.
241 Beebe, supra note 16, at 621.
242 Beebe, supra note 16, at 626.
243 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8: "Congress shall have the power.., to promote
the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." The
reference to "limited times" in the clause indicates that Congress would not be
empowered to enact copyrights or patents of unlimited duration. See Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 743 (2002). Instrumentalist rationales for trademark rights tend to
distinguish them from copyrights and patents, characterizing trademarks as a limited
type of property that attaches, and owes its existence, to a firm's existing goodwill. See,
e.g., United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918):
The asserted doctrine is based upon the fundamental error of supposing that
a trade-mark right is a right in gross or at large, like a statutory copyright or
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alternative rationale, "rights in gross" - signifiers that aspire
not only to float, but to float perpetually - risk being caught on
the uncertain shores of emerging doctrine concerning the
relationship between the Commerce and Copyright and Patents
244Clauses. s
In addition to creating property rights, trademarks are
also part of speech;45 to the extent that trademark rights limit
a patent for an invention, to either of which, in truth, it has little or no
analogy.... There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a
right appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with
which the mark is employed. The law of trade-marks is but a part of the
broader law of unfair competition; the right to a particular mark grows out of
its use, not its mere adoption; its function is simply to designate the goods as
the product of a particular trader and to protect his good will against the sale
of another's product as his; and it is not the subject of property except in
connection with an existing business.
Id. at 97 (internal citation omitted). For a more recent iteration of the same principle,
see TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001): "[Trademark law] does not exist to reward
manufacturers for their innovation in creating a particular device; that is the purpose
of the patent law and its period of exclusivity."
244 See, e.g., United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999)
(holding anti-bootlegging statute empowered by Commerce Clause, notwithstanding
arguable inconsistencies with the Copyright Clause). Until recently, the Supreme
Court has been quite solicitous of the powers vested in Congress to shape trademark
rights in accordance with commercial imperatives. For example, in San Francisco Arts
& Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522 (1987), the Court confronted
an argument that statutory limitations on the use of "Olympic" by parties other than
the U.S. Olympic Committee (USOC) were unconstitutional. Upholding the statute, the
Court characterized the powers Congress has in the trademark context broadly enough
to encompass recent expansions in trademark rights, including dilution doctrine:
Although the Lanham Act protects only against confusing uses, Congress'judgment respecting a certain word is not so limited. Congress reasonably
could conclude that most commercial uses of the Olympic words and symbols
are likely to be confusing. It also could determine that unauthorized uses,
even if not confusing, nevertheless may harm the USOC by lessening the
distinctiveness and thus the commercial value of the marks.
Id. at 539. In contrast, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23
(2003), perhaps reflects a growing unease with too much expansion of trademark
rights, particularly where the scope of the rights conflicts with copyright and patent
law. Though Dastar involved arguments about the limited construction of the Lanham
Act, the Court's analysis possibly also adverts to a more limited approach to the scope
of the protections that can be afforded to trademarks that would be consistent with the
constitutional structure for protecting intellectual property.
245 The Supreme Court captured this tension in San Francisco Arts &
Athletics:
This Court has recognized that words are not always fungible, and that the
suppression of particular words "run[s] a substantial risk of suppressing
ideas in the process." . . . Yet this recognition always has been balanced
against the principle that when a word acquires value "as the result of
organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money" by an entity,
that entity constitutionally may obtain a limited property right in the word.
483 U.S. at 532 (footnotes and citations omitted). In copyright law, First Amendment
concerns are largely addressed through the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use
defense. The potential for the First Amendment to constrain copyright law was
vigorously pursued in argument before the Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
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others' speech,4' they may implicate the First Amendment.24 7
First Amendment concerns have become more acute in
trademark law in part because trademarks today do more
expressive work than merely symbolizing firms' goodwill.2 " In
situations where it is necessary to identify a product or service
using the trademark, the Ninth Circuit has spearheaded a
version of the fair use defense for "referential" or "nominative"
uses of trademarks.2 4' The defense is not available where the
U.S. 186 (2003). The Court did not accept the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit, that
copyright law is "categorically immune" from First Amendment scrutiny. However, the
Court reasoned that where copyright legislation that is consistent with copyright law's
"traditional contours," by providing for fair use and protecting expression rather than
ideas, further First Amendment scrutiny would not be necessary. See id. at 221.
216 First Amendment challenges have been raised in the context of section 2(a)
of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2000), which precludes registration of marks
that consist of or comprise "immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter." The Federal
Circuit has rejected such challenges on the basis that:
[p]revious decisions of this court and our predecessor court, however, have
rejected First Amendment challenges to refusals to register marks under
section 1052(a), holding that the refusal to register a mark does not proscribe
any conduct or suppress any form of expression because it does not affect the
applicant's right to use the mark in question.
In re Boulevard Entertainmnet Inc., 334 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also In re
Mavety Media Group, Ltd., 33 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re McGinley, 660
F.2d 481, 484 (C.C.P.A. 1981). In contrast, trademark infringement actions more
obviously raise First Amendment concerns, because robust protection of trademark
rights does risk precluding others' use of the trademarks (as opposed to their
registration) in expressive communications.
247 See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional
Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS.
L. REV. 158; Dreyfuss, Express Genericity, supra note 48. For an alternative
perspective, arguing that trademark law does not need to be supplemented by First
Amendment jurisprudence, see Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech,
27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187 (2004).
248 "Apple" for computers communicates relatively little. If confined to its
"core" function, all the mark would really say is: "this is the symbol of the goodwill
Apple Computers Inc. has established in its products and services." Conceptualized in
this way, trademarks carry relatively little semiotic force; they can neither be agreed
with nor argued with. Perhaps the only cogent response to a trademark is another
trademark (e.g., "Dell," or "Gateway," or "IBM"). If trademark rights were constrained
in this way, it is difficult to see how any First Amendment concerns would arise. It is of
course because trademarks do so much more communicative work that numerous
commentators have become concerned with their potential to impede communication.
Some of the most interesting work in this context has been by Professor Rosemary
Coombe, whose work explores whether the distinction between "commercial" uses of
trademarks, and expressive uses - in newspaper articles, television news programs,
and the like - has exhausted its usefulness. See COOMBE, supra note 9, at 274-97.
249 See New Kids on the Block v. New America Publishing, 971 F.2d 302 (9th
Cir. 1992). See also KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 328
F.3d 1061, 1072 (2003) (holding that in such cases, it is not necessary to address the
likelihood of confusion question, because the nominative fair use analysis replaces the
confusion issue). Section 33(b)(4) of the Lanham Act also contains a more limited
'statutory" fair use defense, 15 U.S.C. §1115(b)(4) (2000), which is available, inter alia,
where trademark rights have been established in a descriptive term. Other traders
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user of the trademark suggests sponsorship or endorsement by
the trademark owner." Though the Ninth Circuit deliberately
avoided deciding the case on First Amendment grounds,"5 ' it did
regard the recognition of fair use defenses in trademark law as
ameliorating, at least to some extent, the "primary cost" of
recognizing trademark rights, namely the "removal of words
from (or perhaps non-entrance into) our language."2  Where an
"expressive" use of the trademark can be identified,"
may use the descriptive character of the mark, but not the "secondary" trademark
sense. See Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 905-06 (9th Cir. 2003); KP
Permanent Make-Up, 328 F.3d at 1061, 1071. Cf. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 970 (10th Cir. 1996) (observing that both copyright
and trademark law have "built-in mechanisms" for accommodating First Amendment
values).
2. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308.
251 "[Wlhere we are able to resolve the case on nonconstitutional grounds, we
ordinarily must avoid reaching the constitutional issue." Id. at 305 (citing In re Snyder,
472 U.S. 634, 642-43 (1985), and Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 585 (1982)).
252 New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 305.
2& Courts have confronted the tension between trademark rights and the
First Amendment more directly in cases involving parodies of trademarks or other
.expressive" uses. The "expressive" element aspect of the test is accompanied by a
requirement of an "artistic relationship" between the contested mark and the artistic
expression. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (1989); see also id. at 1006 (Griesa,
J., concurring). In a recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit, the
Court remanded the issue of whether the use of "Rosa Parks" had sufficient artistic
relevance to satisfy the Rogers test, characterizing this question as a matter for the
tribunal of fact. Rosa Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 458 (6th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 925 (2003). For the purposes of the interaction of the First
Amendment and trademark rights, parody is an "example" of the types of expressive
content that is favored under First Amendment analysis. Yankee Publishing Inc. v.
News America Publ'g, Inc., 809 F.Supp. 267, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Some courts consider
that parodies require "more protection than the labeling of ordinary commercial
products" and have held that in deciding the reach of the Lanham Act in any case
where an expressive work is alleged to infringe a trademark, it is appropriate to weigh
the public interest in free expression against the public interest in avoiding consumer
confusion. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d at 998-99; Nike, Inc. v. Just Did It Enters. 6 F.3d 1225,
1228 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that in trademark cases, parody does not give rise to an
affirmative defense and is "but an additional factor in the analysis"); Cliff Notes, Inc. v.
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1989). The
Ninth Circuit appeared to take a stricter approach in Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v.
Penguin Books USA Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997). See Films of Distinction, Inc. v.
Allegro Film Prods., Inc., 12 F. Supp 2d 1068, 1078 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (interpreting Dr.
Seuss as establishing the proposition that the Ninth Circuit will not adapt the
conventional likelihood of confusion analysis for book titles). More recently, however,
the Ninth Circuit has accorded greater deference to First Amendment values in
trademark infringement cases involving expressive use of trademarks. See Mattel, Inc,
v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1171
(2003) (distinguishing Dr. Seuss). The Tenth Circuit, in contrast, has held that
trademark law has "built-in mechanisms that serve to avoid First Amendment
concerns," implying that special treatment for expressive uses of trademarks is not
warranted. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n 95 F.3d 959, 970-
71 (10th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing federal trademark and copyright law from
Okalahoma's right of publicity statute, which does not make accommodations for First
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defendants are given further leeway than is ordinarily the case
in trademark law: Even if some consumer confusion arises, the
constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression
"outweighs any minor injury to the plaintiffs' trademark
rights.""
Trademark rights, then, are a product of far more - and
far less - than what "real" consumers think or believe. The
characteristics of the "ordinarily prudent consumer" are partly
empirically determined, but they are also shaped by judicial
assumptions about consumer beliefs and values, by economic
policy concerns, such as the preservation of after markets, and
also by a number of doctrinal and constitutional limitations. As
the following Part discusses, trademark rights are also the
product of legal actors' assumptions about the characteristics of
the reasonably prudent consumer.
IV. CONSTRUCTING CONSUMERS
Professor Justin Hughes has examined ways that
intellectual property law serves a variety of "audience
interests."" His analysis has purchase for trademarks as well
as other forms of intellectual property where consumers seek to
rely on, amongst other things, the "stability" and accuracy of
the information provided by the mark." There is, however, an
important preliminary step: identifying who the audience or
Amendment concerns). The Eighth Circuit recently discussed the relationship between
First Amendment concerns in Parks,, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003), and reasoned that
expressive uses of trademarks warranted special treatment to give sufficient weight to
First Amendment concerns. The Court reasoned that the approach of the Tenth Circuit
in Cardtoons, and the approach adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Mutual of Omaha
Insurance Co., v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir.1987) (no defense available where the
defendant had "sufficient alternative means" to convey his or her idea), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 933 (1988), were insufficiently protective of First Amendment concerns.
Parks, 329 F.3d at 449-50.
2 Yankee Publ'g, 809 F. Supp at 272.
25 Justin Hughes, "Recoding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience
Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923 (1999) (hereinafter Hughes, Recoding). Hughes uses the
"audience interest" theme to critique scholarship that has suggested that too expansive
intellectual property rights damage disenfranchised groups who seek to "re-code"
intellectual products, deploying them to create new, and often iconoclastic cultural and
personal meanings and to argue that solicitude for this perspective risks neglecting the
interests that consumers of intellectual products might have in more passive kinds of
consumption of intellectual property products and in the "stability" of intellectual
creations. For a sample of this literature, see, e.g., Michael Madow, Private Ownership
of the Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV 125 (1993);
Rosemary Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property
Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1854 (1991).
- 2' Hughes, Recoding, supra note 255, at 991-92.
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"the consumer" is. Answering that question requires
interrogating the meaning trademark law accords to the
consumer in a variety of doctrinal settings. In the discussion
above, we saw that trademark law has various kinds of
"people" in mind when courts apprehend the likely confusion of
"consumers." Legal actors accord different meanings to the
"person," and have a tendency to slip, often unthinkingly,
between these meanings.257 One route toward making explicit
trademark law's theory of the consumer is to engage more
deeply with the doctrine that ascribes characteristics to the
"ordinarily prudent consumer." In the previous Part, we saw
that trademark law's consumer is a legal construct. This Part
examines in more detail how she is constructed.
A. Perspicuity
As we have seen, courts have adopted differing stan-
dards for the level of astuteness ordinarily prudent consumers
bring to their purchasing decisions. At times, courts assume
that "purchasers will act with ordinary care to see that they get
what they want."25 Some strands of case law, particularly from
the early decades of the twentieth century, emphasized that
"the public must be credited with a minimum capacity for dis-
crimination."59 More recently, however, ordinarily prudent con-
sumers have also been characterized as "credulous," "inexperi-
enced," and "gullible."" One result of the different standards
available is that courts have a large measure of teleological
flexibility. Professor J. Thomas McCarthy observes: "When the
court wants to find no infringement, it says that the average
257 See generally Ngaire Naffine, Who are Law's Persons? From Cheshire Cats
to Responsible Subjects, 66 MOD. L. REV. 346 (2003); Note, What We Talk About When
We Talk About Persons: The Language of a Legal Fiction, 114 HARv. L. REV. 1745
(2001).
21 Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc. v. Penn-Maryland Corp., 79 F.2d 836, 839 (2d
Cir. 1935) (citing Ward Baking Co. v. Potter-Wrightington, 298 F. 398 (1st Cir. 1924)).
259 Id. at 839 (citing Armour & Co. v. Louisville Provision Co., 283 F. 42 (6th
Cir. 1922), Wornova Mfg. Co., v. McCawley & Co., 11 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1926), and
Stevens Linen Works v. William & John Don & Co., 121 F. 171, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1903)).
26 See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 59, § 23:93; see also supra note
3. In a 1948 case involving likelihood of confusion between a famous New York
nightclub, the Stork Club, and a modest bar in the San Francisco Tenderloin district
with the same name, the Ninth Circuit said: "It may well be true that a prudent and
worldly-wise passerby would not be so deceived. The law, however, protects not only
the intelligent, the experienced, and the astute. It safeguards from deception also the
ignorant, the inexperienced, and the gullible." Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166
F.2d 348, 359 (9th Cir. 1948).
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buyer is cautious and careful and would never be confused. But
if the judge thinks there is infringement, the judge sets the
standard lower and says the average buyer is gullible and not
so discerning, and would be easily confused by the similar
marks." 6'
How judges characterize the perspicuity of the con-
sumer is, as Professor McCarthy's observation implies, an im-
portant element in determining the scope of trademark pro-
prietors' rights. Sometimes, the way that judges calibrate the
perspicuity of consumers is discernible from their conclusions
about what might confuse consumers on the particular facts of
a case. These can sometimes be more illuminating than their
express statements on the topic. In Best Cellars, Inc. v. Grape
Finds at Dupont, Inc.,262 for example, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York preliminarily enjoined the de-
fendants from using design elements similar to those used by
the plaintiff to decorate its wine stores and display its prod-
ucts.2" The focus of the case was the allegation that the defen-
dant had copied the plaintiffs "Wall of Wine," a unique way the
plaintiff had devised to display wine bottles." The court formu-
lated the likelihood of confusion test as follows: "[I]s there a
substantial likelihood that an ordinarily prudent consumer
would, when standing in the [defendant's] store think he was
standing in [the plaintiffs] store?"6' After applying the Polar-
oid factors, the court answered affirmatively. ' The court found
a likelihood of success on the merits, notwithstanding a num-
ber of important differences in the layout of the parties'
stores.26 ' From the court's holding and the manner in which it
261 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 59, § 23:92.
262 90 F. Supp. 2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
263 Best Cellars was a case, the Southern District of New York acknowledged,
that "present[ed] the tension between the protection of certain intellectual property
and free and open competition." Id. at 434.
264 The court described the "wall of wine" in these terms:
The essence of the look, however, is the "wall of wine," i.e., the color- coded,
iconographic wall signs identifying eight taste categories above single display
bottles on stainless-steel wire pedestals which run along the store perimeter,
above identical color-coded textually formatted square shelf-talkers, above
vertical arrays of nine glowing bottles stacked horizontally, above a strip of
cabinets or drawers which extend to the floor.
Id. at 452.
262 Id. at 454.
266 id.
267 The relevant findings were as follows:
There are differences between the two stores. The Grape Finds store has
a vaulted ceiling, meant to evoke a wine cellar. It is a prominent design
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articulated the test, it appears that the ordinarily prudent con-
sumer is somebody who has no idea how she gets in and out of
wine stores. Perhaps something about the product caused the
court to be unconcerned with exactly how consumers ended up
in the defendant's store. Presumably, however, there were
some factors that might dissipate confusion, such as the differ-
ent names of the store and the differences between the parties'
trade dress. From the way that the court stated the test, how-
ever, it seems that the ordinarily prudent consumer is quite
oblivious to these clues."
There are innumerable examples in trademark law
where findings of trademark infringement suggest that con-
sumers really are quite susceptible to confusion: A purveyor of
"Mountain King" artificial Christmas trees secured a prelimi-
nary injunction against a party selling the same goods under
the "Alpine Emperor" mark,"9 based on the conceptual similar-
ity of the two marks. The United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals has found that "Cup-O'-Cola" branded sodas
would be confusingly similar to the famous "Coca Cola" brand,
on the basis that "the semantic differences which may exist
between the two marks 'Cup-O'-Cola' and 'Coca-Cola' would, we
feature. The floor of the store is cork. There are eleven mobile boxes in the
store which can be used as seats, for display, and for storage of additional
cases of wine. The boxes are arranged in varying ways on the store floor.
There is an alcove space at the back of the store where a wooden table
and several chairs are located for wine tastings. In the alcove there is also
traditional shelving with smoked glass panels. Grape Finds does not have a
mobile cart for food preparation.
Stainless steel is more prominent in the Grape Finds design. As
mentioned, there are stainless steel blades running from floor to ceiling,
dividing the categories. On each blade is written the primary and the
secondary descriptors for the Grape Finds category marked off by that blade.
The cash wrap is on wheels, has a linoleum top, has shelves along the
front and top, is curved, and is finished with metal. It is located at the middle
of one of the long walls.
There is no burgundy wall in the Grape Finds store.
The layout of the Grape Finds store resembles a wine bottle, though
Adamstein testified that this was more happenstance based on the
configuration of the lease space than deliberate design.
Id. at 443.
2M The opinion in subsequent litigation involving Best Cellars' attempt to
protect its trade dress presents a more subtle analysis. In Best Cellars, Inc. v. Wine
Made Simple, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 11780, 2003 WL 1212815 (S.D.N.Y. March 14, 2003),
Judge Lynch recognized that, in trade dress cases involving claims that consumer
confusion is likely based on a similarity between two stores' ddcor, the combination of
different elements used by the defendant in its trade dress may dispel consumer
confusion.
26 American Technical Industries, Inc. v. General Foam Plastics Corp., 200
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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think, be lost on the average purchaser in the market place. 70
It is important, however, not to press too far the point that
trademark's consumer does not seem particularly astute, given
the risk that marginal cases might characterize the middle.
Every case finding unlikely confusion to be actionable can be
matched by cases where confusion that seems as likely was not
actionable."' Moreover, findings about likelihood of confusion
are necessarily impressionistic and present issues on which
people might reasonably disagree.
More telling indications of how the law constructs the
ordinarily prudent consumers can be found in the interstices of
trademark doctrine and the legislative scheme, and in the jus-
tifications courts and commentators give for finding infringe-
ment under the various causes of action that comprise the uni-
verse of "trademark infringement."
B. The "Thought Burden"
Some parts of trademark law minimize the thinking
required by consumers when confronting different traders'
goods, suggesting that the ordinarily prudent consumer does
not want to think particularly hard. In these cases, it doesn't
matter how astute consumers are: Some strands of trademark
doctrine seem to remove the opportunities that consumers
might have to act with acuity in their marketplace activities.
Dilution and initial interest confusion doctrine provide
examples.
1. Dilution doctrine
Judge Posner's discussion of possible rationales for
dilution doctrine in the recent case of Ty Inc. v. Perryman72
evinces a concern with protecting consumers from having to
engage in much discriminating thought. Dilution doctrine
2 7
1
27 Coca-Cola Co. v. Clay, 324 F.2d 198, 200 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
271 Compare Coca-Cola Co. v. Clay, 324 F.2d 198 (C.C.P.A. 1963) (holding that
"coca-cola" and "cup-o'-cola" likely to be confusing), with Coca-Cola Co. Essential
Products Co., 421 F.2d 1374 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (holding "coca cola" and "coco loco" not
confusing). For an illuminating list of cases of each type, see MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS, supra note 59, § 23.23 to 24.
272 306 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2002).
273 Trademark dilution doctrine is probably best understood as a distinct
genus of trademark liability. Prohibitions against dilution arguably create "trespass"-
based rights, whereby the harm is conceptualized in terms of the damage to the
plaintiffs property in the mark, rather than to the goodwill that the mark represents.
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operates not where consumers would be confused as to the
source of goods, but where the luster and clarity of the
plaintiffs mark would be "blurred" by the defendant's use of
the mark, even in remote market contexts. Positing the
example of a restaurant that calls itself "Tiffany,"74 Judge
Posner reasoned:
There is little danger that the consuming public will think it's deal-
ing with a branch of the Tiffany jewelry store if it patronizes this
restaurant. But when consumers next see the name "Tiffany" they
may think about both the restaurant and the jewelry store, and if so
the efficacy of the name as an identifier of the store will be dimin-
ished."'
Judge Posner continued: "Consumers will have to think harder
- incur as it were a higher imagination cost - to recognize the
name as the name of the store."76
Milton Handler, Are the State Antidilution Laws Compatible with the National
Protection of Trademarks?, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 269, 273 (1985) [hereinafter Handler,
Antidilution Laws]. Even within the "core" function of trademark law, trademark law
recognized that a property right was being protected; however, consumer harm
provided the reason for protecting this species of property. For a characterization of
trademarks as a species of property, see, for example, In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100
U.S. 82, 92 (1879) (characterizing "the whole system of trade-mark" as founded on the
concept of "a property right"). This view had also been adopted at the state level. See,
e.g., Derringer v. Plate, 29 Cal. 292, 295 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1865)("[T]he right of property in
a trade mark accrues without the aid of a statute."). For an explanation of the "dual
purpose" of trademarks, that of protecting the public and the proprietor, see, for
example, Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Goldwyn, 296 F. 391, 401 (2d Cir. 1924) ("[Tlhe
court seeks to protect the purchasing public from deception and also the property rights
of the complainant."). The difference between the "trespass" and "confusion" rationale
remains important, however. The latter constructs trademarks as a "special" property,
which is limited by the extent to which the defendant's conduct causes material
consumer confusion. "Trespass-based" rights are not limited in this way, which
explains why some commentators have characterized dilution doctrine as more
consistent with a "trespass" paradigm. See Handler, Antidilution Laws, supra. Limits
to the scope of dilution doctrine, are, however, emerging, as is indicated by the
Supreme Court's analysis in Mosely v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
By implication, the Court's holding in V Secret that a showing of actual dilution is
required underscores the doctrinal reality that, even within a dilution-based analysis,
not all "trespasses" are infringing. For an excellent recent discussion of dilution
doctrine, see Brian A. Jacobs, Note, Trademark Dilution on the Constitutional Edge,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 161 (2004).
214 Cf. Tiffany & Co. v. The Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp 836 (D. Mass.
1964).
275 Ty Inc., 306 F.3d at 511.
276 Id. (emphasis added). As a further illustration of the nature of dilution,
Judge Posner then gave an example of tarnishment, where the junior user of "Tiffany"
is operating a strip joint rather than a restaurant. Id. Once again, "even more
certainly" than in the restaurant case, consumers "will not think [that] the striptease
joint [was] under common ownership with the jewelry store." Id. However, "because of
the inveterate tendency of the human mind to proceed by association, every time they
think of the word "Tiffany" their image of the fancy jewelry store will be tarnished by
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The Supreme Court's more recent examination of
dilution doctrine in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. seems,
at first blush, to differ from Judge Posner's approach. The key
doctrinal significance of V Secret lies in the Supreme Court's
holding that the federal dilution statute requires a showing of
"actual," as opposed to the mere "likelihood" of, dilution.277
However, the case is also likely to be important for its analysis
of what "actual dilution" means, and the kind of evidence
needed to establish that it has occurred (or might occur).278 The
Court rejected the idea that "mere" mental association between
the senior and junior users' marks is sufficient to establish
association of the word with the strip joint." Id. Thus, in Judge Posner's view,
"tarnishment" is another species of "blurring," and, if the imagination costs rationale is
correct, it would explain the imposition of liability for both forms of trademark
infringement. Judge Posner has recently returned to the "Tiffany's" example in extra-
judicial writing, and, with Professor Landes, has suggested that dilution "protects
trademark owners from the loss of value resulting from nonconfusing duplication of
their trademarks (as where a hot dog stand adopts the name "Tiffany's")." William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471,
485 (2003). It is important to record that Judge Posner's exegesis on dilution doctrine
in Ty Inc. v. Perryman was speculative only, as is indicated by his statement that
"tihere are (at least) three possibilities relevant to this case, each defined by a
different underlying concern." Ty Inc., 306 F.3d at 511.
Certainly, dilution doctrine seems more palatable from a policy perspective
if it does something positive for consumers rather than just protecting the property
interests of proprietors of famous trademarks Cf. Litman, Breakfast with Batman,
supra note 48. An obvious problem with subsuming the "imagination costs" explanation
within the economic orthodoxy of the search costs rationale however, is that it is not
clear why imposing a higher imagination cost should give rise to dilution-based
liability, when it does not give rise to liability for confusing or misleading uses of
trademarks. Trademark law has long tolerated the use of the same or similar
trademarks on different goods, where there is no likelihood of confusion. Even a famous
mark such as "Apple," when used in conjunction with computers, has to compete with a
number of other "apple" trademarks that might enter consumers' imaginations when
they think of the stylish brand of computer merchandise. For recent judicial discussion
of various uses of "apple" trademarks, see Interstellar Starship Services, Ltd. v. Tchou,
304 F.3d 936, 944 n.8 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the PTO website reports 679 active
trademark registrations which include the word "apple"). There is an "Apple" bank in
New York and elsewhere, for example, and many consumers will recall that records by
the English pop group "The Beatles" were always published by "Apple Records."
Moreover, "Apple" has all sorts of non-trademark meaning - as a literal description for
a type of fruit, and in various metaphoric contexts, such as "Big Apple," which is a
description for at least two American cities. Presumably, these marks and ordinary
uses of the word "apple" might enter at least some consumers' minds when they
confront the "Apple" trademark. Distinguishing between them requires the kind of
cognitive activity against which Judge Posner suggests we need to be protected. But if
having to think hard were the touchstone of liability, many of the commercial uses of
"Apple" would presumably have been enjoined long ago.
277 See generally Beebe, supra note 16, at 690-91.
218 See also V Secret, 537 U.S. 418, 435 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (pointing out
that interim relief remains available for trademark dilution and that accordingly, the
prospect of dilution provides a basis for a court's intervention).
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liability.79 Instead, the Court seems to require a kind of
"association" that will lead to the mental impression of the
senior user's mark being changed, so that its meaning becomes
associated with the junior user's mark or less strongly
associated with the senior user's goods or services."'
At least one commentator"' has suggested that the
Supreme Court's approach is consistent with the established
principle that merely causing consumers to call to mind
another's mark is not trademark infringement." However,
when it is recalled how courts determine what consumers
think,' this may prove to be a distinction in degree rather than
kind. The V Secret Court did not require that the plaintiff
demonstrate economic consequences of dilution, such as loss of
income as a result of the defendant's conduct.2" Moreover, the
Court confirmed that "direct evidence of dilution such as
279 V Secret, 537 U.S. at 433. "'Blurring' is not a necessary consequence of
mental association. (Nor, for that matter, is 'tarnishing.')." Id. at 434.
280 These requirements can be inferred from the following parts of the
Supreme Court's analysis in V Secret. First, when discussing Ringling Bros. Barnum &
Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999),
which concerned an allegation that "the greatest snow on earth" used for winter
sporting events diluted the famous Ringling Brothers/Barnum & Bailey trademark,
"the greatest show on earth," the court observed:
We do agree, however, with that court's conclusion that, at least where the
marks at issue are not identical, the mere fact that consumers mentally
associate the junior user's mark with a famous mark is not sufficient to
establish actionable dilution. As the facts of that case demonstrate, such
mental association will not necessarily reduce the capacity of the famous
mark to identify the goods of its owner, the statutory requirement for dilution
under the FTDA. For even though Utah drivers may be reminded of the
circus when they see a license plate referring to the "greatest snow on earth,"
it by no means follows that they will associate "the greatest show on earth"
with skiing or snow sports, or associate it less strongly or exclusively with the
circus.
V Secret, 537 U.S. at 433-34. The standard adopted by the Supreme Court in V Secret
seems quite close to a form of trademark liability known as "reverse passing off," one of
the manifestations of which is the swamping of senior user's mark by the junior user.
The legal "harm" is done to the mental impression that consumers have of the senior
user's mark, which risks being "displaced" by the new message being purveyed by thejunior user. See, e.g., Murray v. Cable National Broadcasting Co., 86 F.3d 858, 861 (9th
Cir. 1996) (finding that the defendants had 'so saturate[d] the market with promotion
of [their] trademark that consumers come to believe that the infringer, rather than the
plaintiff, is the source of the trademarked product."). See also Dreamwerks Production
Group, Inc. v. SKG Studio, d/b/a DreamWorks SKG, 142 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir.
1998).
'81 Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right to Invoke, 44 B.C. L. REV. 291 (2003).282 See, e.g., Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Streeter, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1717 (T.T.A.B. 1987) (holding that while "Corn Patch Pigs" for toy stuffed
animals may call to mind "Cabbage Patch Kids," there is no likelihood of confusion).
283 See supra Part III.
24 V Secret, 537 U.S. at 433.
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consumer surveys will not be necessary if actual dilution can
reliably be proven through circumstantial evidence," noting
that the "obvious case" where dilution might be established by
circumstantial evidence is where the plaintiffs and defendant's
marks are identical." This is exactly the kind of case Judge
Posner was describing with his "Tiffany" examples: Because his
example involved the same brand used in different contexts,
the use of circumstantial evidence would be consistent with the
Supreme Court dicta. Whereas some lower courts appear to be
adopting a stricter approach to evidentiary requirements for
dilution in the light of V Secret,' for others it seems to be
business as usual.28
When conclusions about the impact of a contested mark
on consumers' minds are drawn from judicial analysis of
various "factors,"" any distinction between uses of trademarks
that cause a defendant's mark to "come to mind" and those that
"displace" the plaintiffs mark may prove somewhat illusory, at
least in some cases." Accordingly, in a practical sense, there
'85 Id. at 434. But see Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1893
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (rejecting this reading of V Secret and requiring actual confusion even
where marks are identical).
2S6 See, e.g., Voice-Tel Enterprises, Inc. v. JOBA, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1353
(N.D. Ga. 2003).
287 See, e.g., Nike Inc. v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (S.D.
Ga. 2003) (finding dilution based on the identity or near identity of the trademarks);
Pinehurst, Inc. v. Wick, 256 F. Supp. 2d 424, 432 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (finding actual
dilution where defendant used plaintiffs marks in its domain name because a customer
using the internet "will be unable to discern any appreciable difference" between the
defendant's domain name and the plaintiffs mark); Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts
B.V. v. Consorcio Barr S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Nasdaq Stock
Market, Inc. v. Antartica, S.R.L., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1718 (T.T.A.B. 2003)
(discussing and applying the actual dilution standard in an opposition proceeding). But
compare Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1893 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(requiring actual dilution, even where marks are identical).
'8 The factors courts use to structure their analysis in dilution cases differ
from those used in likelihood of confusion cases. In Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.,
191 F.3d 208, 217-22 (2d Cir. 1999), the court articulated a list of 10 factors to establish
dilution: (1) the degree of distinctiveness of the senior user's mark; (2) the similarity of
the marks; (3) the proximity of the products and likelihood of bridging the gap; (4)
interrelationship among the distinctiveness of the senior mark, the similarity of the
junior mark, and the proximity of the products; (5) shared consumers and geographic
limitations (this factor looks to the overlap between consumers of the two goods or
services); (6) sophistication of consumers; (7) actual confusion; (8) adjectival or
referential quality of the junior use; (9) harm to the junior user and delay by the senior
user; and (10) effect of senior's prior laxity in protecting the mark (this factor looks to
the senior user's failure to protect the mark from dilution by third parties).
289 This point is further underscored by the fact that preliminary injunctions
are available in trademark dilution doctrine cases, an issue to which Justice Kennedy
adverted in his V Secret concurrence:
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may in a number of instances be little difference between the
approach in Ty Inc., and the facially stricter approach
articulated in V Secret.
Implicit in Judge Posner's approach is the idea that
consumers care that they must think harder - that they suffer
detriment, for instance, when they are forced to hold two or
more different meanings of "Tiffany" in their heads." If
dilution imposes an imagination "cost," it follows that the
ordinarily prudent consumer is somebody who prefers to have
her imagination unburdened by conflicting messages about
brands. But this is not necessarily so, or even more likely so.
Close to the surface of Judge Posner's analysis is a normative
preference: His conception of "harm" privileges one (assumed)
consumer response above others. Plausibly, to have a "Tiffany"
strip joint or greasy-spoon diner come to mind when thinking
about the jewelry store might, for some people, be more fun
than costly. The appeal that such associations have to their
ludic sensibilities, for instance, may amply compensate for
having to think a little harder to keep the jewelry brand "clear"
in their minds.
Diminishment of the famous mark's capacity can be shown by the probable
consequences flowing from use or adoption of the competing mark. This
analysis is confirmed by the statutory authorization to obtain injunctive
relief. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2). The essential role of injunctive relief is to
"prevent future wrong, although no right has yet been violated." Equity
principles encourage those who are injured to assert their rights promptly. A
holder of a famous mark threatened with diminishment of the mark's
capacity to serve its purpose should not be forced to wait until the damage is
done and the distinctiveness of the mark has been eroded.
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 435-36 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(internal citation omitted). The availability of interim relief in trademark dilution cases
suggests that, in some cases courts must draw a (hardly robust) distinction between
action by the defendant that will probably cause the defendant's mark to be called to
mind when apprehending the plaintiffs mark (no basis for judicial intervention) and
action by the defendant that will probably displace the plaintiffs mark when thinking
about the plaintiffs mark (a basis for judicial intervention).
290 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd, 604 F.2d 200(2d Cir. 1979), which concerned the use of the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleader marks and
trade dress in a pornographic movie, shows a court in a similarly protective mode.
Finding trademark infringement to be established, the court observed that "[t]he
uniform depicted in 'Debbie Does Dallas' unquestionably brings to mind the Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders. Indeed, it is hard to believe that anyone who had seen
defendants' sexually depraved film could ever thereafter disassociate it from plaintiffs
cheerleaders."Id. at 205. Once again, the legal harm is that consumers might have two
conflicting images when they are confronted by the plaintiffs mark. One implication
that follows is that consumers need to be protected against having to differentiate
between these two meanings of "Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders" - one presumably
wholesome, the other apparently not.
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The implications for constructing the consumer
worldview are largely the same even if trademark dilution is
rationalized as a benefit to firms rather than consumers.
Indeed, most courts, including the Supreme Court in V Secret,"
consider trademark dilution to be about protecting trademark
proprietors rather than consumers." Trademark dilution
doctrine is premised on the idea that trademark proprietors are
entitled to have consumers' minds relatively clear of conflicting
messages about the meaning of a particular brand. If a
trademark proprietor has managed to shape the consumer
worldview through its advertising and promotional efforts so
that consumers are convinced that "Tiffany means diamonds
only" (and/or whatever other meanings Tiffany has taught us to
associate with its brand), it is entitled to keep consumers'
minds that way. That is, trademark dilution doctrine wants the
ordinarily prudent consumer's response to the "Tiffany"
trademark to be singular, well-trained, undiscriminating,
automatic, and unthinking.
2. Initial Interest Confusion
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp.," a
leading case on initial interest confusion, the Second Circuit
enjoined the use by an oil trader of the trade name "Pegasus
Petroleum" because it infringed Mobil's trademark rights in a
"flying horse" symbol. It did this even though no one would be
confused into buying wholesale oil from the wrong party. The
defendant, which was in the business of wholesale oil trading,
used the "Pegasus" name on letterhead and when soliciting
telephone business. In a letter to between four and five
hundred potential customers in the oil business, the defendant
stated that its business was part of the "Callimanoulos group of
companies," and used an interlocking "P" as a logo. It made no
express representation that it was associated with Mobil Oil.
The Second Circuit endorsed the district court's concern that
"potential customers would be misled into an initial interest in
Pegasus Petroleum," and that such initial interest "works a
2 V Secret, 537 U.S. at 429 ("Unlike traditional infringement law, the
prohibitions against trademark dilution are not the product of common-law
development, and are not motivated by an interest in protecting consumers.").
22 See, e.g., Enterprises Rent-A-Car Co. v. Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc., 330
F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 453-54 (4th Cir. 1999).
23 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987).
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sufficient trademark injury."" According to the Second Circuit,
legally cognizable harm occurs when a telephone call is
accepted, for example, even though the recipient quickly
realizes that she is talking to someone with whom she does not
wish to speak.
Conventionally, "the law provides that confusion is
unlikely if the products or services at issue are complex and
expensive, the purchaser highly sophisticated, and the
purchase process one that is lengthy and requires close
attention and analysis by the purchasers,"9 a characterization
that would seem applicable to the kinds of transactions at issue
in Pegasus Petroleum: Few purchases of wholesale oil are likely
to occur by mistake. However, the doctrine of initial interest
confusion largely overrides the significance of this truism. In
initial interest cases, a legal harm is consummated even before
consumers are given the opportunity to engage in the kind of
close attention and analysis that would avoid a mistaken
purchase."' By rendering unlawful messages that risk giving
the junior user "credibility during the early stages of a
transaction, " "' initial interest liability suppresses messages
about trademarks that conflict with the interests of trademark
proprietors. The interest that trademark proprietors have in
prohibiting this kind of commercial activity is obvious: If a
consumer decides to transact anyway, even knowing that the
defendant's mark does not stand for the trademark proprietor,
the trademark proprietor may lose a sale. As the Fifth Circuit
has noted, the consumer may "possibly bar the senior user from
consideration.., once the confusion is dissipated.298
But if the confusion has dissipated, the consumer is
never confused into buying the wrong thing. Indeed, so long as
the consumer is not confused, the result of the defendant's
294 Id. at 260.
295 Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d
427, 460 (D.N.J. 2000) (citations omitted).
29 Initial interest confusion has been invoked by plaintiffs seeking relief
under the Lanham Act for other parties' use of their marks as metatags. See, e.g., Niton
Corp. v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D. Mass. 1998)(holding that direct copying of plaintiffs metatags and HTML code constituted
trademark infringement). But compare Wells Fargo v. WhenUcom, Inc., 293 F. Supp.
2d 734, (E.D. Mich. 2003) (emphasizing that mere use of another's trademark as a
metatag is not infringement under the Lanham Act absent likelihood of confusion).
297 Elvis Presley Enterprises Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 204 (5th Cir. 1998)('Once in the door, the confusion has succeeded because some patrons may stay,
despite realizing that the bar has no relationship with [plaintiff].").
298 See id.
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action may be to give the consumer greater purchasing choice.
From the consumer's perspective, it may very well be the "right
thing," based on information that distinguishes the object of
the purchase from goods or services purveyed under the
proprietor's trademark. The paradox of initial interest liability
is that it involves analysis of whether consumers would be
confused,2" yet the doctrine is only required because there is no
confusion at the point of purchase. As a result, initial interest
confusion doctrine obliterates the relevance of quite a lot of
meaningful thinking by ordinarily prudent consumers.
Initial interest confusion is not entrenched in all
circuits.3 ' But where it is, the doctrine establishes that a legal
harm occurs when a consumer's hand reaches for the "wrong"
product from a supermarket shelf, a harm that cannot be
undone even if the consumer realizes the mistake and returns
the misperceived product before making any purchase. Initial
interest doctrine thus accords trademark proprietors a right to
our unthinking responses to brands, without regard for the
effect of later thought upon those initial responses. Trademark
proprietors' rights, it seems, extend to control over that series
of learned responses to brands that begins with the consumers'
recognition of the brand and ends with the purchase of the
product."1
C. Licensing Assumptions - Promotional Goods
Protections afforded to trademark proprietors in the
promotional goods context provide further insights into the
characteristics of trademark law's ordinarily prudent
299 The Pegasus Oil court, for example, analyses the trademark infringement
issue by applying the Polaroid "factors." See supra note 185.
300 The position in the First Circuit appears to be unclear, for instance. See,
e.g., Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 232 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2000) (endorsing the
district court's "refusal to enter the 'initial interest thicket'"). A district court in the
First Circuit has observed that initial interest confusion is "not cognizable" under the
First Circuit's trademark law. Northern Light Tech., Inc. v. Northern Lights Club, 97
F. Supp. 2d 96, 113 (D. Mass. 2000), affd on other grounds, 236 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2001).
But see EMC Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 59 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150 (D. Mass. 1999)
(declining to accept the argument that the initial interest confusion is not part of the
First Circuit's trademark law). The Sixth Circuit also seems to be ambivalent,
particularly in the Internet context. See, e.g., Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770
(6th Cir. 2003). As is discussed infra Part V.B., there seems to be a (welcome) trend to
accord web surfers greater acuity than was perhaps the case in the past.
301 As is noted below, however, initial interest is less readily found,
particularly in the Internet context, where the defendant and plaintiff do not market
similar goods. See infra Part V.C.
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consumer. These cases show how trademark law's consumer is
somebody who has learned to assume that promotional goods
require sponsorship, even if this means that consumers end up
paying the "information cost" 2 when all they might want are
the promotional goods themselves, regardless of their
provenance. 303
A key conceptual problem with the use of trademarks
for promotional goods is that the trademarks on promotional
goods frequently do not serve as badges of origin of goods or
services. Some consumers simply want to wear something with
the logo of their favorite sports team: They don't necessarily
care whether the item is officially sponsored." ' That some
consumers do believe that promotional goods need to be
sponsored has, however, been established by some consumer
surveys00  According to Professor McCarthy, this helps
establish the legal basis for trademark protection: "[Ihf
consumers think that approval is needed for the use of a
trademark on certain goods, then approval via a license is
required.""0 However, this may be a dubious line of inquiry
because it requires consumers to have formed a view about
what is essentially a matter of legal analysis. 7 There is thus a
302 See supra Part IV.B.
303 Compare Arsenal Football Club plc v. Reed, 2 C.M.L.R. (C.A. 2003) (citing
2002 Eu L.R. 806 (E.C.J.), available at 2002 WL 31712). In Arsenal, the European
Court of Justice reasoned that, where the defendant used the Arsenal football club's
trademarks on promotional goods accompanied by a disclaimer of any association with
the club, "[tihere is a clear possibility ... that some consumers, in particular if they
come across the goods after they have been sold by [the defendant] and taken away
from the stall where the [disclaimer] notice appears, may interpret the sign as
designating Arsenal... as the undertaking of origin of the goods." Id.
304 The facts of a recent case before the European Court of Justice areillustrative. Arsenal Football Club plc v. Reed, 2 C.M.L.R. (C.A. 2003). Arsenal involved
unofficial promotional goods for the Arsenal football team. These goods apparently
sold, notwithstanding a sign disclaiming any official affiliation with the famous football
club.
305 See National Football League v. Governor of Delaware, 435 F. Supp. 1372(D. Del. 1977). In this case, which involved a state lottery based on football games, the
Judge said the following of a consumer survey: "Apparently, in this day and age when
professional sports teams franchise pendants, teeshirts, helmets, drinking glasses and
a wide range of other products, a substantial number of people believe, if not told
otherwise, that one cannot conduct an enterprise of this kind without NFL approval."
Id. at 1381.
306 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 59, §§ 23.8, 24.9.
30' The theoretical difficulty most often identified with these cases is that
trademark doctrine assumes the consumer to know the answer to a critical legal
question: whether or not the use of the trademark needs to be licensed. See, e.g., Pebble
Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 1998). This has not, however,
deterred some courts from imposing liability. See id.; Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v.
Metropolitan Baltimore Football Club, 34 F.3d 410 (7th Cir.1994). Other courts have
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large measure of analytical circularity in Professor McCarthy's
observation.
Recognizing the circularity problem, some courts have
articulated legal presumptions that favor finding liability
where defendants use others' marks in a promotional goods
context. In the light of problems with ascertaining actual
consumers' views about the (legal) need for sponsorship, the
doctrinal position effectively sidesteps the task of ascertaining
those views. The First Circuit's approach seems largely to
remove consumers' actual responses from the analysis
altogether, articulating the test as follows: "Given the
undisputed facts that (1) defendants intentionally referred to
the Boston Marathon on its shirts, and (2) purchasers were
likely to buy the shirts precisely because of that reference, we
think it fair to presume that purchasers are likely to be
confused about the shirt's source or sponsorship.""' The Fifth
Circuit articulates the test in these terms: "The confusion or
deceit requirement . . . is met by the fact that the defendant
duplicated the protected trademarks and sold them to the
public knowing that the public would identify them as being
the teams' trademarks. The certain knowledge of the buyer
taken a more critical view. See, e.g., Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Sed Non
Olet Denarius, Ltd., 817 F. Supp. 1103, 1122-23 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (rejecting a survey for
asking the leading question, "Do you believe that [the defendant] had to get
authorization, that is, permission to use the name . . . ?"), vacated pursuant to
settlement, 859 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). Professor McCarthy succinctly captures,
but does not appear to be concerned with, the circularity in this analysis: "[1It is
consumer perception that creates 'the law' of whether permission is needed .... And it
is likelihood of confusion that creates 'the law' that requires permission for a given use
of a mark." MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 59, § 24.9. One logical difficulty
with relying on consumers' assumptions as to the legal need for "official" endorsement
is that it requires consumers to have only a partial understanding of the (legal) need
for sponsorship. The question remains: Why are consumers assumed to know about the
need for sponsorship and not any countervailing principles or policies, such as the need
to ensure that according trademark rights does not usurp copyright policies? See, e.g.,
Comedy III Prods. Inc. v. New Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2000).
308 Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 34 (1st Cir. 1989). Similar
kinds of presumptions have been adopted by other courts. See, e.g., Perfect Fit Indus.,
Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 618 F.2d 950, 954 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that when there is
intentional copying of a product's trade dress, "the second comer will be presumed to
have intended to create a confusing similarity of appearance and will be presumed to
have succeeded") (citations omitted); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 852, 857 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (holding that defendant's use of
plaintiffs mark "Jaws" on a trash compactor, "with an intent to capitalize on the
plaintiff['s] mark permits the court to draw the strong inference of likelihood of
confusion"). But compare Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 791 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1981) (stating, in contrast to Universal City Studios, that "in order to raise the
inference of a likelihood of confusion, a plaintiff must show that the defendant intended
to profit by confusing consumers") (emphasis in original).
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that the source and origin of the trademark symbols were in
plaintiffs satisfies the requirement of the act." 9
Suppressed in this analysis, however, is how consumers
gain this "certain" knowledge. The "ordinarily prudent
consumer" in promotional goods cases appears to be somebody
who has learned one of the key lessons trademark proprietors
seek to instill, which is, to invoke Professor McCarthy's
analysis again, that any use of the mark requires a license.
That consumers "know" this of course significantly bolsters the
property rights subsisting in promotional trademarks."'
The consumer, as constructed in promotional goods
cases, thinks relatively little for herself - or, at least, her
thinking is exactly in line with the aspirations trademark
proprietors have for their brands. There is of course an
important normative preference for one set of consumers over
others that is close to the surface of these neutrally-expressed
"presumptions." As a result, the ordinarily prudent consumer
gets constructed as somebody who is concerned with whether
goods are officially sponsored, and not as somebody who values
the brand for its affiliative symbolism alone."' It is not prudent,
apparently, for consumers to want promotional goods simply
for their own sake, and possibly to pay cheaper prices, with
little concern with the actual origin of the goods."'
309 Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc.,510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
310 Recent amendments to the Lanham Act preclude courts from considering
source motivation in trademark infringement cases.
31 Cf Arsenal Football Club Plc v. Matthew Reed, 2001 R.P.C. 46 (Ch.)(Laddie, J.). Holding that the use of the Arsenal trademarks was not "trademark use,"Justice Laddie reasoned that the marks "would be perceived as a badge of ...
affiliation to those to whom they are directed. They would not be perceived asindicating trade origin." On appeal, the Court of Justice of the European Communities,34 I.I.C. 542 (2003), disagreed with Justice Laddie and came to a different conclusion.
312 Doubtless, some important marking interests are served by insisting thatpromotional goods be officially sponsored, as reflected, for instance, in the assumption
that proprietors of sports team brands or trademark proprietors engaged in trademarklicensing police the quality of the goods and services to which the brands are attached.On the other hand, the quality of most promotional goods - t-shirts, scarves, drink-bottles, beer can sleeves, lunchboxes and the like - is usually obvious at the point ofpurchase. Both those consumers who regard the use of a trademark as a badge of
affiliation and those who regard it as a badge of origin would, in many instances, be
able to establish quite quickly whether the goods are of sufficient quality to merit
purchasing at the price asked.
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D. Protecting Prestige - Post-Sale Confusion
The value that consumers accord to prestige brands is
enormously important to firms, as it enables them to charge
premium prices for goods well above their marginal cost.
313 The
post-sale impression of goods may be critical to a brand's
success. Indeed, what "friends and family" think of our
purchases may be particularly important to the goodwill that
firms build up in their brands. Some research into the sources
of consumer desires suggests that among the most powerful
stimulators of desire to purchase goods are the goods friends
and family have already purchased.314  If so, trademark
proprietors are likely to be vigilant about protecting the
meanings accorded to brands in this context by invoking
doctrines such as "post-sale" confusion. Adding to the concern
to protect the impressions of goods gained by friends and
family viewing these purchases is the fact that these
impressions are harder won today, a result of the increased
privacy of the American home."'
Post-sale confusion doctrine316 is an adaptation of
trademark doctrine that protects the "value" that has been
built up in the mark. The infringement claim reflects the
reality that consumers often regard trademarks as valuable
items in their own right. 7 In a leading case, the Second Circuit
313 See note 91 (discussing Angela Chao and Juliet B. Schor study on the
prestige value of, and premiums paid for, goods used in public).
314 See SCHOR, OVERSPENT AMERICAN, supra note 3, at 69 (citing Susan
Fournier & Michael Guiry, A Look into the World of Consumption Dreams, Fantasies,
and Aspirations, (Research Report, University of Florida, Dec. 1991)).
315 See generally HALLE, supra note 119.
316 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 59, § 23.7. The expansion of the
kinds of confusion that is actionable in part occurred as a result of Amendments to the
Lanham Act in 1962, which struck out the requirement of confusion, mistake or
decision of "purchasers as to the source of origin of such goods and services." Lanham
Act, § 32(1), 15 U.S.C.A § 1114, at Historical and Statutory Notes (2000) (amended
Pub. L. No. 87-772, 76 Stat. 769 (1962)). Courts have held that this amendment
supports the conclusion that trademark infringement may be found even when
consumers are themselves not confused. See, e.g., Insty*Bit, Inc. v. Poly-Tech Indus.,
Inc., 95 F.3d 663 (8th Cir. 1996); Marathon Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite Prods Corp., 767 F.2d
214 (5th Cir. 1985); Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le
Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 832
(1955); Checkpoint Systems, Inc. v. Checkpoint Software Technologies, Inc., 269 F.3d
270 (3d Cir. 2001); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 631 F. Supp.
735 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd., 799 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1986).
317 Plasticolor Molded Prods. v. Ford Motor Co., 713 F. Supp. 1329, 1332
(observing that in promotional goods cases, trademarks "have effectively become goods
in their own right"). For further elaboration on this point, see Alex Kozinski, supra
note 10, at 962; Litman, Breakfast with Batman, supra note 48; Dreyfuss, Expressive
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reasoned that the copying of the distinctive appearance of an
expensive clock is trademark infringement, even when the
design was not protected by a design patent or other
intellectual property right."8 It rationalized the decision on the
basis that anyone, other than the purchaser, who saw the
cheaper electric version of the clock might think that it was the
original prestige product. Professor McCarthy characterizes the
"damage" to the senior user in such cases as the risk that
"consumers could acquire the prestige value of the senior user's
product by buying the copier's cheap imitation,"39 concluding
that "the senior user suffers a loss of sales diverted to thejunior user, the same as if the actual buyer were confused."3 2
Some courts have even rationalized "post-sale
confusion" as a harm to the purchaser of the original prestige
product. Referring to the proliferation of "knockoff' versions of
prestigious goods, the Second Circuit observed:
The creation of confusion in the post-sale context can be harmful in
that if there are too many knockoffs in the market, sales of the
originals may decline because the public is fearful that what they are
purchasing may not be an original . ... [Tihe purchaser of an
original is harmed by the widespread existence of knockoffs because
the high value of originals, which derives in part from their scarcity,
is lessened."'
Here, the purpose of trademark law is not to help consumersfind goods, but rather to help consumers maintain the value of
their goods.32
The Second Circuit's analysis suggests that the
consumer worldview that trademark law protects is one that
appreciates trademarks for the prestige they garner, rather
Genericity, supra note 48, at 397. These doctrines contrast markedly with earlier
formulations of the relevant law adopting the rule that a trademark must be something
other than, and separate from, the merchandise to which it is applied. See, e.g., Davis
v. Davis, 27 F. 490, 492 (D. Mass. 1886).
318 Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co., 221 F.2d at 466.
319 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 59, § 23.7.
320 Id. The flaw in this analysis, of course, is that characterizing post-sale
confusion as equivalent to point of sale confusion on the basis that the two have the
same effect on the trademark proprietor begs the very question at issue. Bothlegitimate and illegitimate forms of competition can have the same effect on the
targeted firm, but coincidence of effects does not necessarily render the legal
significance of the former equivalent to that of the latter.
321 Hermes Intern. v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Avenue, Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 108
(2d Cir. 2000).
322 The analysis echoes the invective on luxury by John Rae in 1834: "The
general consumption of any commodity by the vulgar lessens .. .in many minds, the
pleasure it would otherwise give." RAE, supra note 91, at 249.
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than the information as to the source of products that they
provide. Through the doctrine of post-sale confusion,
trademark law is engaged in protecting that worldview - and a
large measure of snobbery - by preventing firms from
promulgating messages that conflict with what "ordinarily
prudent consumers" believe or value about brands, even if this
means that cheaper substitutable goods might not be available.
Again, these doctrinal positions reveal normative preferences.
The ordinarily prudent consumer is a brand snob - and
trademark law provides doctrinal support to the proprietors of
prestige brands who want to keep him that way.
V. RE-IMAGINING TRADEMARK'S CONSUMER
In summary, a range of different factors comprise
trademark law's underlying theory of the consumer. First, the
empiricism of modern trademark law is incomplete; given the
costs of information production and the exigencies of litigation,
this is probably inevitable. And when survey evidence is used,
it is only ever a proxy for evidence about the actual responses
of consumers. Second, courts' assessment of consumer
responses is produced by a combination of different doctrinal
concerns and a number of vague standards and judicial
speculations that are structured by analyzing mostly
circumstantial evidence under the various factors. These
characteristics of trademark law provide significant scope for
the generation of normative assumptions about what
consumers are like and what they value. Third, a number of
important strands of trademark doctrine disclose that an
"ordinarily prudent consumer" is someone who gets confused
relatively easily, does not want to think very hard, and readily
internalizes the messages trademark proprietors seek to
convey about promotional and prestige goods.
This Part offers a more aspirational vision of trademark
law's consumer than that offered by the current
jurisprudence.32 The alternative construction of the consumer
presented here draws first on the history of consumerism in the
United States and then on ideas about consumers that appear
in modern marketing literature. From these sources one can
distil a picture of American consumers whose purchasing
323 Cf JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 14 (1999) ("[a] normative
theory of law and politics needs an aspirational quality").
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activities manifest self-determination, agency, and careful
deliberation. Importantly, by drawing on these two sources to
"reconstruct" the consumer, I am not suggesting, as an
empirical matter, that this is what "real" consumers are "like."
There are many examples of consumers behaving quite
irrationally, 2"' in accordance with some of the doctrinal
positions discussed above. Given the range of factors identified
above that shape trademark law, trademark law's knowledge of
the "ordinarily prudent consumer" can only ever be incomplete,
partly apprehended by empirical evidence and partly
determined by normative construction. Legal norms emerge
from cultural processes and bear the marks of history,
prejudices, superstitions, and common sense,32 among many
other things. The "reconstructed consumer" explored here is
offered as a source of ideas that legal actors might draw on
when expressing their own sense of what trademark law's
consumer might be like. My suggestion in this Part is that
trademark law's understanding of the consumer is sometimes
much less rational than consumers have been throughout
history, and perhaps ironically, trademark law's consumer is
also far less astute than she is often portrayed in marketing
literature.
Of course, pursuing these ideas inevitably means
hitching doctrinal preferences to one of many competing visions
for the "good life."26 Valorizing qualities such as rationality,
freedom of choice, and self-awareness has attracted compelling
critiques that characterize the liberal legal subject as
"mythical" because of his very rationality.327 While I believe that
324 Behavior of this kind is discussed in KASSER, supra note 110; see also
ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: WHY MONEY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN ERA OF EXCESS3-9 (1999). For a somewhat more benign interpretation, see TWITCHELL, supra note 68.
325 See JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE VOICE AND
THE LAw 12 (1991).
326 The approach I advocate here necessarily involves a kind of "elaboration of
virtues" from which true conceptions of human nature might be discovered. See
generally Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern /Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133U. PA. L. REV. 291, 314 (1985). This inevitably provokes anxiety as to whether it is
possible to identify such conceptions, and how one goes about doing so. See, e.g.,Martha Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian
Essentialism, 20 POL. THEORY 202, 222 (1992) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Human
Functioning]. Included in Professor Nussbaum's list of 'basic human functional
capabilities" is "[bieing able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical
reflection about the planning of one's own life." Id. at 222. This is an attribute that
modern trademark law seems reluctant to ascribe to ordinarily prudent consumers.
327 KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & ROSANNE KENNEDY, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY:
READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 7 (1991)
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the vision of the consumer explored here is preferable to that
underlying much of modern trademark law, I am not going to
essay a thoroughly theorized justification for that position.
Important work justifying the kind of perspective I am
advocating has, however, been undertaken by theorists such as
Martha Nussbaum, who have derived their vision of the good
life in part from Aristotelian ideas about human nature."'
8
Instead, the principal purpose of this Part is to suggest that
characterizing the consumer as rational and discriminating, as
an agent in the processes of communication with firms that are
mediated by brands, is as plausible as the characteristics that
modern trademark law often accords to the ordinarily prudent
consumer. Moreover, one of the ironies of trademark doctrine is
that it fashions its consumer as somebody who fails to exhibit
the "virtue" of rationality quite a lot of the time, even though,
as we have seen, the principal justification for trademark
rights focuses on the efficient functioning of markets, itself
assumed to be produced by the conglomeration of sovereign
consumers' rational choices." Instead of resisting whatever
affronts marketing strategies make to consumer rationality,
trademark doctrine constructs the "ordinarily prudent
consumer" as someone who dutifully and passively internalizes
their messages. As much as anyone, those who fully endorse
"rational actor" theories as foundational principles in
trademark jurisprudence should be concerned about the
characteristics modern trademark law assumes consumers
exhibit.
32s Nussbaum, Human Functioning, supra note 326. For exploration of these
ideas in the context of intellectual property law, see William W. Fisher III,
Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1746 n.364 (1988)
(examining the relevance of Aristotelian notions of the good life in the context of
copyright's fair use doctrine).
329 See supra Part II.C.1. In his recent book, The High Price of Materialism,
Professor Tim Kasser argues that materialism and autonomy are antonymic. He
describes psychological studies indicating that people who exhibit materialistic values
devalue "freedom-oriented" values such as participation in governmental decision-
making and freedom of expression, and argues that the difference may be due to the
fact that materialism and autonomy represent fundamentally different motivational
systems that are responsible for driving behavior. In Professor Kasser's analysis,
materialism derives from a motivational system concerned with rewards and praise,
whereas autonomy and self-expression derive from a motivational system concerned
with expression of interest, enjoyment, and challenge, and of doing things for their own
sake. KASSER, supra note 110, at 75-76.
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A. Politicized Consumption
When urging the public to go shopping after the
September 11 terrorist attacks,33 ° the Bush administration
invoked a long tradition of connecting the consumption of goods
and services with politics."' History reveals many examples of
Americans acting in consumer marketplaces with acute
awareness of the political implications of their actions. Initially
at least, the American Revolution centered on the concerns of
consumers,332 beginning as a consumer boycott of British
goods. 3 But in this aspect, the Revolutionary Era was not
unique: The history of American marketplace activity includes
many examples of specifically targeted consumption choices
that linked purchasing power with political causes.
In the nineteenth century, American workers organized
boycotts of specific goods in an effort to secure shorter working
hours. ' In the Progressive Era, housewives in some local
communities bolstered the efforts of reformers by successfully
boycotting merchants to bring down prices."O In the 1930s, a
second consumer movement was one of the "countervailing
330 Glenn Kessler, Riding to the Economy's Rescue: In Days After Attacks,
Bush Team Bent Rules to Stabilize System, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2001, at El.
331 See generally COHEN, supra note 50.
332 See T.H. Breen, Narrative of Commercial Life: Consumption, Ideology, andCommunity on the Eve of the American Revolution, 50 WM. & MARY Q. (3rd Ser.) 471,
486 (1993) ("No previous popular rebellion had organized itself so centrally around the
consumer."). From the mid-eighteenth century onwards, American colonists saw
themselves in a complex commercial relationship with Great Britain, within aframework of a rapidly expanding consumer marketplace, supplied increasingly withimported luxury items from British merchants. The resistance to the British
Parliament's attempts to tax its colonies was an early, and radical, example of
consumer resistance. Consumption of, and decisions not to consume, imported goods
was a source of political empowerment that created a community of shared, and
uniquely egalitarian, commercial and political interests. Consumer resistance toimported good politicized private economic choice for individuals from many more
sectors of colonial society than were included in formal politics. In Professor T.H.Breen's analysis, liberal market ideology in the colonial period proved capable ofproducing and sustaining "interpretive communities," mobilizing ordinary men and
women, linking the exercise of purchasing power with the common good. Importantly,
as Breen recounts, the ideological aspects of commercial life were not lost on consumersin the pre-Revolutionary era: the boycott movements represented deliberate, carefully
orchestrated manifestations of the "civic virtue" of personal restraint in consumer
markets. See id.
333 MONROE FRIEDMAN, CONSUMER BOYCOTTS: EFFECTING CHANGE THROUGHTHE MARKETPLACE AND THE MEDIA 3-4 (1999).
33 COHEN, supra note 50, at 21. Much of the following discussion draws onProfessor Cohen's important recent work tracking the rise of the notion of the
"consumer citizen."
335 COHEN, supra note 50, at 21-22.
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powers"" spawned by the Great Depression, and a number of
government agencies institutionalized consumer interests."
Ordinary consumers became much more self-conscious about
their identities and interests as consumers"a and organized into
a number of grassroots movements directed at promoting these
interests. Through this period, consumers' leagues and
unionists continued to enlist consumers in their battles to
improve workers' conditions."'
During the New Deal Era, women were particularly
influential in the consumer movement. Throughout the 1930s
consumer organizations mobilized on a national level, inspiring
thousands of American women to join together to safeguard not
only their families' interests, but also in an effort to safeguard
American society more generally through the political exercise
of purchasing power. For example, urging women shoppers to
"Use Your Buying Power for Justice," the National League of
Women Shoppers Inc., supported striking workers by
boycotting their employers' goods, lending crucial purchasing
power to strikers' causes." In some instances, by protesting
against rising food prices, consumer organizations forced retail
businesses to close down.3
Also important in the New Deal Era were connections
between good citizenship and consumption. Policymakers came
to see increased consumer spending as critical to economic
33 See generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE
CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER (1952) (identifying as a lasting impact of the
New Deal Era its implementation of "countervailing powers" or "counterorganizations"
of weaker interests to balance more powerful economic interests).
33' Politicians also directed their attention to consumers. In his 1932
campaign, Franklin Roosevelt foreshadowed "a fundamental change in our popular
economic thought," anticipating that "in the future, we are going to think less about the
producer and more about the consumer." Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Address at
Oglethorpe University (May 22 1932), available at Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt
Institute, http://www.feri.org/archives/speeches/may22
3 2
.cfm. In 1929, John Dewey
and economist Paul Douglas had formed their own political party, the League for
Independent Political Action, centered on the interests of the consumer. See COHEN,
supra note 50, at 27. Though Dewey and Douglas's party did not receive much
widespread political support, their writings during this period helped draw attention to
the coincidence of interests between citizens as consumers and as voting citizens in a
democracy. Id. See, e.g., John Dewey, The Need for a New Party, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
March 18, 1931, at 115.
3,3 COHEN, supra note 50 at 31.
339 Id. at 23.
340 Id. at 35.
3" Id. at 37. As with the importation boycotts in the Colonial Era, the
consumer boycott movement through the 1930s succeeded in cutting across locale,
ethnic and class barriers. Id. at 37.
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recovery. The political implications of spending were
persistently emphasized: At the micro-level, individual
consumption choices were the exercise of political power. In
addition, New Dealers came to understand revived capitalism
as a means to achieve the survival of democracy and liberal
equality. Consumer spending provided a bulwark against the
external threats of communism and fascism.2
The Second World War further galvanized the
"consumer as citizen" ideal 34 ' During this time, women's
organizations meticulously scrutinized merchants' actions
through local "Consumer Interest Communities." 34' The price
hikes that followed the end of the war provoked a succession of
consumer protests through the remainder of the 1940s. Buying
strikes were a persistent feature of the post-war economy, as
consumers sought by their protest actions to discipline
producers and retailers from further increasing prices.5 In the
postwar era, a range of diverse economic interests coalesced
around the idea that mass consumption was essential to a
successful conversion from war to peacetime. In the media, the
connections between individuals' consumer choices and good
citizenship were persistently driven home. 6
342 Id. at 55.
343 A contemporary account of the importance of consumer movements to the
war effort was provided by New Deal economist Caroline Ware. CAROLINE F. WARE,
THE CONSUMER GOES TO WAR: A GUIDE TO VICTORY ON THE HOME FRONT (1942). See
also Meg Jacobs, 'Democracy's Third Estate': New Deal Politics and the Construction of
a 'Consuming Public,' 55 INT'L LABOR & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 27 (1999). The Office of
Price Administration and Civilian Supply (OPA) was established in 1941, and it came
to oversee price controls on over nine thousand commodities. One of the initiatives of
the OPA (subsequently thwarted through political pressure) was to grade branded
canned goods "A" "B" and "C", to assist consumers with price and value comparisons.
COHEN, supra note 50, at 69.
344 These were formed, often under the aegis of the OPA, which encouraged
women at the local level to insist on compliance with OPA price regulations. The OPA
issued "Anti-Inflation Shopping Lists" - forms which enabled consumers to minutely
compare merchants' price tags with the ceiling prices set by the OPA. The OPA
spawned a vast new bureaucracy that reached into every locale, propelling women into
new levels of political influence.
35 COHEN, supra note 50, at 105. One of the most dramatic protests was the
national boycott of meat purchasing that occurred in 1948.
346 At the macro-level, the burgeoning U.S. economy also served as a bulwark
against the threat of communism. Throughout the Cold War Era private corporations
and non profit organizations produced films for public consumption extolling the
benefits of consumption, characterizing them as the "American Way of Life," and
contrasting these values, and American economic success with "Soviet
impoverishment." See COHEN, supra note 50, at 124-25. One of the best-known
exemplars of this kind of politicization of consumption came with the "kitchen" debate
between then Vice President Nixon and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev at the
American Exhibition in Moscow in 1959. Nixon characterized the displays of American
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For African-Americans, the Civil Rights Era was not the
first moment of "consumer politics." Prior to the Civil War, free
Africans boycotted slave-owning merchants." During the 1930s
African-American consumer activism reached unprecedented
levels, responding to Jim Crow laws in the South by boycotting
streetcars and refusing to shop where business refused to
employ African-Americans. ' Political activists linked black
purchasing power to social and political advancement, and the
development of a "separate black economy" as key to African-
Americans' prosperity." Disciplined consumer action, through
boycotts and sit-ins, was of course among the many protest
strategies 35 that launched the civil rights struggles of the
1960s, leading eventually to the federal Civil Rights Act of
1964.3°
Professor Lizbeth Cohen characterizes the new political
commitment to the rights of the consumer ushered in by
President John F. Kennedy as a "third-wave consumer
movement." 2 It had a number of successes, including the
enactment of a substantial number of consumer protection
consumer abundance - new appliances, cars, homes - as exemplars of "what freedom
means to us." See generally KARAL ANN MARLING, AS SEEN ON TV: THE VISUAL
CULTURE OF EVERYDAY LIFE IN THE 1950S, at 243-83 (1994).
347 COHEN, supra note 50, at 55 (citing statement by Caroline Ware).
3 The "Don't Buy Where You Can't Work" campaigns resulted in agreements
by the Woolworth's chain that a quarter of their staff in stores in African-American
neighborhoods would be African-American. Chains such as Sears, Roebuck, A & P, and
Walgreens Drugs began to welcome African-American customers with signs in their
windows reading "We Employ Colored Salesmen." COHEN, supra note 50, at 44 (citing
ST. CLAIR DRAKE & HORACE R. CLAYTON, BLACK METROPOLIS: A STUDY OF NEGRO LIFE
IN A NORTHERN CITY (1935)). An important chapter in the legal history of the boycott
movement included the U.S. Supreme Court decision in New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary
Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938), which based its decision to uphold the right of
African-Americans to picket businesses on the fact that African-Americans suffered
employment discrimination due to their race. The protest signs mentioned by the Court
read: "Do your Part! Buy Where You Can Work! No Negroes Employed Here!"
349 COHEN, supra note 50, at 43.
350 Some historians characterize the emphasis on protest action in consumer
marketplaces as indicative of struggles within African-American organizations. One of
the most well-known accounts of the civil rights struggle quotes a Harpers Magazine
article of 1960 characterizing the student sit-in movement as sending a signal to
NAACP leadership that African-American elites were no longer in control of the protest
movement. JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIL RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-
1965, at 136 (1987).
3 Recent historical work is drawing attention to the amount of protests that
occurred in commercial spaces prior to the more well-known events of the early 1960s.
See Robin D. G. Kelly, We are Not What We Seem: Rethinking Black Working-Class
Opposition in the Jim Crow South, 1993 J. AM. HIST. 75. See also GRACE ELIZABETH
HALE, MAKING WHITENESS: THE CULTURE OF SEGREGATION IN THE SOUTH, 1890-1940,
at 121-97 (1998).
352 COHEN, supra note 50, at 346.
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measures."3 There was also a grassroots consumer movement,
spurred on by consumers' declining confidence through the
1960s and 1970s in products, services, retailers, and
advertisers, and by a desire for better regulation and
legislation to protect consumers' interests." Consumers'
interest groups, such as the Consumers' Federation of America,
coordinated a grassroots explosion of consumer activism across
the United States, campaigning for better inspection of weights
and measures, more honest advertising of specials, and
boycotts of specific brands and specific supermarket chains."'
Although the intensity of politicized consumerism
waned in the years of the Reagan administration, there have
been occasional instances of brand-focused consumer activism
in more recent years. Sometimes, these have been more
"underground" in nature, such as the email campaigns amongst
gay men and lesbians aimed at encouraging a boycott against
the Domino's Pizza brand because of allegations of antagonism
towards homosexuals by its CEO. The same brand was also
targeted by the pro-choice movement. The "McLibel" trial,
involving consumer resistance towards the McDonald's
hamburger chain, is an example of a grassroots protest whose
impact, measured in terms of getting its message across about
the business practices of McDonald's, was significant."' Other
instances have been more mainstream, such as the 1980s
boycott against firms promoting infant formula in the third
world as a (sometimes deadly) status symbol," and consumers'
protests against clothing manufacturers using sweat shops to
produce their goods."
353 See COHEN, supra note 50, at 360 (listing enactments).
354 E.B. Weiss, Does Consumerism Show Signs of Giving Up the Ghost? Not
Quite, AMERICAN ADVERTISER, Apr. 30, 1973, at 52, cited in COHEN, supra note 50, at
520, n.41.
315 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 333, at 76-84 (tracing the history of
supermarket and commodity boycotts in the 1960s and 70s).
35 Duncan Campbell, Pizza Fortune Builds Student Stairway To Salvation:
Dislike Of Liberal Catholic Universities Prompts Domino's Founder To Plan Campus
Serving Up A Diet Of Conservatism, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON), Feb. 11, 2003, at 14.
357 See Greenpeace (London), Factsheet, What's Wrong with McDonald's
(1986), cited in KLEIN, supra note 107, at 465 n.15, available at
http://www.mcspotlight.org/case/pretrial/factsheet.html.
35 See Robert Reinhold, Furor Over Baby Formulas 
- Where, When, and How,N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1981, § 4, at 9; Philip J. Hilts, 612-Year Boycott of Nestle is Ended
as Firm Adopts Baby-Formula Code, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1984, at Al.
3"9 See KLEIN, supra note 107, at 347-48. In the late 1990s, the National Labor
Committee was particularly astute in using targeted brands as a vehicle for getting
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At the same time, the politicization of consumption can
be seen in anti-consumer movements, including, most recently,
in the rejection of branded products as a protest against some
consumers' sense that large corporations wield too much power
over their worldviews.s But there is also a more benign kind of
politicized consumption, where brands are hitched to high
profile causes, as occurs, for instance, with corporate
endorsement of breast cancer fundraising.36" ' Another famous
instance of the politicization of branding is the success of the
brands promoted by actor Paul Newman, the profits from
which are donated to charities."
B. Consumer Competencies
In a range of different contexts, then, we see in this
brief - and partial - history of American consumerism, "real"
consumers acting in ways that are quite different from the
somewhat unthinking, acquisitive "ordinarily prudent
consumer" who peoples trademark cases. Somewhat ironically,
strands of modern marketing theory also understand the
consumer as exhibiting far greater agency than she is often
accorded by trademark jurisprudence.
The early triumph of branding occurred around the turn
of the twentieth century, as brands changed the relationship
between retailer and customer.' Prior to this time, the
customer's key relationship was with the retailer, from whom
they bought household goods from unmarked barrels and vats
in small grocery or general stores.3" Through the latter decades
across its anti-sweatshop message. See Steven Greenhouse, A Crusader Makes
Celebrities Tremble, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1996, at B4.
30 See QUART, supra note 11, at 189-201; KALLE LASN, CULTURE JAM: How TO
REVERSE AMERICA'S SUICIDAL CONSUMER BINGE - AND WHY WE MUST (2000). Lasn's
work discusses various strategies for resisting consumer culture, including "chain
reactions of refusal," such as "buy nothing days," and counter-branding strategies, such
as "culture jamming," the promulgation of deliberately targeted counter messages
about brands, through activities characterized as "Meme warfare." Adbusters is a high
profile group of "meme warriors," who use brands against themselves, excavating the
subtext of branded messages and using them to generate new meanings about the
brands and the products they represent. See id. at 129-36.
36' See, e.g, BON APPETIT, Sept. 2003, at 73 (printing advertisements linking
KitchenAid, Gevalia and WeddingChannel.com brands to the Susan G. Komen Breast
Cancer Foundation's "Cook for the Cure" campaign).
32 Jon Gertner, Newman's Own: Two Friends and a Canoe Paddle, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2003, § 3, at 4.
36 See STRASSER, supra note 50, at 29-57.
3 id.
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of the nineteenth century, powerful national brands arose, such
as Nabisco, Quaker Oats, and Colgate, accompanied by
advertising strategies that encouraged consumers to purchase
these products "by name.""' Gradually, the role of the
storekeeper in mediating consumer preferences abated, and
customers came to have a more direct relationship with the
distant manufacturer of branded products.' Anyone who has
been asked by a checkout operator whether a particular brand
is good will have witnessed the passivity of the retailer's role in
the processes of consumption: In this situation, the customer
and the checkout operator alike are acting like consumers.3"
Advertising expenditures aimed at national brands have
achieved enormous customer recognition. In 1909, an executive
for a soap company lamented that Ivory was almost one
hundred percent "embedded in the broad American mind."3u
The language is revealing: Displacing the "embedded" brand is
part of the mischief against which dilution doctrine is meant to
guard. It also bespeaks the passive role of the consumer:
Consumers are the object in the relationship with the brand
and the manufacturer, which echoes the ideas about consumer
responses we have seen informing much trademark doctrine."
This understanding of the customer as a firm's passive
audience endured until about the end of the twentieth
century. Some marketing commentators observe that the
golden age of the brand is now over."1 A number of factors
account for its passing: customers experience the media as
fragmented;... the continuing rise of a "culture of entitlement,"
which makes consumers much more demanding about what
they want from retailers and manufacturers,373 and makes
"' Id. at 204.
366 Id.
37 STRASSER, supra note 50, at 287.
3w The Ivory Soap Dent, PRINTERS INK, Mar. 17, 1909, at 20, cited in
STRASSER, supra note 50, at 57.
369 See supra Part IV.
370 Prahalad & Ramaswamy, supra note 12, at 80.
371 See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 67, at 92; Prahalad & Ramaswamy, supra note
12, at 80.
372 See Boyle, supra note 67 (reporting that while in 1995 it took three TV
commercials to reach 80% of the 18-49-year-old women, today it takes 97
advertisements to reach the same group); see also John Brady & Ian Davis, Marketing's
Midlife Crisis, MCKINSEY Q., Spring, 1993, at 17 (noting the role of mass media in
building trust between customers and brands); DEBORAH KANIA, BRANDING.COM 35-37
(2001).
173 See generally Diane Brady, Why Service Stinks, BUS. WEEK, OCT. 23, 2000
118.
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relationship branding more difficult to achieve;... and, of course,
the Internet.7
Ours may be the "post-mass-media era,"3 M6 as Professors
Erich Joachimsthaler and David Aaker have characterized it.
Symptoms of these changes include the reassertion of aspects
of the retailer/customer relationship that became so attenuated
in branding's golden age. For example, we are witnessing a rise
in the power of the private brand, which is now aggressively
competing with and sometimes displacing its national
counterpart.3 ' In addition, marketing professionals are coming
to understand the relationship between producer and customer
as far more individualized and far less coercive than in the
past.7 In part, this is due to the manner in which the Internet
facilitates the individual tailoring of retail services to customer
demandsY.3 9 This is not to suggest that firms are no longer
interested in building brand loyalty in the online context: On
the contrary, customer loyalty continues to be a prevalent
concern in marketing literature.' However, today's task is far
more complex as a result of consumers' increasing agency in
the process.8'
The key marketing implication flowing from the
personalization of the consumer is enhanced customization.
Marketing gurus gush about firms' ability to forge one-to-one
relationships with individual customers, one at a time."s One
314 Dillard B. Tinsley, Relationship Marketing's Strategic Array, 45 BUS.
HORIZONS, Jan/Feb 2002, at 70.
375 See generally KANIA, supra note 372; see also James Lardner, Your Every
Command: Consumers Are Getting the 'One-to-One Treatment', U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., July 5, 1999, at 44; Alastain Ray, Internet-Personalisation is Vital for Response,
MARKETING, May 29, 2003, at 27.
376 Erich Joachimsthaler & David A. Aaker, Building Brands Without Mass
Media, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.IFeb. 1997, at 39.
377 See Boyle, supra note 67.
378 See Dignam, supra note 12.
379 See KANIA, supra note -372, at 230-34 (discussing "personalized branding"
in the on-line context); Lardner, supra note 375 (discussing on-demand retailing
strategies); Dignam, supra note 12 (examining the increasing brand literacy following
two way communication facilitated by Internet retailing); See Pierre Berthon et al.,
Brand Management Prognostications: New Technologies and Emerging Market Trends,
Including a Shift In Power to Retailers, Are Converging to Alter Traditional Branding
and Brand Management, 40 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 53 (1999) (discussing information
efficiencies that flow to consumers from on-line transactions).
m See Pamela Paul, Sell It to the Psyche, TIME, 62, Sept. 15, 2003, at A2;
Tinsley, supra note 374.
8 Personalisation is Vital for Response, MARKETING, May 29, 2003, at 27.
32 See generally DON PEPPERS &MARTHA ROGERS, THE ONE TO ONE FUTURE:
BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS ONE CUSTOMER AT A TIME (1997).
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commentator has noted the similarity between these kinds of
relationships and those between store-keepers and individual
customers around one hundred years ago." Corporations such
as Dell Computers and Hewlett Packard were trail-blazers and
the trend has spread to a diverse range of product segments:
Land's End custom tailoring, customized "Friends of Barbie,"
customized airline sites, and customized news delivery
services.' Marketing theorists also draw on the insights of
postmodernism to describe the relationship between the
consumer and advertising as an active one, with consumers as
an active and participating audience. These theorists see the
meaning of an advertisement as itself a "constructed" process.3'
Professors C.K. Prahalad and Venkatram Ramaswamy
suggest that firms should recognize the increasing customer
"competence" that has arisen as a result of technological and
marketing changes, as a strategic asset.' They argue that the
intellectual capital of a firm includes knowledge of suppliers,
and that firms should also try to capture the knowledge
generated by customers in a market that "has become a forum
in which consumers play an active role in creating and
competing for value.""7 They conceive of a firm's competencies
as including the company, its suppliers, its partners, and its
customers, and urge that firms need to harness customer
competence by continuing to manage the kinds of personalized
retail experiences that the Internet facilitates." Prahalad and
Ramaswamy advise that firms should start conceiving of their
customers as co-equals, actively engaged in producing valuable
information for the firm,"8 rather than as passive recipients of
firms' marketing messages. Progressive Internet companies
such as Amazon.com and Netflix" already conceive of the
383 Lardner, supra note 375.
3"4 Lardner, supra note 375.
3W Elliott & Wattanasuwan, supra note 90, at 136, 137 (arguing that
"advertising literacy is not only the skill to be able to understand and transfer the
meanings from an advertisement, but also the ability to use those meanings within the
social context of existence").
386 Prahalad & Ramaswamay, supra note 12.
3"' Id. at 80. See also PATRICK H. SULLIVAN, VALUE-DRIVEN INTELLECTUAL
CAPITAL: HOW TO CONVERT INTANGIBLE CORPORATE ASSETS INTO MARKET VALUE 57-58
(2000).
3w8 Prahalad & Ramawamay, supra note 12, at 81-82
389 Id. at 81.
390 See generally Nicholas Thompson, Netflix Uses Speed to Fend Off Wal-
Mart Challenge, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2003, at CI (discussing the Netflix business
model and comparing it with that adopted by Amazon.com).
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customer as an interlocutor; these firms learn from the
"information" consumers generate through "click trails," which
feeds back into developing greater customization of the retail
experience.39" '
Of course, there are numerous variables in this
endeavor, including the type of product at issue and the
consumers who are attracted to them." For present purposes,
however, what is important is that the characteristics of the
consumer underlying these ideas is quite different from those
of the "ordinarily prudent consumer" in trademark doctrine.
Just as American consumers have, since the colonial period,
recognized the close connection between politics and
consumption, these new perspectives on consumer behavior see
consumers as far more actively engaged in the processes of
consumption and production than was once thought.
C. Implications
These different perspectives on consumer behavior are
sources for developing ideas about what trademark law's
ordinarily prudent consumer might be like. It is vital to
reemphasize, however, that the picture of the consumer that
emerges from the historical literature on consumption and
from marketing literature cannot claim to be an exact portrait
of "real" consumers. The perspective is necessarily limited.
Recall that all that politicized consumption occurred during the
golden age of brands, when firms probably achieved quite a
large measure of passive, unthinking responses to branded
products. And even in the Internet era, consumers exhibit a
range of very different responses to marketing campaigns.93
Moreover, some branding strategists in the online context
continue to aspire to "etch" brands on the consumer
consciousness." If they do nothing else, these perspectives
underscore the arbitrariness of the characteristics that
391 Prahalad & Ramawamay, supra note 12, at 82.
392 Microsoft's ability to persuade thousands of customers to try out beta
versions of software, becoming, in a sense, the software product's co-developers, is
unlikely to be duplicated by many firms, for instance. See id. at 81.
393 See, e.g., ISABELLE SZMIGIN, UNDERSTANDING THE CONSUMER 133-50
(2003) (discussing a wide range of different manifestations of consumer behavior); see
also CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY 57-58 (1999) (discussing how awareness of different attributes of
consumers might prompt flexibility in designs of graphical user interfaces, pricing
structures, etc.).
"4 See, e.g., Tedeschi, supra note 11.
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trademark law often ascribes to ordinarily prudent consumers.
Nonetheless, disaggregating fact from assumption, and
acknowledging that there may be differences between
individual consumers, and also their potential for greater
agency in the consumer/firm relationship, might encourage
legal actors to begin questioning the normative character of the
consumer they conjure through the development of trademark
doctrine.
One implication of greater awareness of the constructed
character of trademark's consumer might be to insist on
greater use of survey evidence."5 As part of an increased
emphasis on empirical evidence of consumer responses, greater
use might be made in trademark cases of the insights of
cognitive science. As noted above," from a constantly
developing understanding of human cognition, we are coming
to recognize mental processes as inherently imaginative and
interactive but also inherently grounded in "embodied" mental
processes. For instance, cognitive scientists tell us that the
resources of the brain that are available to us as we make
innumerable decisions in the marketplace and elsewhere are
limited; hence the interest of some scholars in the "heuristics"
of decision making."7 These kinds of insights may be relevant to
trademark law's understanding of consumers' susceptibility to
confusion by a defendant's use of a contested brand."9 As
Professors Kysar and Hansen have suggested in their work on
perceptions of risk in the products liability context, " control
over the framing of information may be particularly relevant to
the formulation and manipulation of consumer decision
making."
395 For a recent example of a court declining to find liability absent
appropriate survey evidence, see Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp.
2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 2003). One issue in this case was whether consumers would be
confused by the use of "pop up" advertisements that appeared in new windows on web
surfers' browsers when they accessed particular websites. The types of advertisements
were determined by an algorithm that analyzed web-browsing habits. The district
court was not prepared to assume, absent appropriate survey evidence, that consumers
would be confused by the appearance of the advertisements. Id. at 765.
39 See discussion supra note 147 and accompanying text.
397 See generally Gregory Mitchell, Why Law And Economics' Perfect
Rationality Should Not Be Traded For Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal
Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
3" See WINTER, supra note 41.
39 Hansen & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously, supra note 146.
400 See, e.g., id. at 724-42 (discussing the inevitability of firms' taking
advantage of manipulation of consumer perceptions in competitive markets). It is
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Second, particular care should be taken in developing
doctrine that results in limiting consumers' access to
information that might inform purchasing decisions. The
suggestion that dilution doctrine is a legal wrong because
thinking is an "imagination burden" is one example. Careful
reading of V Secret suggests that its analysis largely comports
with this idea of what "harm" means in the dilution context. If
dilution doctrine is to endure, and there is every likelihood that
it will,' "' courts should insist that plaintiffs produce actual
evidence of displacement of one mark by another, even when
the contested marks are identical, and not rely on
circumstantial evidence that can too easily base liability on
defendants' uses of marks that "call to mind" the plaintiffs
mark. °2
Initial interest confusion provides a particularly
egregious example of trademark doctrine limiting consumers'
access to information. Encouragingly, however, there have been
some limitations of this doctrine in the Internet context.
Initial interest confusion has also been curtailed where there is
no connection between the goods offered by the defendant and
the senior user.'0 This may not go far enough, however.
Genuine choice exists when consumers can learn
simultaneously that a product is similar to products previously
enjoyed (or heard about), but is not the same product. Because
brands are becoming more parts of products themselves, 5
possible, of course, that an increased reliance on empirical evidence about consumer
responses will distil a picture of the consumer that has more in common with the
"susceptible" consumer than the "sovereign" consumer. As the discussion of genericism
and functionality, supra Part III.C., indicates, however, it is possible that trademark
doctrine may develop in ways that render the actual responses of consumers less
relevant in some contexts.
401 See, e.g., Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1893 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (holding as not very likely harm from consumers being "diverted" as a result of
initial interest confusion); Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (same).
See also Playboy Enterprizes v. Netscape Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1034-36 (9th Cir. 2001)
(Berzon, J., concurring) (criticizing the broad scope of initial interest confusion in
earlier iterations of the doctrine in the Ninth Circuit). See discussion supra Part
IV.B.2.
402 See supra Part IV.B.1.
403 See, e.g., Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 776 (6th Cir. 2003)
(characterizing as "irrelevant" whether consumers are confused as to the source of
websites, "unless there is confusion as to the origin of the respective products").
404 See, e.g., The Network Network v. C.B.S., Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1150
(C.D. Cal. 2000): "Unlikely indeed is the hapless Internet searcher who, unable to find
information on the schedule of upcoming NASCAR broadcasts or "Dukes of Hazzard"
reruns, decides to give up and purchase a computer network maintenance seminar
instead." Id. at *30.
405 See supra Part II.B.
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relevant points of comparison might need to encompass the
trademarks themselves. That is, if trademark material -
marks, packaging, character merchandising material, etc. - is
part of the value customers ascribe to goods and services,
opportunities for proper comparison may need to include, and
tolerate, non-confusing uses that draw customers attention to
those similarities. We should not therefore too readily assume
that it is a burden for consumers to make these comparisons.
Third, more rigorous analysis of assumptions about
consumers' acuity might be encouraged. The survey of
consumers in history and in recent marketing literature
suggests that they are often quite astute. In the Internet
context, there are indications that some courts are constructing
the consumer as more discriminating than in past cases.
Sometimes, it seems, the ordinarily prudent consumer is not
particularly naive about the operation of the Web, and, has at
least learned that where the same name is used by different
businesses, any one of them might have secured the domain
name. 7 Similarly, the level of acuity some courts require of
consumers in their interactions with Web search engines
provides another example of a more optimistic vision of
trademark's ordinarily prudent consumer. Often, without the
aid of empirical evidence, courts are assuming that consumers
know that firms pay for rankings produced by search engines.
The subjection of search engine algorithms to commercial
imperatives now seems to be something that ordinarily prudent
consumers should understand."8
401 See id.
401 In Interstellar Starship Servs. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936 (9th. Cir. 2002),
the Ninth Circuit consumer expectations arising from different kinds of domain names.
It reasoned that "Consumers expect that owners of famous, fanciful trademarks will
own the corresponding domain name, like www.XEROX.com or www.KODAKcom... "
On the other hand, consumers "would not be shocked to find an apple grower at
www.apple.com (although Apple Computer actually owns that domain name), or
United Van Lines at www.united.com (although United Airlines happens to own that
domain name). Id. at 944-45. Elaborating on the latter point, the Court observed,
"[although a consumer might incorrectly guess that United Van Lines would be found
at www.untied.com . . . , such an erroneous guess does not generally amount to a
likelihood of initial interest confusion." Id. at 945 (citation and internal quotation and
citation omitted). See also GoTo.Com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th
Cir. 2000).
In Epix, the Ninth Circuit also noted that "search engine algorithms
incorporate corporate dollars into their formulae" and that "[flirms can pay the search
engines in return for primarily placement..." 304 F.3d at 945 n.10. Accordingly, the
court found the results produced by search engines "largely irrelevant" and observed
that its "initial interest confusion analysis does not depend on a given business's
payment or lack thereof to the various search engines." But compare DeVry/Becker
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A fourth implication of the analysis above might be to
encourage greater scrutiny of the kinds of values that are
ascribed to consumers and that are marshaled in support of
liability theories. As we have seen, post-sale confusion
constructs the consumer as someone who fetishizes prestige
brands, who has dutifully absorbed the "because you're worth
it" messages of branding strategies. The ordinarily prudent
consumer peopling post-sale confusion cases finds it hard to
live with the idea that "other people can have one too." A more
rigorous analysis of whether consumers actually feel this way,
combined with a deeper questioning of whether the law should
be solicitous of this worldview in the formulation of trademark
doctrine, might illuminate this area of law better than the
traditional approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
Professor Patricia Williams describes how by the early
1990s students regarded delivery of an L.L. Bean jacket
without the label as a fundamental breach of contract, the
opposite of the response prompted by the hypothetical when
she first started teaching." Williams fears that "masque [will]
become the basis of our bargains," and that "reordering social
relations in favor of the luxurious" will create "new standards
of irrelevance in our lives." ' In these passages, Williams hints
at something that we might describe as the imagination burden
imposed by prestigious brands, and the doctrines that protect
them beyond traditional trademark infringement. Professor
Tim Kasser has closely analyzed the relevant psychological
literature on the relationship between psychological well-being
and materialism. He has also conducted his own laboratory
experiments aimed at exploring this relationship. Kasser
concludes that the "one simple fact" that stands out across
these studies is that "people who strongly value the pursuit of
wealth and possessions report lower psychological well-being
Educational Development Corp. v. Totaltape, Inc., No. 00-C-3523, 2002 WL 99743, at
*2-3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2002) (defendant enjoined from use of mark "in connection with
the retrieval of data or information (including the use of such terms as a keyword or
keywords in pay-for-placement or pay-for-rank search engines").
409 PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 39 (1991).
410 WILLIAMS, supra note 409, at 40. For a seminal exploration of similar
ideas, see JOHN RAE, supra note 91, at 245 app. 1 (Macmillan ed., 1905) (reprint The
New Principles of Political Economy (1834)).
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than those who are less concerned with such aims."' 1
Nevertheless, trademark doctrine privileges those consumers
who are concerned with the prestige value of their goods over
those who care somewhat less, or not at all. As Kasser's
research suggests, the latter group, of whom trademark law
seems somewhat less solicitous, may actually be healthier.41
Smarter, more self-critical, more engaged, less
mesmerized consumers are less likely to be easily confused.
Accordingly, re-imagining the consumer in this way should
lead to a curtailment of the scope of trademark rights,
something numerous distinguished commentators have long
been urging. ' For the most part, however, debates about the
scope of trademark law have focused on broad theoretical or
policy issues, such as consistency with the purposes of
trademark rights, whether they enhance or thwart
fundamental premises of liberal capitalism, and so on - issues
that are unlikely to be resolved anytime soon."' Of course, the
approach I advocate here - more rigorous scrutiny of the way
in which the law constructs the ordinarily prudent consumer -
does not avoid difficult issues of theory and policy. Analyzing
the construction of the "legal person," whatever the
circumstances, can seldom avoid tapping issues relating to the
legal system's aspirations for and promulgation of values
associated with such things as good citizenship, self-
actualization, full personhood - and, in commercial contexts,
fully engaged participation in markets and in consumer society.
But focusing on the characteristics of consumers in trademark
law to a large extent side-steps these broader policy and theory
issues. This is because the "ordinarily prudent consumer" is
already a key part of trademark doctrine. In the workaday
world of trademark litigation, legal actors already engage in
the continuing process of shaping the ordinarily prudent
consumer's attributes and characteristics: sometimes expressly,
411 KASSER, supra 110, at 5.
... Societal health may also be at stake. Sociologist, Professor Robert D.
Putnam has documented the decline in levels of civil engagement in the United States,
reflected in decreasing participation in community organizations (Putnam uses the
metaphor of the lone bowler to capture this sense of social disengagement). As
Putnam's research attests to the "crowding out" of other meaningful activity by
materialistic values. ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL
OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
4" Lunney, Monopolies, supra note 12. Lemley, supra note 45; Dreyfuss,
Express Genericity, supra note 48; Dinwoodie, Rational Limits, supra note 47; Litman,
Batman, supra note 48; Brown, supra note 45.
414 See supra Part II.
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as they generate assumptions about consumers' acuity;
sometimes implicitly, as they continue the process of
developing and refining trademark law.
Greater awareness of the processes informing and the
assumptions underlying this key part of trademark doctrine
may enhance this important branch of U.S. commercial law.
But pressing this point further, however, and suggesting that
the consumer might be "re-imagined" as more astute, more
discriminating, and more self-aware might strike many as
excessively paternalistic to the extent that the analysis
privileges certain attributes over others."' As the discussion in
this Article indicates, however, legal actors are already making
normative choices about the attributes of consumers. Hence,
any normativity in this endeavor is probably unavoidable. But
before we ascribe characteristics to consumers in ways that
usually bolster the rights of trademark proprietors, we should
at least require trademark proprietors to establish a firm
evidentiary foundation, using survey evidence if available.
However, due to the numerous doctrinal and policy factors that
affect the scope of trademark rights,' the results of surveys
cannot dictate the results of cases. Moreover, survey evidence
is very often not available. Courts are likely to continue to
construct "ordinarily prudent consumers," shaping the
characteristics they ascribe to them out of assumptions,
general observations, truisms, prejudices, and hunches.
Awareness of how trademark law assembles ordinarily
prudent consumers might encourage us to "reconstruct" them
as individuals who are better equipped to make all the choices
a vibrant consumer marketplace offers. So long as trademark
law continues to refer to consumers in its various liability
theories, it might not be a bad thing if, at least in the absence
of empirical evidence to the contrary, the "ordinarily prudent
consumer" who peoples trademark cases were thought of as
somebody who tends to be rational and discriminating: less like
the George Wilsons of this world, with imaginations less
burdened by brands.
415 See generally TWITCHELL, supra note 68. For an exploration of these ideas
in the copyright context, see Fisher, supra note 328, at 1762-66.
416 See supra Part II.C.
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